Maintaining Security and Trust in Large Scale Public Key Infrastructures by Braun, Johannes
Maintaining Security and Trust in Large
Scale Public Key Infrastructures
Vom Fachbereich Informatik der
Technischen Universita¨t Darmstadt genehmigte
Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Grades
Doktor-Ingenieur (Dr.-Ing.)
von
Dipl. Wirtsch.-Inform. Johannes Braun
geboren in Herrenberg.
Referenten: Prof. Dr. Johannes Buchmann
Prof. Dr. Max Mu¨hlha¨user
Tag der Einreichung: 16.03.2015
Tag der mu¨ndlichen Pru¨fung: 30.04.2015
Hochschulkennziffer: D 17
Darmstadt 2015

List of Publications
[B1] Johannes Braun. Ubiquitous support of multi path probing: Preventing man
in the middle attacks on Internet communication. IEEE Conference on Com-
munications and Network Security (CNS 2014) - Poster Session, pages 510–
511, IEEE Computer Society, 2014. Cited on pages 52 and 173.
[B2] Johannes Braun, Florian Volk, Jiska Classen, Johannes Buchmann, and Max
Mu¨hlha¨user. CA trust management for the Web PKI. Journal of Computer
Security, 22: 913–959, IOS Press, 2014. Cited on pages 9, 66, 89, and 104.
[B3] Johannes Braun, Johannes Buchmann, Ciaran Mullan, and Alex Wiesmaier.
Long term confidentiality: a survey. Designs, Codes and Cryptography, 71(3):
459–478, Springer, 2014. Cited on page 161.
[B4] Johannes Braun and Gregor Rynkowski. The potential of an individ-
ualized set of trusted CAs: Defending against CA failures in the Web
PKI. International Conference on Social Computing (SocialCom) - PAS-
SAT 2013, pages 600–605, IEEE Computer Society, 2013. Extended version:
http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/275. Cited on pages 9, 32, and 57.
[B5] Johannes Braun, Florian Volk, Johannes Buchmann, and Max Mu¨hlha¨user.
Trust views for the Web PKI. Public Key Infrastructures, Services and Appli-
cations - EuroPKI 2013, vol. 8341 of LNCS, pages 134–151. Springer, 2013.
Cited on pages 9 and 66.
[B6] Johannes Braun, Franziskus Kiefer, and Andreas Hu¨lsing. Revocation & non-
repudiation: When the first destroys the latter. Public Key Infrastructures,
Services and Applications - EuroPKI 2013, vol. 8341 of LNCS, pages 31–46.
Springer, 2013. Cited on pages 9 and 152.
[B7] Johannes Braun, Moritz Horsch, and Andreas Hu¨lsing. Effiziente Umsetzung
des Kettenmodells unter Verwendung vorwa¨rtssicherer Signaturverfahren.
iv List of Publications
Tagungsband zum 13. Deutschen IT-Sicherheitskongress 2013, pages 347–359.
BSI, SecuMedia Verlag, 2013. Cited on pages 9 and 152.
[B8] Andreas Hu¨lsing and Johannes Braun. Langzeitsichere Signaturen durch den
Einsatz hashbasierter Signaturverfahren. Tagungsband zum 13. Deutschen
IT-Sicherheitskongress 2013, pages 565–576. BSI, SecuMedia Verlag, 2013.
Cited on pages 9, 10, and 152.
[B9] Johannes Braun, Alexander Wiesmaier, and Johannes Buchmann. On the
security of encrypted secret sharing. 46th Hawaii International Conference
on Systems Science (HICSS-46), pages 4966–4976. IEEE Computer Society,
2013.
[B10] Johannes Braun, Andreas Hu¨lsing, Alexander Wiesmaier, Martin A. G. Vigil,
and Johannes Buchmann. How to avoid the breakdown of public key in-
frastructures - forward secure signatures for certificate authorities. Public
Key Infrastructures, Services and Applications - EuroPKI 2012, vol. 7868 of
LNCS, pages 53–68. Springer, 2012. Cited on pages 9, 136, and 152.
[B11] Johannes Braun, Moritz Horsch, and Alexander Wiesmaier. iPIN and mTAN
for secure eID applications. 8th International Conference on Information
Security Practice and Experience (ISPEC 2012), vol. 7232 of LNCS, pages
259–276. Springer, 2012. Cited on page 158.
[B12] Johannes Braun and Johannes Buchmann. Perfect confidentiality network
- a solution for information theoretically secure key agreement. 5th IFIP
International Conference on New Technologies, Mobility & Security (NTMS
2012), pages 1–5, IEEE Computer Society, 2012.
[B13] Moritz Horsch, Johannes Braun, Alexander Wiesmaier, Joachim Schaaf, and
Claas Baumo¨ller. Verteilte Dienstnutzung mit dem neuen Personalausweis.
D-A-CH Security 2012. syssec Verlag, 2012.
[B14] Detlef Hu¨hnlein, Dirk Petrautzki, Johannes Schmo¨lz, Tobias Wich, Moritz
Horsch, Thomas Wieland, Jan Eichholz, Alexander Wiesmaier, Johannes
Braun, Florian Feldmann, Simon Potzernheim, Jo¨rg Schwenk, Christian
Kahlo, Andreas Ku¨hne, and Heiko Veit. On the design and implementa-
tion of the Open eCard App. GI SICHERHEIT 2012 Sicherheit - Schutz
und Zuverla¨ssigkeit, vol. P-195 of LNI, pages 95–110. Bonner Ko¨llen Verlag,
2012.
List of Publications v
[B15] Johannes Braun, Andreas Hu¨lsing, and Alexander Wiesmaier. Schlanke In-
frastrukturen fu¨r den digitalen Rechtsverkehr - vorwa¨rtssichere Verfahren fu¨r
qualifizierte elektronische Signaturen. Technical report. TU Darmstadt / IS-
PRAT e.V., 2012.
[B16] Alexander Wiesmaier, Moritz Horsch, Johannes Braun, Franziskus Kiefer,
Detlef Hu¨hnlein, Falko Strenzke, and Johannes Buchmann. An efficient PACE
implementation for mobile devices. 6th ACM Symposium on Information,
Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS 2011), pages 176–185.
ACM, 2011.
[B17] Johannes Braun, Moritz Horsch, Alexander Wiesmaier, and Detlef Hu¨hnlein.
Mobile Authentisierung und Signatur. In Peter Schartner und Ju¨rgen Taeger,
editor, D-A-CH Security 2011, pages 32–43. syssec Verlag, 2011.
[B18] Johannes Braun, Alexander Wiesmaier TU Darmstadt; Eric Klieme, Linda
Strick, and Wolfgang Wunderlich Fokus Fraunhofer. Der elektronische Safe
als vertrauenswu¨rdiger Cloud Service. Technical report. TU Darmstadt /
Fokus Fraunhofer / ISPRAT e.V., 2011.
Patents:
[B19] Alexander Wiesmaier, Johannes Braun, and Moritz Horsch. EP 2639997
(B1) - Method and system for secure access of a first computer to a second
computer. European Patent Office, September 2014. Granted EP Patent 2
639 997.
[B20] Claas Baumo¨ller, Joachim Schaaf, Moritz Horsch, Alexander Wiesmaier and
Johannes Braun. EP 2600270 (A1) - Identification element-based authen-
tication and identification with decentralized service use. European Patent
Office, June 2013. Pending Application EP Patent 2 600 270.

Acknowledgments
My first thanks go to Professor Johannes Buchmann for giving me the possibility
to write this thesis. I thank him for his support and guidance throughout the past
five years and for now giving me the opportunity to take over new and interesting
tasks within the Collaborative Research Center CROSSING.
Next, I want to thank my collaborators and colleagues that provided valuable
comments and helped me to improve this work during many discussions.
Finally, I want to especially thank my family and friends. They supported and
believed in me all the time.
To Angelika Braun, my beloved wife.
Without you by my side, this would not have been possible.

Abstract
In Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs), trusted Certification Authorities (CAs) issue
public key certificates which bind public keys to the identities of their owners. This
enables the authentication of public keys which is a basic prerequisite for the use
of digital signatures and public key encryption. These in turn are enablers for e-
business, e-government and many other applications, because they allow for secure
electronic communication. With the Internet being the primary communication
medium in many areas of economic, social, and political life, the so-called Web
PKI plays a central role. The Web PKI denotes the global PKI which enables the
authentication of the public keys of web servers within the TLS protocol and thus
serves as the basis for secure communications over the Internet.
However, the use of PKIs in practice bears many unsolved problems. Numerous
security incidents in recent years have revealed weaknesses of the Web PKI. Be-
cause of these weaknesses, the security of Internet communication is increasingly
questioned. Central issues are (1) the globally predefined trust in hundreds of CAs
by browsers and operating systems. These CAs are subject to a variety of jurisdic-
tions and differing security policies, while it is sufficient to compromise a single CA
in order to break the security provided by the Web PKI. And (2) the handling of re-
vocation of certificates. Revocation is required to invalidate certificates, e.g., if they
were erroneously issued or the associated private key has been compromised. Only
this can prevent their misuse by attackers. Yet, revocation is only effective if it is
published in a reliable way. This turned out to be a difficult problem in the context
of the Web PKI. Furthermore, the fact that often a great variety of services depends
on a single CA is a serious problem. As a result, it is often almost impossible to
revoke a CA’s certificate. However, this is exactly what is necessary to prevent the
malicious issuance of certificates with the CA’s key if it turns out that a CA is in
fact not trustworthy or the CA’s systems have been compromised.
In this thesis, we therefore turn to the question of how to ensure that the CAs an
Internet user trusts in are actually trustworthy. Based on an in depth analysis of the
Web PKI, we present solutions for the different issues. In this thesis, the feasibility
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and practicality of the presented solutions is of central importance. From the prob-
lem analysis, which includes the evaluation of past security incidents and previous
scientific work on the matter, we derive requirements for a practical solution.
For the solution of problem (1), we introduce user-centric trust management for
the Web PKI. This allows to individually reduce the number of CAs a user trusts in
to a fraction of the original number. This significantly reduces the risk to rely on a
CA, which is actually not trustworthy. The assessment of a CA’s trustworthiness is
user dependent and evidence-based. In addition, the method allows to monitor the
revocation status for the certificates relevant to a user. This solves the first part of
problem (2). Our solution can be realized within the existing infrastructure without
introducing significant overhead or usability issues. Additionally, we present an
extension by online service providers. This enables to share locally collected trust
information with other users and thus, to improve the necessary bootstrapping of
the system. Moreover, an efficient detection mechanism for untrustworthy CAs is
realized.
In regard to the second part of problem (2), we present a CA revocation tolerant
PKI construction based on forward secure signature schemes (FSS). Forward secu-
rity means that even in case of a key compromise, previously generated signatures
can still be trusted. This makes it possible to implement revocation mechanisms
such that CA certificates can be revoked, without compromising the availability of
dependent web services. We describe how the Web PKI can be transitioned to a
CA revocation tolerant PKI taking into account the relevant standards.
The techniques developed in this thesis also enable us to address the related prob-
lem of “non-repudiation” of digital signatures. Non-repudiation is an important se-
curity goal for many e-business and e-government applications. Yet, non-repudiation
is not guaranteed by standard PKIs. Current solutions, which are based on time-
stamps generated by trusted third parties, are inefficient and costly. In this work, we
show how non-repudiation can be made a standard property of PKIs. This makes
time-stamps obsolete.
The techniques presented in this thesis are evaluated in terms of practicality and
performance. This is based on theoretical results as well as on experimental analyses.
Our results show that the proposed methods are superior to previous approaches.
In summary, this thesis presents mechanisms which make the practical use of PKIs
more secure and more efficient and demonstrates the practicability of the presented
techniques.
Zusammenfassung
Public Key Infrastrukturen (PKIs) ermo¨glichen, mittels der Ausstellung von dig-
italen Zertifikaten durch vertrauenswu¨rdige Zertifizierungsautorita¨ten (CAs), die
Authentisierung von o¨ffentlichen Schlu¨sseln. Das ist eine grundlegende Vorauset-
zung fu¨r den Einsatz digitaler Signaturen und Public Key Verschlu¨sselung. Diese
wiederum sind fu¨r eBusiness, eGovernment und andere Anwendungen unabdingbar,
da sie eine sichere elektronische Kommmunikation ermo¨glichen. Mit dem Inter-
net als prima¨rem Kommunikationsmedium in vielen Bereichen des wirtschaftlichen,
sozialen und politischen Lebens kommt somit der sogenannten Web PKI eine zen-
trale Rolle zu. Die Web PKI bezeichnet die globale PKI, welche die Authentisierung
der o¨ffentlichen Schlu¨ssel von Web Servern im Rahmen des TLS Protokolls mo¨glich
macht und damit als Basis fu¨r sichere Kommunikation u¨ber das Internet dient.
Der Einsatz von PKIs ist in der Praxis jedoch mit vielen bisher ungelo¨sten Prob-
lemen verbunden. Zahlreiche Sicherheitsvorfa¨lle in den vergangen Jahren haben
Schwachstellen in der Web PKI sichtbar gemacht und dazu gefu¨hrt, dass die Sicher-
heit der Internetkommunikation zunehmend in Frage gestellt wird. Im Zentrum der
Kritik stehen dabei (1) das global durch Browser und Betriebssysteme vordefinierte
Vertrauen in hunderte von CAs, welche den unterschiedlichsten Rechtssprechungen
als auch Sicherheitsregularien unterliegen. Dabei genu¨gt es eine einzige CA zu kom-
promittieren um die Sicherheit der Internetkommunikation zu unterwandern. Und
(2) der Umgang mit Revokation von Zertifikaten. Revokation wird beno¨tigt um
Zertifikate ungu¨ltig zu erkla¨ren, wenn diese beispielsweise fehlerhaft erstellt wurden
oder der zugeho¨rige private Schlu¨ssel kompromittiert wurde. Nur so kann der Miss-
brauch durch Angreifer verhindert werden. Revokation ist jedoch nur wirksam, wenn
diese auf verla¨ssliche Weise publik gemacht wird, was im Rahmen der Web PKI ein
schwieriges Problem darstellt. Desweiteren ist hier die enorme Abha¨ngigkeit einer
Vielzahl von Services von einzelnen CAs ein schwerwiegendes Problem. Dadurch
ist es ha¨ufig nahezu unmo¨glich das Zertifikat einer CA zu revozieren und damit
zu verhindern, dass mit dem entsprechenden Schlu¨ssel weiterhin gu¨ltige Zertifikate
ausgegeben werden ko¨nnen. Genau das ist jedoch notwendig wenn sich herausstellt,
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dass eine CA tatsa¨chlich nicht vertrauenswu¨rdig ist oder ihre Systeme von einen
Angreifer kompromittiert wurden.
In dieser Arbeit wenden wir uns daher der Fragestellung zu, wie sichergestellt
werden kann, dass die CAs, denen ein Internetnutzer vertraut auch tatsa¨chlich ver-
trauenswu¨rdig sind. Ausgehend von einer detailierten Problemanalyse stellen wir
Lo¨sungsverfahren fu¨r die einzelnen Teilprobleme vor. Dabei ist Umsetzbarkeit und
Praktikabilita¨t von zentraler Bedeutung. Aus der Problemanalyse, welche die Un-
tersuchung bisheriger Sicherheitsvorfa¨lle und bereits existierender Lo¨sungsansa¨tze
beinhaltet, werden Anforderungen fu¨r die Problemlo¨sung abgeleitet.
Zur Lo¨sung von Problem (1) fu¨hren wir nutzerzentriertes Vertrauensmanagement
fu¨r die Web PKI ein. Dies erlaubt es die Anzahl der als vertrauenswu¨rdig betra-
chteten CAs nutzerindividuell auf einen Bruchteil der urspru¨nglichen Menge zu re-
duzieren. Damit wird das Risiko auf eine CA zu vertrauen, die tatsa¨chlich nicht ver-
trauenswu¨rdig ist, signifikant reduziert. Die Beurteilung der Vertrauenswu¨rdigkeit
von CAs erfolgt dabei individuell und evidenzbasiert. Daru¨ber hinaus erlaubt uns
das Verfahren, den Widerrufsstatus der nutzerrelevanten Zertifikate zu u¨berwachen
und somit ein Teilproblem von (2) zu lo¨sen. Die Lo¨sung ist im Rahmen der bestehen-
den Infrastruktur ohne Performanz- oder Nutzbarkeitseinbußen umsetzbar. Desweit-
eren stellen wir eine Erweiterung mittels Online-Diensteanbietern vor. Damit er-
mo¨glichen wir die lokal gesammelten Vertrauensinformationen anderen Nutzern zur
Verfu¨gung zu stellen und damit die notwendige Initialisierung des Systems zu verbes-
sern. Daru¨ber hinaus wird ein effizienter Erkennungsmechanismus fu¨r nicht vertrau-
enswu¨rdige CAs realisiert.
Bezu¨glich des zweiten Teilproblems von (2) stellen wir eine PKI Konstruktion
vor, welche robust gegenu¨ber der Revokation von CA Zertifikaten ist. Dies wird
u¨ber den Einsatz vorwa¨rtssicherer Signaturverfahren erreicht. Vorwa¨rtssicherheit
bedeutet, dass selbst im Falle einer Kompromittierung des privaten Schlu¨ssels, zuvor
erzeugten Signaturen weiterhin vertraut werden kann. Damit la¨sst sich ein Wider-
rufsmechanismus umsetzen, der es erlaubt CA Zertifikate bei Bedarf zu revozieren,
ohne die Erreichbarkeit der abha¨ngigen Web Services zu gefa¨hrden. Wir zeigen, wie
die Web PKI unter Beru¨cksichtigung der relevanten Standards in eine solch robuste
PKI u¨berfu¨hrt werden kann.
Die in dieser Arbeit entwickelten Mechanismen erlauben es uns, zusa¨tzlich das ver-
wandte Problem der Nichtabstreitbarkeit digitaler Signaturen anzugehen. Nichtab-
streitbarkeit ist ein wichtiges Sicherheitsziel fu¨r viele eBusiness und eGovernment
Anwendungen und erfordert im allgemeinen den langfristigen Gu¨ltigkeitserhalt digi-
taler Signaturen. Dies wird von PKIs nicht standardma¨ßig unterstu¨tzt und erfordert
bisher aufwa¨ndige Zusatzmaßnahmen wie Zeitstempel durch vertrauenswu¨rdige Zeit-
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stempeldiensteanbieter. Wir zeigen in dieser Arbeit, wie Nichtabstreitbarkeit als
Standard-Eigenschaft von PKIs etabliert und somit auf Zeitstempel verzichtet wer-
den kann.
Die in dieser Arbeit vorgestellten Verfahren werden im Hinblick auf Praktikabilita¨t
und Performanz evaluiert. Dies basiert zum einen auf theoretischen Resultaten zum
anderen auf experimentellen Ergebnissen und Analysen. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen,
dass die vorgestellten Verfahren bisherigen Lo¨sungsansa¨tzen u¨berlegen sind.
Zusammenfassend stellt diese Arbeit Mechanismen zur Verfu¨gung, welche den
praktische Einsatz von PKIs sicherer und effizienter gestalten und belegt die Prak-
tikabilita¨t der vorgestellten Verfahren.

Contents
Abstract ix
1 Introduction 1
2 Background 9
2.1 Public key cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.1 Hash functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.2 Digital signature schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.3 Public key encryption schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2 Public key infrastructures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2.1 Hierarchical PKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2.2 Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.3 Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.4 Path validation and validity models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.5 Certificate policies and certificate practice statements . . . . . 21
2.2.6 Object identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2.7 Time-stamping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3 Internet communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3.1 DNS and DNSSEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.2 Transport Layer Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4 Computational trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4.1 CertainTrust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4.2 CertainLogic operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.5 Further related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3 The Web PKI requires user-centric CA trust management 31
3.1 The defectiveness of the Web PKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.1.1 Security model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.1.2 Attacker model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
xvi Contents
3.1.3 The Web PKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2 CA failures and compromises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.2.1 Categories of CA security incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.2.2 History of CA security incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2.3 Wrap-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3 State of the art: Concepts for mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3.1 Proposals for the system-centric trust model problem . . . . . 48
3.3.2 Proposals for the provision problem of revocation information 54
3.3.3 Proposals for the too-big-to-fail problem . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.3.4 Wrap-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.4 The Web PKI from a user’s perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.4.1 The user-centric trust model for the Web PKI . . . . . . . . . 56
3.4.2 Web PKI user study - setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.4.3 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.4.4 Discussion of the results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4 CA-TMS: User-centric CA trust management 65
4.1 Trust view and trust validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.1.1 Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.1.2 Modeling trust validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.1.3 The trust view . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.1.4 Initialization of trust assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.1.5 Trust validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.1.6 Trust view update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.1.7 Bootstrapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.1.8 Parameters and system behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.2 Continuous revocation monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.2.1 Functionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.2.2 Advantages of revocation monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.3 Implementation of CA-TMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.3.1 The CA-TMS client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.3.2 The browser plugin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.4 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.4.1 Attacks against CA-TMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.4.2 Attack surface evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.4.3 Performance of CA-TMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Contents xvii
5 Service providers for CA-TMS 103
5.1 Architecture and system model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.2 Reputation system for CA trust management . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.2.1 Functionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.2.2 Trust view selection and trust aggregation . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.2.3 Service provider handover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.2.4 Privacy aware data collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.3 Push service for behavioral changes of CAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.3.1 Report functionality for behavioral changes . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.3.2 Pushing CA warnings to relying entities . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.3.3 Processing CA warnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.4 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.4.1 Attacker model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.4.2 Attacks against CA-TMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.4.3 Reputation system performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.4.4 Push service evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6 CA revocation tolerant PKI 135
6.1 Realizing CA revocation tolerance with forward secure signatures . . 136
6.1.1 The chronological ordering of signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.1.2 Fine grained revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.1.3 Adaptation of the validity model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.2 Implementation in the Web PKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.2.1 FSS and X.509 certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.2.2 Adaptation of revocation mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6.2.3 Adaptation of path validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
6.2.4 Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
6.3 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
6.3.1 eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS) . . . . . . . . . . 144
6.3.2 Practicality of the CA revocation tolerant PKI . . . . . . . . . 145
6.3.3 Comparison to time-stamping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
7 Providing non-repudiation and long term verifiability 151
7.1 Guaranteeing non-repudation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
7.1.1 Non-repudiation – motivation and problems . . . . . . . . . . 152
7.1.2 FSS for end entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
xviii Contents
7.1.3 Adaptation of the validity model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
7.1.4 Sign & Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
7.1.5 Incorporation of compromise detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
7.2 Long term verifiability of end entity signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
7.2.1 Chain model without time limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
7.2.2 Preventing the sudden break down of signature security . . . . 161
7.3 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
7.3.1 The Sign & Report approach provides non-repudiation . . . . 163
7.3.2 Comparison to time-stamping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
7.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
8 Conclusion 171
Appendix 195
1 Introduction
Electronic communication has become an integral part of daily life. In 2015, a
monthly traffic of more than 83 exabyte of data being sent over the Internet will
be reached [178]. The Internet offers a nearly inconceivable mass of applications to
its users such as e-commerce, e-banking, e-government and online social networks
just to name a few. As of mid 2014 more than 3 billion Internet users [135] use the
services provided by more than 1 billion hosts [134] all around the world. Looking
at the different growth rates concerning Internet usage, it is safe to predict that this
is by far not the end.
Because of its importance, Internet communication must be protected. Most
of the applications mentioned above typically involve sensitive data, for example
credit card numbers, medical data or industrial secrets. Security of communication
not only refers to the protection of business assets and monetary values but also
to the protection of the privacy of the communication partners. And at least since
the disclosures of Edward Snowden [124] it is commonly known, that the attackers
which aim at the interception, surveillance and the control of the communication
are not limited to criminals and totalitarian regimes but also comprise intelligence
agencies and other governmental organizations even of democratic countries. In
many cases such attackers have a big budget and far-reaching capabilities to intercept
the communication channels of the Internet.
The protection of the communication requires: authentication, integrity and con-
fidentiality. This means, the communication partners must be sure with whom they
communicate (authentication), that the sent data has not been changed on the way
from the sender to the receiver (integrity) and that no unauthorized third party
can access the communication (confidentiality). Secure Internet communication is
realized using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, which relies on digital
signatures and in many cases public key encryption. Digital signature schemes as
well as public key encryption schemes belong to the field of public key cryptography
and require key pairs: a private key, which is only known to the owner of the key pair
and a public key, which must be provided to any potential communication partner.
2 1 Introduction
In digital signature schemes, the key owner uses the private key to sign messages,
and the public key is used to verify the correctness of the signature. In encryption
schemes, the public key is used to encrypt messages and the private key is used to
decrypt the ciphertexts.
A necessary condition for security of digital signatures and public key encryption
is the possibility of public key authentication, i.e., the assertion to which entity a
public key belongs. Without this possibility, an adversary can sign messages in the
name of any other entity by pretending that his own public key belongs to that en-
tity. Or, in the case of encryption there would be no guarantee, that the entity which
is able to decrypt a ciphertext is actually the entity which is intended to be able to
do this. The problem with authentication is that the communication partners must
authenticate the public keys of each other before they can use digital signatures and
public key encryption for the establishment of secure authenticated and encrypted
communication channels. But, when considering global communication, it must be
assumed that the communication partners have never met in person or communi-
cated through an a priori secure channel which would allow the authentication of
their public keys.
This authentication problem is solved with Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs).
PKIs reduce trust in the authenticity of a public key of an entity to the trust in the
authenticity of a Certification Authority’s (CA’s) public key and the trustworthiness
of this CA. In fact, in PKIs chains of trust reductions that involve several CAs reduce
the trust in the authenticity of a public key to the authenticity of the public key and
the trustworthiness of a Root CA which serves as a trust anchor. CAs are trusted
third parties that issue public key certificates which bind public keys to their owners.
Certificates are electronic documents that contain the public key together with the
key owner’s name and are digitally signed by the CA. By issuing certificates, the CA
guarantees for the authenticity of public keys. Furthermore, CAs are responsible for
the revocation of certificates, which ends the binding between a public key and an
identity established through a formerly issued certificate. Revocation is for example
necessary when the respective private key has been compromised in order to prevent
misuse of the key in the name of the legitimate key owner.
The certificates are used to authenticate the public keys of the communication
partners and subsequently the communication partners themselves. In TLS mainly
unilateral authentication is applied, i.e., only the web servers are authenticated by
certificates.
This raises the important question which CAs are in fact trustworthy to issue
certificates. In recent years, it has repeatedly happened that supposedly trustworthy
CAs issued fraudulent certificates to attackers and showed serious breaches of duty
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servers and intercept private communication of Internet users.
Currently, the decision which CAs are to be considered trustworthy is left to
operating system and browser vendors. Operating systems and browsers contain
root stores: lists of Root CAs which are directly trusted. CAs themselves can
delegate trust to subordinate (Sub) CAs making them trusted by operating systems
and browsers as well. This is done by issuing CA certificates to the Sub CAs. For
technical details on how this is realized we refer the reader to Sections 2.2 and 3.1.3.
The PKI which comprises all these trusted CAs is referred to as the Web PKI.
Currently, the Web PKI consists of approximately 1,590 CAs which are controlled
by 683 private as well as governmental organizations and are located in 57 different
countries [17]. There are several issues why the Web PKI fails to provide the desired
security which we highlight in the following:
• The huge number of CAs together with the fact that the security relies on
the weakest link of the system has disastrous consequences for security: Each
of the CAs is equally trusted. Thus, an attacker controlling a single one of
the CAs may impersonate arbitrary entities. This is especially problematic
because:
– Any CA must be seen as being ultimately fallible, e.g., due to implemen-
tation errors, poor operational practices or human errors.
– There is no globally standardized mechanism that ensures the trustwor-
thiness of CAs.
– Governments, which were identified as potential attackers, have in many
cases control over CAs. Either the CA is being operated by a govern-
mental organization or access may be obtained through jurisdiction of
the country in which the CA resides.
• Revocation of certificates in general and in particular the revocation of CA
certificates is problematic.
– The provision of revocation information to billions of users has shown to
be a particular challenge in the Web PKI. However, if the availability of
revocation information cannot be guaranteed, this may render the whole
revocation mechanism useless.
– CA certificates can often not be (immediately) revoked, although a CA
compromise or CA misbehavior would actually make this step necessary.
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In many cases the authentication of thousands of service providers de-
pends on a single CA. Upon revocation of such a CA’s certificate all these
services would become unavailable. This makes the removal of faulty CAs
problematic if not impossible.
Therefore, the research goal which this thesis addresses is:
To ensure that the CAs which an entity trusts in are actually trustworthy.
Our contribution to achieving this goal will take into account the following critical
success factors imposed by the global scale of the Web PKI:
• Scalability: The solutions must scale to billions of users and services and, at
the same time, must not depend on being implemented globally.
• Usability: In general, the users are non-experts and cannot be expected to
understand the functioning of PKIs.
• Backward compatibility and deployability within the existing infrastructure.
In this work we introduce user-centric CA trust management. It addresses the
research goal by individually reducing the number of trusted CAs. The reduction is
based on evidence of the trustworthiness of CAs. This significantly reduces the risk
to rely on a CA, which is actually not trustworthy. Furthermore, user dependent
data collection allows to continuously monitor the revocation status for certificates
relevant to a user.
Secondly, we present a CA revocation tolerant PKI construction based on forward
secure signature schemes (FSS). The forward security property of FSS maintains
the validity of signatures generated prior to a key compromise. Making use of this
property, revocation mechanisms can be implemented such that the revocation of CA
certificates becomes feasible without being restricted by availability requirements.
We show that these solutions solve the above mentioned issues without introducing
significant overhead.
The techniques developed in this thesis that allow for forward security in PKIs also
enable us to address the security goal “non-repudiation” which is not guaranteed
by standard PKIs. It refers to an entity not being able to deny being the origin
of a certain piece of data. For example, non-repudiation is important in many e-
business and e-government contexts. Non-repudiation requires long term verifiability
of digital signatures. We show how non-repudiation can be made a standard property
of PKIs.
In the following, the contributions are summarized and the organization of this
thesis is presented.
5Contribution and outline
The main contributions of this thesis are:
1. Concept and realization of user-centric CA trust management which enhances
the trustworthiness of CAs in the Web PKI.
2. Techniques that enable the Web PKI to tolerate CA certificate revocation and
provide non-repudiation.
The contributions are divided into several parts as described in the following.
Chapter 2 – Background In this chapter, the relevant background for this thesis
is provided. This includes relevant definitions regarding public key cryptography
and an introduction to hierarchical PKIs. We also provide background on Internet
communication and introduce computational trust. In particular, we present Cer-
tainTrust, the trust model which is used throughout this thesis to represent trust.
Chapter 3 – The Web PKI requires user-centric CA trust management In this
chapter we provide an in depth analysis of the Web PKI and a problem exposition.
The practical relevance of the identified problems is demonstrated based on an
analysis of past security incidents regarding the Web PKI. Also, previous scientific
work as well as practical proposals for the solutions regarding the described problems
are reviewed and weaknesses are identified. This enables us to identify challenges
and requirements for a practical solution.
Starting from this, we define the user-centric trust model for the Web PKI meaning
that trust decisions are individualized and trust settings regarding CAs are tailored
to the user-specific requirements of a relying entity. Based on a user study, we show
the potential of user-centric CA trust management in regard to the reduction of the
attack surface of the Web PKI.
Chapter 4 – CA-TMS: User-centric CA trust management Based on the find-
ings in Chapter 3, we develop CA-TMS: a CA trust management system that realizes
the user-centric trust model. The core of CA-TMS are trust views that serve as a
local and user dependent knowledge base for trust decisions. Trust views achieve
two goals: The number of CAs a user trusts is reduced. This leads to a reduction
of the attack surface by more than 95%. Secondly, for the trusted CAs the revo-
cation status can be continuously monitored, which enables a reliable provision of
revocation information.
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An important aspect of CA-TMS is, that it realizes user-centric trust management
without involving the user into decision making. This is achieved by means of
computational trust along with learning processes and automated trust decisions
based on defined decision rules. CA-TMS exclusively builds on data which either is
initially available or is collected over time. In contrast to existing proposals, CA-
TMS does not require recommended trust values embedded into certificates or the
evaluation of certificate policies and expert opinions.
Techniques of previous proposals like public key pinning and certificate notaries
are integrated and combined as building blocks. These different building blocks
complement each other such that it allows to overcome scalability and usability
problems of previous proposals.
Chapter 5 – Service providers for CA-TMS CA-TMS as presented in Chapter 4
protects relying entities from fraudulent certificates issued by CAs that are not part
of their trust view or do not fulfill the trust requirements for a specific application.
CA-TMS works autonomously and does not require an additional check of every
(new) certificate once the trust view is bootstrapped.
The extension of CA-TMS by service providers solves two specific issues: Boot-
strapping in case no or only limited input data is available and protection in the
face of CAs that are already considered to be trustworthy but suddenly change their
behavior and become untrustworthy.
The bootstrapping problem is solved by a reputation system. It makes the knowl-
edge of other relying entities available to a relying entity whenever its own expe-
rience is insufficient for decision making. With this mechanism, we speed up the
bootstrapping process. The second problem is solved with a push service. CA-TMS
implements a function which detects suspicious certificates. The service providers
monitor the trust views collected within the reputation system’s database. Upon
detection of a CA becoming untrustworthy, this information is pushed to all clients
whose trust view contains the CA in question.
Chapter 6 – CA revocation tolerant PKI In this chapter we show how to trans-
form a PKI into a CA revocation tolerant PKI. This is achieved by the application
of forward secure signature schemes. The special properties of FSS allow the adap-
tation of certificate validation and revocation mechanisms such that CA certificates
can be revoked in a secure way without invalidating former signatures. This prevents
the unavailability of dependent services.
Besides providing the concepts, we describe how to implement the solution in the
Web PKI. The results show that the implementation is feasible without infrastruc-
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The performance evaluation includes a comparison to the standard setup where
common signature schemes like RSA or (EC) DSA are used. It turns out, that a
CA revocation tolerant PKI admits good performance in regard to runtimes and
certificate as well as signature sizes.
Chapter 7 – Providing non-repudiation and long term verifiability In contrast to
authentication scenarios, in use-cases that require non-repudiation, digital signatures
must remain valid and verifiable for a long time. A common example is contract
signing.
This solution is a significant improvement of the current solutions which are based
on time-stamps generated by trusted third parties. In order to guarantee non-
repudiation, time-stamps must be applied to each signature directly after signature
generation. This is costly and therefore has prevented the broad application of
digital signatures as a replacement for handwritten signatures so far.
Extending the mechanisms used in Chapter 6, in Chapter 7, we provide a solution
based on FSS which establishes non-repudiation as an inherent guarantee provided
by the PKI. This guarantee is preserved as long as the used signature scheme is
considered secure. Additionally, we present possibilities to prevent the sudden break
down of the security of signatures based on special properties of XMSS [12], a hash-
based FSS.
Chapter 8 – Conclusion Finally, in this chapter we conclude our thesis and discuss
future research directions.

2 Background
In this chapter we present the necessary background for the work at hand. We
provide the definitions and concepts used throughout this thesis. We start with
an introduction to public key cryptography and cryptographic building blocks in
Section 2.1. Afterwards, we describe the components and processes of public key
infrastructures in Section 2.2. This is followed by a short introduction to secure
Internet communication in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4, computational trust models
are introduced and in particular CertainTrust, which is used to represent trust in
this thesis. Finally, further related work is listed in Section 2.5.
This chapter contains revised and extended parts of the background sections pub-
lished in [B2, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8, B10].
2.1 Public key cryptography
The security goals relevant to this thesis are integrity, confidentiality, authentication,
data authenticity and non-repudiation. Integrity refers to the fact, that data has not
been modified since its generation. Confidentiality denotes the property, that data is
not available to an unauthorized entity. Authentication is the process of confirming
the identity of some other entity. Data authenticity refers to the determination of
the originator of data. Non-repudiation is the property, that an entity cannot deny
to have performed a certain action, such as having signed a document.
These security goals can be and are in practice achieved with public key cryptog-
raphy. In general, public key cryptography requires key pairs: a private key (also
called secret key) sk that is only known to the owner of the key pair as well as a
public key pk, which must be provided to the other participants in a cryptographic
protocol. Furthermore, it is generally required to ascertain a relation between a
public key pk and the identity of its owner, i.e. to verify the authenticity of a public
key. This shows a dilemma: in order to enable authentication, authenticated cre-
dentials need to be available to the participants. This also shows the central role of
authentication in cryptography.
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The authentication of public keys is achieved with public key infrastructures which
are explained in Section 2.2. First, several cryptographic mechanisms will be ex-
plained in more detail.
2.1.1 Hash functions
Hash functions are important cryptographic building blocks. Generally, a hash
function h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n maps bit strings of arbitrary length {0, 1}∗ to bit
strings of length n ∈ N. h(x) can efficiently be computed for any x ∈ {0, 1}∗.
To be used in cryptographic applications, hash functions require special properties.
These are one-wayness, second-preimage resistance and collision resistance. We only
give an informal description of the properties and refer the reader to [34] for formal
definitions. One-wayness denotes the property that it is infeasible to invert the
hash function, i.e. it is infeasible to compute x ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that h(x) = s for a
given s ∈ {0, 1}n. Second-preimage resistance means, that it is infeasible to find a
collision for a given x ∈ {0, 1}∗, i.e. to find an x′ ∈ {0, 1}∗ with x 6= x′ such that
h(x) = h(x′). Finally, collision resistance denotes the property that it is infeasible
to find any collision, i.e. it is infeasible to find any pair x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and x′ ∈ {0, 1}∗
with x 6= x′ such that h(x) = h(x′). Hash functions that are collision resistant are
also called cryptographic hash functions. Collision resistance is for example required
to generate digital signatures which will be described in Section 2.1.2.
Collision resistance is the strongest of the explained security properties. Collision
resistance implies second-preimage resistance which in turn implies one-wayness,
however this does not hold the other way around. A one-way function can be
used to construct a second-preimage resistant hash function. But, collision resistant
hash functions are not known to be constructable from one-way functions nor from
second-preimage resistant hash functions [34, B8].
Another security property of hash function families is pseudorandomness. It
means, that a function randomly drawn from a pseudorandom function family is,
concerning its in- and output behavior, indistinguishable from a function randomly
drawn from all functions with the same in- and output sets. Pseudorandom function
families can as well be constructed from one-way functions. Thus, again the collision
resistance is a stronger security assumption than pseudorandomness [34].
2.1.2 Digital signature schemes
A digital signature scheme S = (KGen, Sign,Ver) is given by three algorithms:
KGen The key generation algorithm, on input of security parameter 1λ, λ ∈ N
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generates a key pair (sk, pk) consisting of a secret signing key sk and a public
verification key pk.
Sign The signing algorithm, on input of a secret key sk and a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗,
outputs a signature σ.
Ver The verification algorithm, on input of public key pk, a message m, and a
signature σ, outputs 1 iff σ is a valid signature on m under pk, else 0.
S is correct if for all λ ∈ N, (sk, pk)← KGen(1λ), m ∈ {0, 1}∗, and σ ← Sign(sk,m),
Ver(pk,m, σ) returns 1 as output.
In general, a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ is not signed directly, but the according hash
value h(m) is used as input for Sign. Where h is a collision resistant hash function.
When referring to a signature scheme, we refer to a secure digital signature scheme.
Secure means, that an adversary is unable to forge signatures without knowing
the private key. For formal definitions of the security of signature schemes like
existential unforgeability under chosen message attacks (EU-CMA), we refer the
reader to [25, 34].
In the following, we introduce key evolving signature schemes and forward secure
signature schemes and explain their specific properties.
Key evolving signature schemes
In contrast to conventional signature schemes, in key evolving signature schemes
(KES) the secret key sk changes over time, while the public key pk remains the
same. The lifetime of a key pair is split into several intervals, say t. These intervals
can be defined in different ways. Either an interval corresponds to a time period,
e.g., one day. Or an interval ends after the key was used to create a certain number
of signatures. Note that this implies that the length of two intervals might differ.
Especially, it is possible to associate the intervals with single signatures.
The number of intervals t becomes a public parameter of a KES and is taken as an
additional input by the key generation algorithm. A KES key pair has t secret keys
sk1, . . . , skt; one secret key for each of the t intervals. The key generation algorithm
outputs (sk1, pk), where sk1 is the first secret key. To obtain the subsequent secret
key, a KES has an additional key update algorithm KUpd, which updates the secret
key at the end of each interval. The signing algorithm takes as additional input the
index of the current interval. This index also becomes part of the signature and is
therefore available for the verification algorithm. Finally, if a user generates a valid
key pair and the key update algorithm is called at the end of each interval, then a
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signature generated with the current secret key and the index of the current interval
can be verified by any user with the corresponding public key. A signature is verified
as valid if the signature is a valid signature on the message under the given public
key and the index of the interval included in the signature.
Forward secure signature schemes
The idea of forward security for digital signature schemes was introduced by Ander-
son [4] and later formalized in [8]. In one sentence, the forward security property
says that even after a key compromise, all signatures created before remain valid.
A forward secure signature scheme (FSS) is a KES that provides the forward
security property. The forward security property guarantees, that an adversary that
is allowed to launch a chosen message attack for each interval and learns the secret
key ski of an adaptively chosen interval i is unable to forge a signature for any
interval j < i. In particular, this means that an adversary is unable to invert the
key update algorithm KUpd.
To maintain the forward security in practice, it is indispensable that KUpd is
executed on-time at the end of each interval and no keys of past intervals are kept
e.g. as a back up. Otherwise, an adversary might be able to compromise a secret
key ski of a past interval which would destroy the forward security.
For a formal definition of FSS we refer the reader to [8]. Note that forward security
implies the standard notion of EU-CMA extended to the case of KES.
2.1.3 Public key encryption schemes
In public key encryption schemes, the key owner also has a key pair (sk, pk) which
is generated with a key generation algorithm. The public key is used to encrypt
messages, which can then only be decrypted with the corresponding private key. A
public key encryption scheme is defined as follows.
A public key encryption scheme PKE = (KGen,Enc,Dec) for message space M ⊆
{0, 1}∗ is given by three algorithms:
KGen The key generation algorithm, on input of security parameter 1λ, λ ∈ N
generates a key pair (sk, pk) consisting of a secret decryption key sk and a
public encryption key pk.
Enc The encryption algorithm, on input of a public key pk and a message m ∈M ,
outputs a ciphertext c.
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Dec The decryption algorithm, on input of a secret key sk and a ciphertext c
outputs the decrypted message m′ ∈ {invalid} ∪M
PKE is correct if for all λ ∈ N, (sk, pk)← KGen(1λ), m ∈M and for c← Enc(pk,m)
m′ ← Dec(sk, c) it is m′ = m.
2.2 Public key infrastructures
A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) supports the use of public key cryptography by
handling keys and providing public key certificates, first introduced in [44]. The
most basic operations of PKIs is the issuance and the revocation of certificates.
Certificates bind the key owner’s identity (e.g. a name) to his public key. In contrast,
a revocation ends a previously established binding between an identity and a public
key. The fundamental question is who is trusted to issue certificates. For this two
basic principles exist. Either certificates are issued by users themselves to other
users like in the OpenPGP Web of trust [75] or it is left to trusted third parties.
The latter is the case in hierarchical PKIs, which are explained in the following.
Whenever we refer to a PKI in this thesis, we refer to a hierarchical PKI.
2.2.1 Hierarchical PKI
In hierarchical PKIs, the trusted third party which is responsible for the issuance
and management of certificates is called Certification Authority (CA). By issuing a
certificate, a CA attests that a public key belongs to a particular entity, namely the
subject of the certificate. Entities can request certificates from CAs. Before issuing
a certificate, the CA must verify the identity of the requesting entity and that the
public key for which the certificate is requested is indeed owned by the requesting
entity, i.e. the requesting entity possesses the corresponding private key. As these
verification processes are complex, a CA is usually supported by a Registration
Authority (RA), which checks the credentials of a subject in order to attest its
identity. A CA may in general be also supported by multiple RAs. A CA together
with its RAs and further components is sometimes referred to as a Certification
Service Provider [13]. Throughout this thesis we refer to entities authorized to issue
certificates as CAs, disregarding its exact organizational structure.
The subject of a certificate may be an organization, an individual, a server or
any other infrastructure component. The entity that actually contracts the CA and
pays for the service of issuing certificates is called the subscriber. Subscriber may
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be the subject of a certificate itself, or another entity. For example, an organization
might request certificates for its employees.
Finally, there is the relying entity, which can be any individual or entity that
relies on the certificates. For example, a relying entity may be an individual that
verifies a signature or encrypts messages using a public key certified in a certificate.
There is not necessarily a business relationship of any kind between a CA and the
relying entity. However, a relying entity must trust the issuing CA in order to be
convinced that the binding between subject and public key is valid.
In general, certificates are signed by the issuing CA (also referred to as the issuer).
Thus, to verify the signature on a certificate, the relying entity must know the issuer’s
public key, and the relying entity must be able to verify the authenticity of that key.
In a hierarchical PKI, CAs are organized in a tree structure. The CA that builds
the root of the tree is called Root CA. The Root CA (also called trust anchor) acts
as the trust basis for the whole PKI. Root CAs sign certificates for subordinate CAs
(Sub CAs) and end entities such as web servers or individuals. Sub CAs themselves
sign certificates for other Sub CAs as well as end entities. A sample PKI is shown
in Figure 2.1.
Sub CA1
end entity 
Ԑ3
Root CA
Sub CA2
end entity 
Ԑ2
end entity 
Ԑ1
Figure 2.1: Hierarchical PKI. The boxes represent different entities, the arrows represent
certificates.
By issuing a certificate to another CA, the issuer delegates trust to the Sub CA
and authorizes the Sub CA to issue certificates itself. The authenticity of the Sub
CA’s key is guaranteed by the certificate issued by the CA on the next higher level.
This reduces the key authentication problem to the secure pre-distribution of the
Root CA’s public key, which is to be realized via some out of band channel. Trust
in the authenticity of an entity’s public key is then established by the chain of
certificates starting with the Root CA’s certificate and ending with the end entity’s
certificate. This chain of certificates is called certification path. In a hierarchical
PKI, a relying entity thus trusts any CA which has a valid certification path from
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the Root CA to the CA’s certificate.
The process of checking the certification path for correctness and validity is called
path validation, which we explain in more detail in Section 2.2.4. In general, a
certification path is a sequence p = (C1, ..., Cn) of n ∈ N certificates Ci, with the
following properties [13]:
• Except for Cn, the subject of a certificate is the issuer of the subsequent
certificate.
• The issuer of the first certificate C1 is the trust anchor.
• The subject of the last certificate in the path Cn is the end entity.
The Root CA’s certificate C1 is usually a self-signed certificate. Self-signed means
that a certificate is issued by an entity to itself and is signed with the private key
associated to the public key in the certificate.
The most common type of hierarchical PKIs is the X.509 PKI which is an ITU-T
standard [97] and was adopted by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) [83].
In particular, the Web PKI which we explain in detail in Chapter 3 is an X.509
PKI. In the following, PKIs are assumed to be constructed according to the X.509
standard.
2.2.2 Certificates
As already stated, the binding between a public key and an identity is established
through certificates. Certificates are data structures, that contain several fields.
X.509 certificates are specified in the Abstract Syntax Notation version 1 (ASN.1)
[96]. The most relevant contents of a certificate are the name of the subject and
the subject’s public key. Furthermore, a certificate specifies with which public key
algorithm the certified public key is to be used. Also the name of the issuer is
given in the certificate. This is required to identify the public key used to verify
the issuer’s signature on the certificate. Certificates also contain restrictions on the
purpose for which the certified public key may be used. Even though a multitude of
different key usages are possible, we only differentiate between CA certificates and
end entity certificates. CA certificates are issued to (Sub) CAs and allow certificate
signing. In general, this is not allowed for end entity certificates. To make certificates
identifiable, they contain serial numbers. Together with the issuer’s name, the serial
number is a globally unique identifier for a certificate. Further auxiliary information
can be included into certificates within so called certificate extensions. Please refer
to [83] for details on standard extensions in X.509 certificates.
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A certificate provides a binding between subject and public key only for a limited
time period. This time period is called validity period and is defined in the certificate
by the fields NotBefore and NotAfter. After the date given in the NotAfter field, a
certificate is considered as expired. The binding between a public key and a subject
can also be ended by a revocation, which we explain in the following section.
2.2.3 Revocation
Revocation means the invalidation of a certificate during its validity period. Re-
vocation is done by the CA that certified the binding. The main mechanisms for
revocation are Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL) [83] and the Online Certificate
Status Protocol (OCSP) [104]. There are many reasons, why a revocation may be
required, such as organizational changes, identity changes regarding the subject’s
identity, or the private key was compromised. In the last case, revocation is espe-
cially important, in order to prevent the malicious use of the key by an attacker.
In order to trigger a revocation the compromise needs to be detected first. This is
only possible with a certain delay. The time period between compromise and its
detection is called gray period. During the gray period, the PKI is in an insecure
state, in particular, when a CA’s key is compromised.
CRL
CRLs are defined in [83]. CRLs are released by CAs in regular intervals and specify
certificates that are revoked and have not yet expired. Within CRLs, the revoked
certificates are identified by the issuer’s name together with the certificate’s serial
number. Furthermore, they also may contain information about the reason for a
certificate revocation and a date from which on the certificate needs to be considered
invalid. There exist different forms of CRLs, such as full, delta or indirect CRLs
which we do not explain here. For more details on the different CRL types we refer
the reader to [13, 83].
CRLs are an oﬄine mechanism for revocation checking. Relying entities can
download the CRLs in regular time intervals from the CAs’ servers and then use
these CRLs to check the revocation status of certificates during path validation.
From where to get the CRL relevant for a certain certificate is specified in the
cRLDistributionPoints extension of the certificate.
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OCSP
CRLs can get rather large and introduce delays into revocation until the next update
of a CRL is published. Therefore, the Online Certificate Status Protocol [104] was
defined. As the name says, it is an online mechanism to check the revocation status
for a certificate. To provide the OCSP service, so called OCSP servers are operated,
either by the CAs themselves or by an additional service provider. OCSP servers are
special servers from which relying entities can request revocation status information
of a certificate on demand. Within the request, the relying entity specifies the
certificate using the issuer’s name and the certificate’s serial number. OCSP also
allows to request the status of several certificates aggregated into one request.
The OCSP responder replies to a request with a signed response. Three different
answers are possible:
• revoked, which states that the specified certificate has been revoked.
• unknown, which states that the OCSP server has no information about a cer-
tificate and is unable to give any answer about the status of the certificate.
• good, which indicates that the certificate is not revoked.
The answer good does not necessarily mean that a certificate is valid. The certifi-
cate might be expired or never have been issued. The actual behavior is left open
to the implementation. OCSP servers that reply with revoked to requests for non-
issued certificates must include the extended-revoke extension according to RFC
6960 [104].
Besides these possible status answers, an OCSP response may contain any infor-
mation contained in CRLs, and includes the date showing when the response was
generated.
OCSP is capable to provide up-to-date revocation information. However if OCSP
responders base their answers on CRLs, this advantage is lost. To sign OCSP
responses, OCSP servers normally use their own signing key and a certificate that
was issued by the CA for which the OCSP server is operated. As for CRLs, the
address of the OCSP server responsible for a certain certificate is specified in the
authorityInfoAccess extension.
OCSP stapling OCSP stapling means that an OCSP response is not provided by
the OCSP server to relying entities, but by the key owner himself. To do so, a key
owner requests the status for his own certificate (or all certificates in the certification
path of his certificate) from an OCSP server as described above. The responses are
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then transferred to the relying entity by the key owner. As the responses are signed
along with the date of their generation by the OCSP server, the relying entity can
verify their authenticity and timeliness as in standard OCSP. This is especially rel-
evant in scenarios where the key owner and the relying entity communicate directly
and exchange the certification path during the communication as in TLS which will
be detailed in Section 2.3.2. OCSP stapling has been specified as the certificate sta-
tus request TLS extension [76] for a single certificate, and was extended to multiple
certificates in [103].
Compared to the standard use of OCSP, OCSP stapling has the advantage that
additional online communication with the OCSP server can be omitted. This saves
overhead and also protects the relying entity’s privacy, as the OCSP server is not
able to track the communication of the relying entity. An additional benefit can be
seen in the fact that the key owner can reuse the OCSP response for a certain time
interval, depending on the required freshness of the response to be accepted by a
relying entity. Thus, an OCSP response does not have to be newly generated every
time a relying entity is verifies the key owner’s certification path.
2.2.4 Path validation and validity models
In this section we explain how the validity of a certification path is evaluated. The
outcome of path validation determines, whether a relying entity considers the public
key certified within an end entity certificate as authentic or not.
There are two requirements for the validity of a certification path. The first is that
for each digital signature on a certificate in the path, the corresponding verification
algorithm Ver on input of the signature, the certificate (which is the signed message)
and the issuer’s public key must output 1, i.e., the signature is a valid signature under
the given public key. This basic requirement is assumed to hold in the following.
The second requirement is the semantic correctness of the certification path. It is
evaluated according to a validity model. The validity model specifies how the revo-
cation information and the validity periods of the involved certificates are evaluated.
In literature, three validity models can be found [6], which we shortly explain.
Shell model To formally describe the models let n ∈ N be the length of the
certification path. C1 is the self-signed certificate of the Root CA. Cn is the certificate
of the end entity. We denote by Ti(k) the starting date of the validity period of Ck
and by Te(k) its expiration date. Tv denotes the time of verification. The shell
model is defined as follows and depicted in Figure 2.2.
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Definition 2.1 (Shell model). A certification path is valid at verification time Tv
if all certificates in the certification path are valid at time Tv: Ti(k) ≤ Tv ≤ Te(k)
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n and no certificate is revoked at time Tv.
time
Root CA 
certificate
Sub CA 
certificate
end entity 
certificate
Ts Tv
Figure 2.2: Shell model. The signature generation time is Ts and the verification time is
Tv. Vertical arrows show the point in time used for validation of the certificates.
For a successful verification, all certificates in the path have to be valid at the
time of verification. Thus, a relying entity can use the public key pkn certified in Cn
to encrypt messages or to verify signatures (depending on the allowed key usage)
during the time period where all certificates are valid. Currently, most applications
implement the shell model for certification path validation [6]. In particular, RFC
5280 [83] establishes the shell model as the standard validity model for the Web
PKI.
Note that in the shell model a certification path becomes invalid once one of
the certificates in the path expires or is revoked. This subsequently invalidates all
signatures generated by subordinate entities. However, there are scenarios where
this is not acceptable. For example, when data authenticity and non-repudiation
are desired security goals. These properties must often be preserved for indefinite
time periods. Therefore, two additional validity models have been defined for (end
entity) signature validation. These models explicitly consider the points in time,
where signatures have been generated.
Extended shell model In the following, let Ts be the time of signature generation
by an end entity. Note that while the knowledge of Tv is trivial for a verifier (the
relying entity), the knowledge of Ts is not, because Ts is not provided by a digital
signature and thus requires a trustworthy time information, such as a time-stamp by
a trusted third party (see Section 2.2.7). The end entity signature is also assumed
to be a valid signature under the end entity’s public key. Then, the extended shell
model is defined as follows. Figure 2.3 depicts the model.
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Definition 2.2 (Extended shell model). A digital signature is valid at verification
time Tv if all certificates in the certification path are valid at time Ts: Ti(k) ≤ Ts ≤
Te(k) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n and no certificate in the path is revoked at time Ts.
time
Root CA 
certificate
Sub CA 
certificate
end entity 
certificate
Ts Tv
Figure 2.3: Extended shell model. The signature generation time is Ts and the verification
time is Tv. Vertical arrows show the point in time used for validation of the certificates.
In the extended shell model (also called hybrid or modified shell model) Ts is
used instead of Tv during validation. This means that the certificates in the path
are checked for validity and revocation status at generation time of the end entity
signature.
To implement this model, the signature generation time needs to be tied to the
signature such that it can be checked that the certificates in the path were not
revoked and were valid at that time. Furthermore, as the expiry of a certificate
does not invalidate previously generated signatures, revocation information for the
involved certificates must be preserved beyond certificate expirations, which in gen-
eral is not necessary when applying the shell model. This also holds for the chain
model explained in the following.
Chain Model The chain model is defined as follows and depicted in Figure 2.4.
Definition 2.3 (Chain model). A digital signature is valid at verification time Tv
if:
1. The end entity certificate Cn is valid at the signing time Ts: Ti(n) ≤ Ts ≤ Te(n)
and Cn is not revoked at time Ts.
2. Every CA certificate in the certification path is valid at the issuance time of
the subordinate certificate in this path: Ti(k − 1) ≤ Ti(k) ≤ Te(k − 1) and the
certificate Ck−1 is not revoked at time Ti(k) for all 2 ≤ k ≤ n.
In the chain model, any signature in the certification path is validated using its
signature generation time, i.e. the issuance time of the certificate. The start date
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time
Root CA 
certificate
Sub CA 
certificate
end entity 
certificate
Ts Tv
Figure 2.4: Chain model. The signature generation time is Ts and the verification time
is Tv. Vertical arrows show the point in time used for validation of the certificates.
of the validity period can be used as an approximation. Thus, this date must lie
within the validity period of the superordinate certificate.
If time-stamps are used in the implementation of the chain model, one time-stamp
is required for every signature within the certification path [6]. This is because
different dates prior to the signature generation time of the end entity signature
have to be considered for the path validation. Both, the extended shell model as
well as the chain model allow signature validation at any point in the future.
2.2.5 Certificate policies and certificate practice statements
In PKIs, the CAs are considered as trusted third parties. This trust is based on so
called Certificate Policies (CP). The CP of a CA provides a set of rules for its oper-
ation and the internal procedures to which the CA committed itself. For example,
a CP comprises information about authentication of subjects, security controls and
also covers liability issues. A CA additionally describes the implementation of these
rules in a Certificate Practice Statement (CPS). The CP and the CPS may be used
by relying entities to evaluate whether to rely on the certificate issued by the CA in
a specific application or not. A framework for CPs and CPSs is provided by [82].
2.2.6 Object identifiers
Object identifiers (OIDs) are used to refer to standardized objects, such as crypto-
graphic algorithms or policies. OIDs can be used to identify any arbitrary object.
For example, the OID 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 identifies the RSA public key encryption
scheme. OIDs are globally unique identifiers organized in a tree. The triadic root
of the global OID tree is defined as follows:
0: ITU-T
1: ISO
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2: joint-iso-itu-t
This means that the Telecommunication Standardization Sector of the Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union (ITU-T) [93] is responsible for OIDs starting with
0, while the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) [92] is responsible
for OIDs starting with 1. A leading 2 identifies jointly assigned OIDs.
2.2.7 Time-stamping
The process of adding a trusted time to electronic data is called time-stamping.
Time-stamps are issued by a trusted third party called Time-Stamping Authority
(TSA). Time-stamping can be implemented in different ways [77, 78, 95]. In general,
time-stamping is achieved by signing the data along with the current date and time.
With its signature, the TSA certifies that the time-stamped data existed at a certain
point in time, typically at the time of the generation of the time-stamp. To verify
a time-stamp, the TSA’s public key must be known and authenticated. This in
general is achieved with a hierarchical PKI.
Time-stamping is used for long term archiving of electronic documents and to
achieve non-repudiation in practice [66]. Time-stamping can be provided as an
additional service by a CA, which than acts as a TSA.
2.3 Internet communication
The Internet is a global open network of computer systems based on the TCP/IP
protocol. It is subdivided into Autonomous Systems (AS) operated by different
network operators called Internet Service Providers (ISP). An AS itself is a collection
of IP networks. When data is sent from one computer system to another over the
Internet, the data is routed through these different networks over a multitude of
infrastructure devices such as routers. In general the route from the sender to
the receiver is dynamically chosen depending on the configuration of the involved
routers. In particular, the route is not chosen by the communication partners.
Web servers, to which we also refer as hosts, provide services to client systems.
A typical example is accessing a web page on a web server through a web browser.
The server is identified by its domain name given as a URL, such as example.com.
The Domain Name System (DNS) [102] is responsible for resolving domain names to
IP addresses, the actual network addresses where the server can be reached. To do
so, DNS name servers are operated, for example by ISPs. From these name servers,
clients can request the IP address for arbitrary domain names.
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Basically, anyone can register for a domain name under which he can operate a
web server. The entity who legitimately registered a domain is referred to as the
domain owner.
This high level overview reveals that communication over the Internet in general
is neither authentic nor confidential. Any device on the network path between
communication partners can in principle act as a man-in-the-middle and alter and/or
intercept the communication.
We first provide more information about DNS and DNSSEC. Afterwards, the
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is described, which provides secure com-
munication.
2.3.1 DNS and DNSSEC
DNS is a hierarchical directory service for domain names. It divides the domain
name space into so called zones according to the hierarchical structure of the do-
main name space. The zones are represented by data structures containing resource
records. These resource records either point directly to IP addresses of hosts for
specified domain names, or if not directly responsible for a domain name, to a sub-
ordinate DNS server, which maintains the respective child zone. The child zone in
turn contains resource records, thus building a hierarchical structure.
DNS itself does not provide any protection mechanisms against the malicious al-
teration of DNS records. Therefore, DNS is susceptible to attacks like DNS spoofing
or DNS cache poisoning, which aim at manipulating the IP address assigned to do-
main names, finally leading clients to a server which is actually not operated by the
domain owner but by an attacker.
To counteract such attacks, the Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNS-
SEC) [79] have been specified and are currently in the process of being deployed.
With DNSSEC, the zones and the contained records are digitally signed. The owners
of the keys used for zone signing are the zone administrators. DNSSEC has a single
trust anchor and each zone can only delegate trust to its direct child zones. Basically
this is done by signing the hash of the key of the child zone.
2.3.2 Transport Layer Security
The TLS protocol [84] is the de facto standard for secure Internet communication.
It is the successor of SSL [88] which is considered insecure because of several
vulnerabilities that have been detected in the past. TLS has been updated several
times to its current version TLS 1.2. Many higher level communication protocols
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such as HTTPS, FTPS or SMTPS build on TLS, which shows its outstanding im-
portance for secure Internet communication. Through HTTPS, TLS secures the
communication between web browsers and web servers.
TLS enables authentication and the establishment of confidential channels be-
tween clients and servers. Even though TLS supports client authentication, in most
applications, e.g. in HTTPS, only web server authentication is used. Authenti-
cation is achieved using X.509 certificates. Domain owners subscribe at a CA for
a certificate. The private key of their key pair is installed on the web server for
authentication purposes. Thus, the security relies on the security of the underlying
public key infrastructure, which is the Web PKI and will be described in Chapter 3.
During the TLS handshake, the server sends its certificate along with the certifi-
cation path to the client (the relying entity). The client validates the certification
path and if the validation is successful, client and server establish session keys. The
key exchange protocol uses the server key pair. The server proves the possession of
the private key and thus is authenticated as being the entity specified in the subject
field of the certificate. The session keys are then used to encrypt the communica-
tion between client and server. This procedure ensures that the client communicates
with the intended web server and that no unauthorized third party may access or
manipulate the communication.
Browsers show the establishment of a secure channel to a web server by displaying
locks and other visual items. If the validation of the server’s certificate fails, warning
messages are displayed to the user giving him a choice to abort the connection or to
continue the potentially insecure communication.
2.4 Computational trust
In this thesis, we apply computational trust models to explicitly represent and eval-
uate trust placed in CAs. Computational trust is a means to support entities in
making decisions under uncertainty, that is, under incomplete information. The two
most widely-used definitions of trust are reliability trust and decision trust. Gam-
betta describes reliability trust as a subjective probability of performance without
the option to monitor the performed action [20]. While this definition only captures
the beliefs of an entity that is potentially unaffected by its trust, Jøsang defines
decision trust as the will to depend on a trusted entity (Jøsang [40], inspired by
McKnight and Chervany [55]):
Definition 2.4 (Decision trust). Decision trust is the extent to which a given party
is willing to depend on something or somebody in a given situation with a feeling of
relative security, even though negative consequences are possible.
2.4 Computational trust 25
Computational trust models calculate an approximation to the quality of future in-
teractions. Recommendations, experiences from previous interactions, and context-
related indicators of trustworthiness can serve as input for this calculation. Based
on the outcome, a decision can be made according to a pre-defined set of decision
rules.
2.4.1 CertainTrust
The CertainTrust trust model by Ries [58] is used in this thesis. CertainTrust was
extended with CertainLogic, which is a set of operators to combine CertainTrust
opinions. These operators are similar to those of propositional logic, but consider
the inherent uncertainty of CertainTrust opinions. CertainTrust and CertainLogic
are equivalent to the Beta Reputation System and Subjective Logic, both by Jøsang
et al. [37, 38, 39]. These models both rely on binary experiences that are combined
using a Bayesian approach with beta probability density functions. An overview on
different trust models that rely on this computational approach and similar ones
can be found in the surveys by Jøsang et al. [40] and Ruohomaa et al. [60].
CertainTrust can handle and express trust-related information in two ways:
• The experience space collects results from interactions as binary experiences,
i.e., an interaction was either positive or negative.
• The opinion space uses triples (t, c, f). With such a triple an opinion oS
about a statement S is expressed. The value t ∈ [0; 1] represents the trust
in the correctness of the statement, while the certainty c ∈ [0; 1] represents
the probability that t is a correct approximation. c scales with the amount
of information (for example, the number of collected experiences): the more
information is available, the more reliable is the approximation. Finally, f ∈
[0; 1] defines a context-specific, initial trust value in case no information was
collected, yet. This parameter serves as a baseline and represents systemic
trust. Besides that, CertainTrust has a system-wide parameter n, which defines
how many experiences are expected on average for a statement. This means
after the collection of n experiences, for one opinion, the opinion’s certainty
is 1.
Between the experience space and the opinion space there exists an ambilateral
mapping by parameterizing a Bayesian probability density function with the amount
of positive and negative experiences. For details, see [57].
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A CertainTrust opinion represents a statistical estimate whether the next experi-
ence will be a positive one. Based on the experiences already collected, a maximum
likelihood estimate for the next experience is given by the trust value. The concor-
dant certainty value represents the confidence in the estimate. Positive and negative
experiences are weighted equally in order to supply an unbiased estimate for the bi-
nary experiences – thereby forming a binomial sample.
From opinions, an expectation can be computed. It represents the expectation
for future behavior. In CertainTrust, the expectation of an opinion oA is defined as:
E(oA) = tA · cA + fA(1− cA)
With increasing certainty (which means that a larger amount of experiences is avail-
able), the influence of the initial trust f ceases.
2.4.2 CertainLogic operators
There are several operators to combine different opinions. From two opinions about
two independent statements a combined opinion about the statement regarding the
truth of both input statements is computed with the AND operator of Certain-
Logic [58]:
Definition 2.5 (CertainLogic AND operator). Let A and B be independent state-
ments and the opinions about these statements be given as oA = (tA, cA, fA) and
oB = (tB, cB, fB). Then, the combined opinion on the statement regarding both A
and B is defined as follows:
oA ∧ oB = (tA∧B, cA∧B, fA∧B) with
cA∧B = cA + cB − cAcB
− (1− cA) cB (1− fA) tB + cA (1− cB) (1− fB) tA
1− fAfB
if cA∧B = 0: tA∧B = 0.5
if cA∧B 6= 0: tA∧B = 1
cA∧B
(cAcBtAtB
+
cA(1− cB)(1− fA)fBtA + (1− cA)cBfA(1− fB)tB
1− fAfB )
fA∧B =fAfB
The CertainLogic AND operator is commutative.
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Besides combining independent opinions, there might be the need to combine
dependent opinions, i.e. opinions on the same statement made by different entities.
CertainLogic provides three FUSION operators for this task [28].
For this thesis, the cFUSION operator is required. It combines opinions by taking
their inherent conflict into account. For example, asking different entities about the
trustworthiness of a CA might result in two completely different opinions based on
different previously made experiences. One opinion oA1 might be positive with high
certainty cA1 ≈ 1, while the other opinion oA2 might be negative, also with high
certainty cA2 ≈ 1. Obviously, these two opinions carry some conflict as they cannot
both be correct at the same time. The cFUSION operator handles this conflict by
lowering the certainty of the combination result. Other FUSION operators, e.g.
[38, 28], do not account for conflict and only average the trust and certainty values
of the resulting opinion. Furthermore, cFUSION allows to assign weights to input
opinions to give them higher or lower importance. cFUSION is defined in [28]:
Definition 2.6 (CertainLogic cFUSION operator). Let A be a statement and let
oA1 = (tA1 , cA1 , fA1), oA2 = (tA2 , cA2 , fA2), . . . , oAn = (tAn , cAn , fAn) be n opinions
associated to A. Furthermore, the weights w1, w2, . . . , wn (with w1, w2, . . . , wn ∈
R+0 and w1 + w2 + · · · + wn 6= 0) are assigned to the opinions oA1, oA2, . . . , oAn,
respectively. The conflict-aware fusion of oA1, oA2, . . . , oAn with degree of conflict
DoC is denoted as:
⊕̂c(oA1 , oA2 , . . . , oAn) = ((t⊕̂c(A1,A2,...,An), c⊕̂c(A1,A2,...,An), f⊕̂c(A1,A2,...,An))) with
if all cAi = 1: t⊕̂c(A1,A2,...,An) =
n∑
i=1
witAi
n∑
i=1
wi
if all cAi = 0: t⊕̂c(A1,A2,...,An) = 0.5
if {cAi , cAj} 6= 1: t⊕̂c(A1,A2,...,An) =
n∑
i=1
(cAitAiwi
n∏
j=1, j 6=i
(1− cAj))
n∑
i=1
(cAiwi
n∏
j=1, j 6=i
(1− cAj))
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if all cAi = 1: c⊕̂c(A1,A2,...,An) = 1−DoC
if {cAi , cAj} 6= 1: c⊕̂c(A1,A2,...,An) =
n∑
i=1
(cAiwi
n∏
j=1, j 6=i
(1− cAj))
n∑
i=1
(wi
n∏
j=1, j 6=i
(1− cAj))
· (1−DoC)
f⊕̂c(A1,A2,...,An) =
n∑
i=1
wifAi
n∑
i=1
wi
DoC =
n∑
i=1, j=i
DoCAi,Aj
n(n−1)
2
DoCAi,Aj =
∣∣tAi − tAj ∣∣ · cAi · cAj · (1− ∣∣∣∣wi − wjwi + wj
∣∣∣∣)
The CertainLogic cFUSION operator is commutative.
2.5 Further related work
In this section we shortly summarize further related work relevant in the context of
this thesis.
The multitude of problems and disadvantages of the currently deployed Web PKI
is described by well known researchers [18, 26, 27, 63]. Monitoring of the Web
PKI reveals its enormous size and shows that indeed malpractices are common
[17, 32, 125].
The enhancement of PKI with trust computation has previously been proposed by
several researchers. However, the proposals so far lack practical applicability. Jøsang
proposes an algebra for trust assessment in certification paths in [36] but mainly ad-
dresses trust networks similar to PGP [75]. Huang and Nicol [33] also define another
trust model for trust assessment in PKI. Both approaches require trust values recom-
mended by the intermediates to evaluate trust chains. Such recommendations are in
general not included within commercial certificates. Different certificate classes like
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domain validated (DV) or extended validation (EV) can be indicators for such trust
values, but are to coarse grained for trust evaluation and are also not CA specific.
Other researchers base trust evaluation in CAs on their policies and the adherence
to those [15, 69]. This requires policy formalization [71, 15, 69] for automated pro-
cessing. Such formalized policies are not provided by CAs, and are in general far to
complex to be evaluated by the relying entities. Therefore, such approaches require
technical and legal experts to process policies [70].
By including recommendations, systems using computational trust can generally
be extended toward trust management systems. A survey on systems that evolve
local trust into global trust can be found in [11] and, more specific to reputation-
based trust management systems, in [60, 50, 31].
Key compromise and revocation can cause a huge impact on PKI systems, which
is a well known problem. Many researchers have criticized how revocation is im-
plemented in X.509. In this context, several proposals came up to either avoid
revocation or mitigate its impact.
The complete elimination of revocation in PKIs by the use of short lived certifi-
cates is proposed by Rivest [59] and applied by e.g. Gassko et al.[21]. Yet, this
approach comes with a considerable overhead of repeated certificate issuance and,
in case of CA certificates, rebuilding the whole certificate hierarchy.
Other authors propose to distribute trust among multiple instances. While Ma-
niatis et al. [22] propose a Byzantine-fault-tolerant network of TSAs to provide
protection against TSA compromise, Tzvetkov [65] proposes a disaster coverable
PKI model based on the majority trust principle. The first uses additional proofs of
existence based on threshold signatures but requires a complex infrastructure and
generates a huge overhead during verification of the signatures and time-stamps. In
the latter, to tolerate the compromise of a minority of CAs, each certificate has to
be signed in parallel by different CAs.
The use of write-once and widely witnessed media (e.g. official gazettes or news-
papers) is an alternative to anchor digital objects in the time-line. Combined with
the application of hash chains, as done by the TSA Surety [179], this can be im-
plemented more efficient, but the usability and the preservation (e.g. of printed
journals) in long term raise concerns.
Different proposals to use FSS in the area of PKI exist. Kim et al. [42] propose to
use FSS for CAs to ensure business continuity in case of a CA key compromise. Thus,
they use FSS in a similar way as this thesis. Yet, their work lacks the integration
into the different PKI related mechanisms such as path validation in hierarchical
PKIs and revocation. This is highly interwoven with the properties of FSS and
must be adequately implemented to benefit from the specific properties.
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Several other works apply FSS within PKI [24, 43, 72, 45, 46], but there are
significant differences regarding the goals and the use of FSS compared to this thesis.
Go [24] considers FSS for CAs, yet within the threshold setting in mobile ad-hoc
networks – which significantly differs from our PKI setting – concluding that no
existing scheme fulfills the specific requirements.
Koga et al. [43] propose a PKI model where the certificate chain for validation
always has length one. They propose different constructions where either FSS or
key-insulated signatures schemes (KIS) are used by the Root CA to generate the
secret keys for the Sub CAs. While this allows the keys of Sub CAs to remain valid
in case of a Root CA compromise, in case of the construction based on FSS, the
compromise of a Sub CA implies the compromise of all Sub CAs that obtained keys
with higher indices. Multiple Root CA key pairs or KIS solve this problem but at
the cost of additional overhead. The KIS approach is further developed by Le et
al. [45]. Nevertheless, in both works [43, 45] CAs always use their unique key to
sign end entity certificates. Thus, all user certificates issued by a certain CA are
invalidated in case of this CA being compromised. Furthermore, the CA keys need
to be securely transferred from the Root to the Sub CAs. The approach of Le et al.
even needs the transport of tamper resistant sub devices to the CAs.
In another work Le et al. [46] propose to use FSS in reverse order to allow to easily
invalidate signed credentials. That is, a credential is signed with many keys obtained
from an FSS key pair. Credentials can be invalidated by successively publishing the
keys in reverse order. While this could be used to obtain short lived certificates, the
applicability to establish a PKI is limited. As a key pair can obviously only be used
to sign a single document, this would imply the management of a huge number of
signing keys that are exposed to a possible compromise as the reverse order does
not allow the deletion of former FSS keys.
Xu and Young [72] focus on compromise detection to finally obtain a robust sys-
tem. To keep track of the key usage, signatures are deposited at highly secured
systems and published on bulletin boards. FSS are used to provide a stateful au-
thentication for the upload of signatures. Tampering can be observed based on
inconsistencies in the authentication key states.
3 The Web PKI requires user-centric
CA trust management
In this chapter we first give a problem exposition. Second, we show the practical rel-
evance of the problems and third, it is shown that user-centric CA trust management
is a promising solution to the described problems.
In Section 3.1 we show why the Web PKI – the globally trusted PKI, which is
the basis for secure Internet communication – fails to provide trustworthy public
keys. To show this, first the security model and the attacker model are presented.
Based on these models, the Web PKI is analyzed and a detailed description of the
problems leading to the failure of the Web PKI is presented.
The security model describes the involved entities and gives a definition of secure
Internet communication which requires authenticity, integrity and confidentiality.
In the attacker model, the attacker’s goal, capabilities and limitations considered in
this thesis are defined. Generally, the attackers we consider can generate certificates
that are signed by a trusted CA and contain a subject chosen by the attacker.
This capability can for example be achieved by compromising a CA’s private key.
Additionally, the considered attackers can inject certificates into TLS connections
between web servers and clients, for example by DNS spoofing and acting as a man-
in-the-middle on the network path between server and client. Based on the attacker
and security model, we then show that the reasons for the failure of the Web PKI
are the current trust model and shortcomings in the handling of revocation. The
current trust model – which we refer to as the system-centric trust model – considers
all public CAs fully trustworthy. The shortcomings in the handling of revocation
refer to the reliable provision of revocation information and the hurdles preventing
the revocation of CA keys, also known as the too-big-to-fail problem of CAs.
In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we show the practical relevance of the trust management
problem and the revocation problem described in the first part and that these are
still open issues. This is done by analyzing publicly known security incidents and
the examination of existing proposals that aim at the mitigation or the solution of
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the problems of the Web PKI. We analyze these proposals regarding suitability and
practicality.
In Section 3.4, it is shown that user-centric CA trust management, whose re-
alization is presented in Chapters 4 and 5, is a promising solution for the trust
management problem. The potential of user-centric CA trust management is evalu-
ated by analyzing real world browsing histories and examining how relying entities
experience the Web PKI. It is shown that relying entities individually only require a
small subset of the globally trusted CAs and that user-centric CA trust management
has the potential to reduce the attack surface spanned by the entirety of globally
trusted CAs by more than 95%. Additionally, user-centric CA trust management
enables the continuous monitoring of revocation information, which solves the prob-
lem of a reliable provision mechanism for revocation information. This will be shown
in Chapter 4. For the too-big-to-fail problem, we provide a solution in Chapter 6.
Section 3.5 concludes this chapter.
Parts of the contributions of this chapter were published in [B4], which covers
the examination of the Web PKI from a user’s perspective. This chapter extends
the published results by a detailed analysis of the Web PKI and its weaknesses, the
analysis of past CA security incidents as well as the evaluation of known concepts
for the mitigation of the described weaknesses.
3.1 The defectiveness of the Web PKI
First the security and the attacker model are presented. Then, the Web PKI is
analyzed and a detailed description of the problems causing the failure of the Web
PKI is given.
3.1.1 Security model
In Chapters 3 - 6 of this thesis, secure communication over insecure networks, namely
the Internet, is considered. Secure communication means, that a cryptographically
secured connection is established between the communicating entities, where at
least one of the entities authenticates itself to the communication partner. The
secure connection provides authenticity, integrity and confidentiality. In general,
this refers to secure communication between web browsers and web servers, where
the web server authenticates itself to the web browser (and subsequently the Internet
user that operates the browser). Secure connections are established using the TLS
protocol. Authentication is achieved by presenting a public key certificate issued by
a CA of the Web PKI. We give a formal description of the security model. The web
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browser and the user operating it are considered as a unity and referred to as one
entity.
In the security model we consider two entities E1 and E2. E1 establishes a TLS
connection to E2 which needs to authenticate itself. The problem is to decide whether
the connection is trustworthy for E1. A connection is considered trustworthy by E1,
if E2’s public key pk that was used in the TLS connection establishment, is trusted
by E1 to be a valid public key of E2. This requires:
1. A valid certificate C that binds pk to E2 is available to E1.
2. E1 trusts the issuer of C.
The first requirement is a standard PKI issue (cf. Chapter 2.2 for details). To fulfill
requirement 1, E1 requires a certification path p = (C1, ..., Cn) such that:
(a) Cn = C
(b) p passes path validation
Requirement 2 is fulfilled if p additionally passes trust validation. Explicit trust
validation is not incorporated in the current deployment of the Web PKI but trust-
worthiness is assumed for all CAs of the Web PKI (cf. Section 3.1.3). Explicit
trust validation is the core mechanism of user-centric trust management, which is
described in Chapters 4 and 5.
Note that a trustworthy connection to E2 does not imply the trustworthiness of
E2 itself. The trustworthiness of E2 comprises, for example, the quality of its web
page and the provided content. This is not addressed in this thesis and requires
additional mechanisms like the Web of Trust [190] or commercial web page ratings,
e.g., Norton SafeWeb [166] or McAfee SiteAdvisor [146]. In general, authentication
is a basic requirement for such mechanisms.
3.1.2 Attacker model
In the following, the attacker’s goal, capabilities, and limitations are defined. The
attacker A aims at breaking the authenticity, integrity, and/or confidentiality of
secure communication which was described in the previous section. The availability
of communication is out of scope of this thesis. We focus on attackers that make
use of the malfunctioning of the Web PKI to attack the communication. In Section
3.1.3, we explain why the Web PKI fails to prevent such attacks. In general, the
TLS protocol and the used cryptographic primitives are assumed to be secure. TLS
vulnerabilities, as well as implementation errors are out of scope of this thesis.
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Attacker goal A targets at TLS connections of a relying entity E1. The goal is to
impersonate web server E2, which is the intended communication partner. During
the attack, A may be the end point of the communication channel or acts as a
man-in-the-middle in the secure communication as shown in Figure 3.1. The attack
is successful if A is not detected. To achieve this, A presents a fraudulent certificate
to E1 for which he controls the private key during TLS connection establishment.
This allows A to impersonate E2 towards E1. A optionally establishes a second
connection to E2. This gives A full control over the communication, while the attack
is transparent to E1 and E2.
TLS TLS
Ԑ1 (relying entity) Ԑ2 (web server)attacker
Figure 3.1: Attacker impersonating the intended communication partner.
Attacker capabilities A is generally capable to position himself on the network
path between E1 and E2, for example by DNS spoofing. Additionally, A can generate
certificates that are signed by a CA of the Web PKI and contain a subject chosen
by A. We refer to such certificates as fraudulent certificates. In contrast, certifi-
cates where the subject actually identifies the entity who controls the corresponding
private key are called legitimate certificates. Fraudulent certificates may be issued
by a CA for example by compromising a CA’s private key and using it to issue
certificates. Note that self-signed certificates are unsuitable for attacks as they will
be detected during standard path validation.
Attacker limitations A can only generate fraudulent certificates on behalf of one
CA of the Web PKI at the same time. The CA is chosen by A and fixed afterward.
This assumption is justified by the fact that the issuance of fraudulent certificates on
behalf of a CA is not trivial in practice. We discuss security incidents that enabled
an attacker to manage such a malicious issuance in Section 3.2.
E1 and E2’s IT-systems are assumed to be secure and not compromised. Thus, A
is unable to access or manipulate locally stored data. Furthermore, A has no access
to E2’s private key corresponding to E2’s public key pk certified in E2’s legitimate
certificate. A is not capable of breaking the cryptographic algorithms or circumvent
the establishment of secure connections. In particular this means, once a secure
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channel has been established between E1 and E2 using E2’s legitimate certificate,
A cannot eavesdrop on the content of the communication or manipulate the data
without being detected.
3.1.3 The Web PKI
With the success of the Internet, the Web PKI gained more and more importance.
Its size and its complexity have continuously been growing. In recent years severe
vulnerabilities have been discovered in the design and implementation of the Web
PKI. They have led to the ongoing crisis of confidence in the Web PKI. According to
the IETF Web PKI OPS Working Group [107], the Web PKI is defined as follows:
Definition 3.1 (Web PKI). The Web Public Key Infrastructure (Web PKI) is the
set of systems, policies, procedures and people required to issue manage, distribute,
use, store and revoke public key certificates in order to protect the confidentiality, in-
tegrity, and authenticity of communications between Web browsers and Web content
servers.
In this thesis we follow this definition. The CAs of the Web PKI are the globally
trusted CAs that issue certificates to web content and application providers. The
use of the certificates issued by the Web PKI for the TLS protocols makes the Web
PKI to the indispensable basis for secure Internet communication.
However, the Web PKI fails in many respects to provide the desired security.
This is described in the following. We start with an overview on the Web PKI and
a description of its characteristics. Then, the current trust model – which we refer
to as the system-centric trust model – and the shortcomings regarding revocation
handling as the reasons for the failure of the Web PKI are discussed in detail.
The characteristics of the Web PKI
The Web PKI is a hierarchical PKI according to the X.509 standard [83]. Special
about the Web PKI is its global nature. Because of its scope to enable secure
communication on the Internet, interoperability is a central requirement. On the
one hand, the group of relying entities is virtually unlimited. Namely, any of the
more than 3 billion (stats for June 30, 2014 [135]) individual Internet users as well
as organizations and governments rely on certificates issued by the Web PKI. In
general, the relying entities are non-experts and cannot be expected to understand
the functioning of a PKI [5]. On the other hand, the group of potential certificate
subjects is virtually unlimited. Any web server operator or domain owner may own
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one or more certificates. The customers of CAs can be organizations, governments,
or individuals.
To deal with this complexity, the Web PKI has evolved to a global system of CAs
distributed around the world. These CAs are not organized in a strict hierarchy
with a single Root CA, but a set of Root CAs which serve as trust anchors for
certificate validation. Each of the Root CAs spans a hierarchical PKI as explained
in Section 2.2, while it is also possible that Sub CAs have their keys certified by more
than one superordinate CAs. Because of the huge number of CAs and the fact that
relying entities are non-experts, it is impossible to leave the management of trust
anchors to the relying entities. Instead, this is done by browser and operating system
vendors. The public keys of Root CAs are distributed within trusted lists called root
stores , contained in operating systems and browsers. Thus, browser and operating
system vendors globally define – according to their specific policies [148, 157] which
comprise certain security and audit requirements – which CAs are trusted. Besides
these individual rule sets, the CA/Browser Forum has defined baseline requirements
[81] that CAs of the Web PKI must meet and reflect in their policies. For Root CAs,
the adherence to the different policies is enforced through annual security audits,
while it is in general left to the CAs themselves to ensure this for Sub CAs.
The number of Root CAs has been constantly growing. For example, the root store
of the Mozilla browser comes together with the NSS crypto library [155] and contains
about 160 CAs [32, 156] while Microsoft’s root store even contains about 264 CAs
[63]. The total number of trusted CAs can only be estimated through broad scale
web scanning surveys [17, 32, 125] because there is no public directory that identifies
the existing (Sub) CAs. In this thesis, we use the numbers presented by Durumeric
et al. [17], which is the most complete survey to the best of our knowledge. By
scanning the address space of the Internet and downloading the certification paths
from publicly visible web servers, the CAs of the Web PKI are identified. They are
extracted from the collected certification paths by the use of their issuer names in
conjunction with their public keys. This results in a lower bound of 1,590 trusted
CAs which are controlled by 683 private as well as governmental organizations and
are operated under the jurisdictions of 57 different countries.
Also, there is no central directory service where end entity certificates are reg-
istered. This also results from the global nature of the Web PKI, where a central
directory does not scale. In general, a web server presents its certificate along with
the certification path to the relying entity during the TLS handshake. The relying
entity validates the certification path and checks if it starts with a trusted Root CA
and if the last certificate identifies the intended communication partner. If so the
relying entity trusts in the authenticity of the server. The public key is extracted
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Root CA1 Root CA3Root CA2
Ԑ1
Sub CA2
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Ԑ5Ԑ4
Figure 3.2: Example Web PKI
from the certificate and used to establish session keys to secure the communication.
A simplified example of the resulting Web PKI is depicted in Fig. 3.2. Here,
an exemplary certification path exists from Root CA1 to end entity E1, where the
arrows represent certificates. The circular arrows represent self-signed certificates,
which are often issued by Root CAs to themselves in order to publish their keys. To
validate E1’s certificate, only the key of Root CA1 must be known. All other keys
are contained in the intermediary certificates. In this small example, it can also be
seen, that it is difficult to determine all the trusted CAs. For example if Root CA3
were removed from the root store, its direct Sub CA4 would still be trusted due to
the additional chain from Root CA2. However, as there exists no public directory
of all certificates, the existing chains are in general unknown to relying entities until
they are presented during connection establishment.
Having explained the set up of the Web PKI, in the following sections the main
problems – the system-centric trust model and the shortcomings in the handling of
revocation – are described and it is shown, how they support the attackers described
in Section 3.1.2.
The system-centric trust model of the Web PKI
The universal applicability of the Web PKI makes it impossible to differentiate
between CAs on a global level. Any restriction on the trustworthiness of CAs by
browsers and operating systems also limits their operational capability which contra-
dicts the requirement of universal applicability, i.e., browsers and operating systems
must work for anybody and thus need to be capable of verifying any certificate
deployed on web servers.
This constitutes the system-centric trust model. By this we mean that Root
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CAs as well as Sub CAs are generally considered as trusted third parties, i.e. they
are assumed to be fully trustworthy. By issuing a Sub CA’s certificate, the issuer
delegates all its privileges to the Sub CA, which leads to the above mentioned
1,590 fully trusted CAs. Also, there are no restrictions for CAs with respect to the
domain names for which they are allowed to issue certificates or certificate uses.
Although the name constraints extension [83] can be used to limit the power of a
CA, in practice it is almost never used [1]. Thus, each of the trusted CAs can sign
certificates for any web service or domain.
The system-centric trust model directly leads to a weakest-link situation, where
the security of the whole system is determined by the weakest CA. An attacker as
defined in Section 3.1.2 who can obtain fraudulent certificates (by compromising a
CA or by a CA failure) from one of the trusted CAs can potentially impersonate
any web server and mount a man-in-the-middle attack on any TLS secured connec-
tion without users even noticing the attack. Thus, the system-centric trust model
creates an attack surface growing with each additional trusted CA. This attack sur-
face determines the attacker’s capability concerning the acquisition of a fraudulent
certificate.
The baseline requirements, certificate policies, and security audits enforce a basic
level of security. However, they cannot provide guarantees. The security incidents
in the past clearly show that the issuance and use of fraudulent certificates is a real
threat (cf. Section 3.2). It has also been shown [23] that certificate policies do not
allow to differentiate between CAs regarding their security in a fine grained manner.
As it is impossible to completely eliminate CA failures, the goal must be to min-
imize the attack surface of the Web PKI. However, as a global limitation of the
trusted CAs is not possible, we propose user-centric CA trust management, where
trust decisions are made on a per user level. In Section 3.4 the potential of the
approach is shown. Its realization is presented in Chapters 4 and 5.
Revocation in the Web PKI
Revocation of a certificate is required whenever the certified key needs to be in-
validated before the end of its validity period. Revocation is indispensable as it
transitions the system into a secure state after key compromise, or a malicious or
erroneous certificate issuance. Without revocation, an attacker can use fraudulent
certificates until they expire, which in general is an intolerable time span. Given a
revocation of a certificate, the attacker cannot further use it for attacks as soon as
the relying entity is aware of the revocation.
However, the Web PKI faces several problems concerning the revocation of certifi-
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cates: the reliable provision of revocation information and the too-big-to-fail prob-
lem.
First we describe the provision of revocation information. A relying entity must
obtain the revocation information during TLS connection establishment after having
obtained the certification path of the server’s certificate. Ideally, the connection
establishment and page loading must be blocked until the revocation status of the
certificate in question is checked. However, these online revocation checks on the
one hand introduce latency, which users are not willing to accept [56] and on the
other hand, there is no guarantee that the CA’s OCSP or CRL service is accessible
at the time when revocation checking is required. Because these online revocation
checks fail so often, all major browser vendors turned to so called soft-fails1 [182].
This means that if the revocation information for a certificate cannot be obtained, it
is simply evaluated as not revoked. However, this renders revocation useless exactly
when it is required, namely in the presence of an attacker as defined in Section
3.1.2. The attacker is able to manipulate the relying entity’s communication. Thus,
he can also block revocation checking leading to the acceptance of the fraudulent
certificate, although it might have already been revoked [138, 159]. OCSP stapling
does not solve this problem, as again the attacker can suppress the OCSP response
(cf. Section 3.3). In Chapter 4 it is shown how user-centric CA trust management
solves the provision problem by enabling the continuous monitoring of revocation
information.
The too-big-to-fail problem of CAs refers to the practical impossibility to revoke
CA keys. It is more severe the more services depend on the respective CA and the
more critical these services are. The revocation of a CA certificate subsequently in-
validates all certificates that contain the revoked certificate in their certification path
because of the validation according to the shell model (cf. Definition 2.1). This in
turn means, that all services using such an invalidated certificate for authentication
become unavailable until their certificates are exchanged by new ones. Considering
the huge customer bases of CAs of the Web PKI shows that deploying new certifi-
cates on all affected web servers is problematic. This is not an automated process
but requires manual changes by web server operators. In many scenarios, such a
temporal unavailability of services is not acceptable and thus, either requires that
the revocation of a CA key is considerably delayed or even completely avoided. For
example, revoking a certain Comodo Root CA would invalidate more than 200,000
TLS certificates [5] making the corresponding web services unavailable. The publicly
known incidents evaluated in Section 3.2 show the relevance of this problem. In none
1Note that Google even disabled online revocation checking completely in the Chrome browser
[141].
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of the incidents, browser or operating system vendors were willing to let security go
beyond connectivity. Furthermore, the huge impacts of a CA certificate revocation
and the related effects for the CA’s reputation provide strong incentives not to re-
port security breaches in order to circumvent public attention [5]. A solution for the
too-big-to-fail problem is provided in Chapter 6.
3.2 CA failures and compromises
We show the practical relevance of the trust management and the revocation prob-
lems described in Section 3.1.3. This is done by analyzing publicly known security
incidents concerning the CAs of the Web PKI.
Security incidents have several different reasons. On the one hand, a CA may
intentionally misbehave, e.g., due to economic motives, governmental orders, or a
CA is owned by the government and is used for surveillance [63]. In such cases
the CA intentionally issues fraudulent certificates to be used to attack TLS secured
connections. Subsequently, no security mechanisms set up by the CA itself can
help to detect or prevent such attacks. On the other hand, security incidents may
result from unintentional misbehavior, e.g., because of weak security practices or
implementation errors, social engineering and other attack vectors that are exploited
by attackers to obtain fraudulent certificates.
3.2.1 Categories of CA security incidents
The unintentional security incidents can further be categorized into four scenarios.
These four scenarios are the following [184]:
• Impersonation: The attacker impersonates another entity when registering
with a CA and tricks the RA into falsely validating the attacker’s pretended
identity. This leads to the issuance of a certificate binding the attacker’s key
to the identity of the impersonated entity.
• RA compromise: The second scenario goes one step further. In this scenario,
the attacker infiltrates the RA systems, e.g., by malware or stealing the cre-
dentials of a legitimate RA user account and is enabled to directly authorize
the issuance of (arbitrary) certificates by the related CA.
• CA system compromise: The CA system compromise describes the scenario,
where the attacker directly manipulates the certificate signing processes. In
this scenario, the attacker does not have access to CA’s signing key, but is able
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to directly initiate the issuance of fraudulent certificates, e.g., by querying the
security module containing the key. As the attacker has access to the CA
systems, he may also be able to manipulate security mechanisms of the CA
such as the logging mechanisms and thus conceal the compromise.
• CA signing key compromise: This is the most severe scenario. In this case,
the attacker obtains a copy of the CA’s private key, e.g., by stealing the key,
attacking the underlying algorithm or by a cryptanalytic attack. With the
CA’s key the attacker can arbitrarily issue fraudulent certificates, even after
he loses control over the compromised CA systems.
3.2.2 History of CA security incidents
In this section, publicly known CA security incidents are evaluated. Regardless
the severity of the failures and the threats for global communication no official
investigation and reporting from the affected CA’s side about the incidents can be
found in many cases. The sources of information are discussions between security
experts found on their Internet blogs, discussion forums of browser and operating
system vendors, or the online press.
01.11.2008 31.12.2014
01.01.2009 01.01.2010 01.01.2011 01.01.2012 01.01.2013 01.01.2014
17.06.2011 - 01.11.2011
DigiNotar 
15.03.2011 - 23.03.2011
GlobalTrust.it, InstantSSL.it / Comodo
21.05.2011
ComodoBR SQL injection attack 
(proofs found, exact date unclear)
22.12.2008 - 23.12.2008
Certstar / Comodo
20.12.2008 - 21.12.2008
StartSSL
15.06.2011 - 15.06.2011
StartSSL
09.09.2011
GlobalSign web server hacked 
(proofs found, exact date unclear)
08.08.2012 - 08.01.2013
TürkTrust
30.06.2012 - 09.07.2012
Cyberoam DPI devices 
(start date unclear)
08.07.2009 - 17.07.2009
Etisalat
03.12.2013 - 12.12.2013
ANSSI 
(attack duration unknown)
03.11.2011 - 10.11.2011
DigiCert Sdn. Bhd
04.11.2011
KPN/Getronics
09.08.2010
Verisign breaches
(detected, extend and dates unclear)
26.01.2012
TrustWave
(attack duration unknown)
30.04.2013
KPN Web Server hacked
25.06.2014 - 03.07.2014
NIC / India CCA
Figure 3.3: Timeline of CA failures, compromises and attacks
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Figure 3.3 shows the timeline of publicly disclosed security incidents. In the
following we evaluate these incidents and the respective countermeasures that were
taken upon detection. This will show, that the system-centric trust model is not
justified, the reactions on security incidents are highly influenced by the too-big-
to-fail problem and furthermore, revocation as currently implemented within the
Web PKI is not at all trusted to fulfill its purpose. We note that it is a general
presumption that the estimated number of unreported cases is much higher than
the publicly disclosed incidents [5, 114, 188, 27].
Impersonation
There are many ways how impersonation attacks can be carried out depending on
the mechanisms in place to verify the subscriber’s identity. Examples are using
a compromised employee email account, faxing forged business licenses and even
a case, where the attacker simply told the CA not to do anything bad with the
certificate has been reported [27]. Most of those incidents do not lead to a public
disclosure but to a silent revocation if the erroneous issuance is detected. Even an
incident in 2001 where Verisign erroneously issued two code signing certificates for
Microsoft products to an attacker only lead to a short note on the Microsoft support
pages [153]. The certificates did not contain a CRL distribution point extension and
thus a Windows update was required in order to invalidate them. In the following,
we discuss two impersonation incidents which have been covered by the media and
lead to broad discussions in the community.
Both incidents happened by the end of 2008, one at StartCom ltd., which main-
tains the StartSSL Root CA and the other one at CertStar, one of Comodo’s resellers
of certificates issued by PositiveSSL CA, a Comodo Root CA. While both vulnera-
bilities in the verification processes where discovered by security experts, there are
many differences in the two incidents. The one at StartCom resulted from an im-
plementation error. The exploit was detected by unspecified security mechanisms
implemented by the CA while the exploit was still running and the erroneously is-
sued certificates were immediately revoked (within a few minutes) by publishing a
CRL. Furthermore, investigations immediately started and lead to an update of the
CA’s systems as well as a full disclosure of the incident by the CA itself [163, 164].
In contrast, the impersonation attack at CertStar was possible because of the com-
plete absence of the verification of the subscriber’s identity. In order to prove this,
the attacker bought a certificate for mozilla.com and publicly disclosed the vulner-
ability [112, 110]. Only because of the disclosure by the attacker, the vulnerability
was noticed. Comodo revoked the mozilla.com certificate and initiated an audit of
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CertStar’s RA processes as well as suspended the RA’s ability to request certificates
during the investigation. However, not only a report of the investigation results
is still missing, but Comodo also played down the incident and claimed that the
vulnerability is simply a well known problem of domain validated certificates [110].
Furthermore, because of to the absence of control mechanisms, it is totally unclear
if the vulnerability was previously exploited by real attackers.
The incidents illustrate that the system-centric trust model is not justified.
RA compromises
In 2011, severe RA compromises happened at two of Comodo’s resellers Global-
Trust.it and InstantSSL.it [144]. Both had the privileges to request certificates
from the Comodo owned CA UTN-USERFirst-Hardware [122] without any fur-
ther approvals. This practice makes an RA compromise nearly as severe as a CA
system compromise, with the difference that attackers are not able to manipulate
the CA’s monitoring and logging systems. The attacker managed to compromise
user accounts of the RA and requested 9 certificates for high value domains, of
which at least one was used during man-in-the-middle attacks in Iran [122, 117].
The attack was detected within a time span of several hours and the certificates
where revoked. This time, Comodo additionally informed all major browser ven-
dors, the related domain owners as well as governmental authorities. Subsequently,
the browser vendors additionally blacklisted the fraudulent certificates within their
browsers [137, 185, 109, 152]. It took one week until all browsers where patched.
This was the first time, that such black listing functionality was used to deal with
fraudulent certificates. A public disclosure in the press was actively hold back un-
til all updates where finished [109]. In the aftermath, Comodo investigated the
incident and published an incident report [117]. Additional control and detection
mechanisms where set up which turned out to be effective during another attack on
RA systems one week later, where the issuance of certificates could be prevented.
Besides that, the organizational structure was changed such that each RA obtains
its own Sub CA certificate [108].
First, the incident shows that revocation cannot be considered to securely prevent
attacks with fraudulent certificates. Second, it shows the relevance of the too-big-
to-fail problem as the certificate of the issuing CA could not be revoked due to
its relevance in the certification business [27], which ultimately lead to the change
in Comodo’s business practices. Finally, it demonstrates the tendency to prevent
publication as described in [5], which leaves relying entities unprotected until the
final elimination of the threat.
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CA system compromises
In 2011, two CA system compromises occurred, which are both assumed to be related
to the Comodo RA compromise earlier that year. One occurred at the StartSSL CA
and one at DigiNotar. The attack on StartSSL happened in June 2011 and the
attacker gained access to the CA systems. Yet, the attack was detected in real time
due to monitoring and other unspecified security mechanisms [174] and the issuance
of certificates could be prevented.
The DigiNotar compromise, which presumably was initiated by the Iranian gov-
ernment, turned out to be the most severe incident related to certification that
happened in the history of the Web PKI. The severity of the incident, “which put
the security and privacy of millions of citizens at risk” [127] and threatened the
lives of people in Iran, was due to an accumulation of missing or inappropriate secu-
rity mechanisms combined with misjudgment, inadequacies in reporting about the
incident to relying entities and governments and the attempt to conceal the whole
incident from the public. This had severe consequences and exposed at least 300,000
Iranian Internet users to man-in-the-middle attacks and the interception of personal
communication. It was even argued, that activists had died as a consequence of
this security breach [127]. The attack(s) took place over the period of nearly one
month until they were detected. During this time, the attacker successively compro-
mised the CA systems until he obtained administrative access to all of DigiNotar’s
CA servers including the qualified ones managing the Dutch governmental PKIOver-
heid. However, the attack was not publicly disclosed upon detection. This happened
an additional month later, when fraudulent certificates for Google were detected by
Chrome users because of Google’s pinning mechanism for Google pages. At that
time, DigiNotar informed the Dutch government as well as major browser vendors.
Yet, in contrast to the Comodo RA compromise, the fraudulent certificates could
not be blacklisted as they were unknown because the attackers had also manipu-
lated the CA log files. This finally lead to the decision to completely revoke all
DigiNotar CA certificates and remove it as trusted CA from the Web PKI, which
ultimately lead to the bankruptcy of DigiNotar. However, the final and complete
removal was delayed for two more months. The reason for this intended delay was
not to interrupt the proper functioning of governmental applications that widely
relied on DigiNotar certificates. Investigations of the external IT specialist FoxIT
later revealed that a minimum of 531 fraudulent certificates for high value domains
like Google, Facebook, governmental pages as well as CA certificates on the name
of several other CAs of the Web PKI were issued [129].
Another CA system compromise happened mid 2014 [140] at the National Infor-
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matics Centre (NIC) which is a Sub CA of the India CCA Root CA in the Microsoft
root store. Again it was detected by Google’s pinning mechanism and not by the
CA itself. Thus, the exact duration of the attack is unknown. Google blacklisted the
certificates and alerted NIC, India CCA and Microsoft. This time, all CA certifi-
cates of NIC could be revoked within one day since NIC had only limited relevance
in the certification business. Investigations by India CCA revealed that NIC’s is-
suance process was compromised and certificates for Google and Yahoo were issued
to the attacker. However, Google detected additional certificates other than those
reported by India CCA. This puts the reliability of the investigations in question
and shows that the complete extent of the incident is unknown.
These incidents again illustrate that the system-centric trust model is inappropri-
ate and reveal the threats that can result from fraudulent certificates. Besides that,
the DigiNotar incident shows that the too-big-to-fail problem also concerns CAs
that have a relatively low relevance compared to the big players in the certification
business. However, work arounds that avoid the revocation of CA certificates are
not always effective which shows the necessity of the solution for the too-big-to-fail
problem.
CA signing key compromises
Regarding CA signing key compromises no incidents have been reported so far.
Given such an incident, there is no other measure than revoking the certificate that
certifies the compromised key. This is because in such a case, an attacker can issue
arbitrary certificates with that key, without any possibility to stop the attacker from
doing this.
CA misbehavior
Intentional CA misbehavior is another problem in the Web PKI. Also incidents where
a governmental order forces a CA to issue fraudulent certificates, see e.g. [63], belong
to this class if incidents. The special characteristic of such incidents is that the CA
has full control over its private signing key. No internal control mechanisms can
prevent such misbehavior because no real attack on the CA systems takes place.
Over the years a multitude of such incidents where revealed, which illustrate the
inadequacy of the system-centric trust model. The first one which has been publicly
reported happened in 2009, when Etisalat, a telecommunication company of the
United Arab Emirates, misused a code signing certificate it legitimately owned to
distribute spyware to the Blackberry subscribers among its customers [186, 172].
The spyware was masked as a regular update by RIM [173]. The incident was only
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detected by chance, as the spyware lead to a significant loss in battery life. The
Sub CA certificate also owned by Etisalat was – as far it is known – not misused,
and therefore was never revoked [120]. Thus, Etisalate is still a trusted CA of the
Web PKI even though it may be suspected that a company which intentionally
enabled the surveillance of 145,000 customers [143], also makes malicious use of its
CA certificate.
In 2011, the Malaysian company DigiCert Sdn. Bhd acted not really malicious
but highly irresponsible and violated the policies and baseline requirements of the
CA/Browser Forum [81]. DigiCert Sdn. Bhd issued 22 certificates certifying weak
512 bit RSA keys, which are insecure and prone to factorization. Furthermore,
strictly required extensions as CRL distribution points were missing [126, 136].
This made the revocation of the affected certificates useless. Entrust, the parental
CA detected these policy violating practices and informed the major browser ven-
dors. Subsequently, DigiCert’s CA certificate was revoked by Entrust and all major
browser vendors blacklisted the certificates in question within one week after detec-
tion [165, 116, 149].
In 2012, a policy update of Trustwave revealed that prior to the update Trust-
wave knowingly sold CA certificates to its organizational customers for monitoring
purposes within organizational networks. This allowed a hidden surveillance of the
employees (and potentially of any other Internet user) as there is no need to manually
install an additional trusted CA certificate on the employees’ systems as normally
required when such monitoring devices are used. In a clarification statement Trust-
wave notes [183] that this was only done once and the certificate was installed within
a hardware security module to prevent misuse of the certificate outside the orga-
nization. But, Trustwave claims that this is common practice in the business [5].
Such behavior becomes even more questionable, when taking into account another
incident at Cyberoam in 2012. It turned out that the deep packet inspection devices
sold by Cyberoam [118] allowed the export of the installed CA key [113]. Cyberoam
itself is not a CA of the Web PKI, however the combination of these two incidents
shows the threat potential of Trustwaves former business practices.
Also in 2012, Tu¨rkTrust erroneously issued CA certificates instead of end entity
certificates to two of its customers. One of these certificates was revoked two days
later on request of the customer who detected the error. The incident became public
more then four month later, when the second CA certificate which was still not
revoked, was used in a man-in-the-middle attack. The attack was again detected
by the pinning mechanism of the Chrome browser. Investigations by Tu¨rkTrust
revealed that the erroneously issued Sub CA certificate was installed on a company’s
checkpoint firewall [111] to regulate access to Google by internal clients. By then,
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Tu¨rkTrust also revoked the second fraudulent certificate. However, the fact that
Tu¨rkTrust was not aware of the second erroneously issued CA certificate illustrates
its insufficient security practices. Even though no signs of exploits for fraudulent
purposes [176] could be found, the erroneously issued certificates were additionally
blacklisted in major browsers [150, 176].
At the end of 2013, it turned out, that a certificate which chained up to a public
Root CA of the Web PKI, namely ANSSI a CA of the French government, was
used to inspect encrypted traffic of employees [139]. Subsequently, ANSSI revoked
the Sub CA certificate which was used to issue the certificate employed during the
monitoring activities. Additionally, the Sub CA certificate was blacklisted within
browsers [189, 151] while Google additionally limited trust for ANSSI to only issue
certificates for French and related top level domains [139]. While the impact of
this incident is assumed to be limited [139], it is another example for untrustworthy
behavior of CAs and policy violations.
Further incidents
Several other security incidents at CAs but not directly related to the certificate
issuing systems happened over the past years. In 2012, an investigation by Reuters
[147] revealed that the corporate network of Verisign was breached back in 2010.
Verisign never reported this incident except for a short comment in a in quarterly
report in 2011 [187] which does not reveal details, thus leaving the extent of the
breach totally unclear. In 2011, another Comodo RA, namely ComodoBR [132]
was target of a SQL-injection attack on the RA’s web facing servers, that revealed
information related to certificate signing requests, in addition to email addresses,
user IDs, and password information for a limited number of employees but did not
enable the attacker to make use of the certification infrastructure. Also in 2011, a
peripheral web server of GlobalSign was hacked [131] which lead to the temporal
suspension of certificate issuance and further investigations. These two incidents are
commonly assumed to be related to the other RA and CA compromises in 2011, and
could be unsuccessful attempts to compromise further CAs. Another incident hap-
pened at KPN/Getronics [128], which took over large parts of DigiNotar’s business
after its bankruptcy. An audit, which was conducted after the DigiNotar incident,
revealed that several of the company’s web servers were compromised four years
earlier and the attack remained undetected although the attackers left attack tools
for distributed denial of service attacks behind.
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3.2.3 Wrap-up
The analyzed security incidents related to CAs have shown the practical relevance
of the problems discussed in Section 3.1.3. The issuance of fraudulent certificates
is evident, as is their use in attacks against Internet users. The multitude of CA
incidents often in combination with poor security practices and inadequate reactions
to incidents as well as the many cases of intentionally misbehaving CAs show that
the system-centric trust model is inappropriate. Also, it was shown that revocation
as implemented today cannot be considered sufficient in case of CA compromises and
failures. In many cases, browser vendors reacted with emergency updates to blacklist
fraudulent certificates. However, it was shown that this is not a general solution as
it requires the complete knowledge of all fraudulent certificates. Furthermore, even
emergency updates face delays until they can be published and are actually installed
within browsers. Besides that, the too-big-to-fail problem was identified to prevent
the revocation of compromised CAs’ certificates, which would have lead to a much
faster protection of the users than the mitigating measures taken to circumvent a
complete revocation of the corresponding CA certificate. Although many incidents
have been reported, one must assume that the number of incidents and intentional
CA misbehavior is much higher [121]. This is due to poor reporting practices as
observed in some of the described incidents. Furthermore, it must be assumed that
governments that force CAs [63] to cooperate in the surveillance also prevent a
public disclosure of such activities.
3.3 State of the art: Concepts for mitigation
In this section, we show that the problems described in Section 3.1.3 are unsolved so
far. This is done by the examination of existing proposals that aim at the mitigation
or the solution of these problems.
3.3.1 Proposals for the system-centric trust model problem
Many attempts exist to circumvent the problems related to the system-centric trust
model. In the following we analyze the different proposals and show, that none
of them completely resolves the problem in practice. The proposals have in com-
mon, that they limit the reliance on CAs by introducing additional mechanisms for
certificate reconfirmations.
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Public key pinning
Public key pinning [87, 170] means that a relying entity locally stores information
that uniquely identifies a public key and relates it to a host name that has previously
been accessed. Public key pinning exists in different forms regarding the stored
information and how this information is bootstrapped.
Regarding the stored information it can be differentiated between certificate pin-
ning, public key pinning and CA pinning. Certificate pinning means that either
the certificate or the certificate’s fingerprint is stored. Public key pinning refers to
the storage of the public key or the key’s fingerprint itself. CA pinning refers to
the method, that instead of the end entity’s key, the key (or certificate) of a CA
is stored. This CA must be present in the certification path to the end entity’s
certificate.
Regarding the bootstrapping it can be differentiated between pre-installed infor-
mation, bootstrapping by user interaction and the trust on first use (TOFU) ap-
proach. TOFU means that, when a URL is first accessed, the presented certificate
(and key) is trusted and stored, while during subsequent connections, the same key
is expected. Bootstrapping by user interaction means that the user is asked whether
a certificate is trustworthy whenever a new certificate is received, while pre-installed
information means that public keys are pre-installed, e.g., within software bundles.
The different approaches were invented to resolve problems of public key pinning,
but none of them completely succeeded. One major issue is that public key pinning
is a static approach, while key management on the web is highly dynamic. The
assumption that underlies public key pinning is that a key assigned to a service re-
mains constant, and a key change indicates fraud. However, there are many reasons
why different keys occur reaching from certificate expiry over necessary key length
increase to key exchanges because of a compromise. Furthermore, having a service
with the same URL hosted on different servers like in content distribution networks
(CDN) often results in different certificates that certify different keys and are issued
by different CAs. In general, it is difficult to distinguish between legitimate and
fraudulent key exchanges.
Also the bootstrapping and update mechanisms are problematic. Pre-installed
keys are not a general solution for bootstrapping due to the lack of scalability.
Thus, key pre-installation can only be applied on a very limited scope and is always
application specific. An example for this is Google’s Chrome browser [142], which
is shipped with the public keys for Google services. This in fact led to the detection
of several security incidents as was discussed in Section 3.2. For a general scope,
user interaction or the TOFU approach is applied. Yet, in the first case this implies
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warnings whenever a new key or a key exchange is observed. Studies [64, 30, 2]
show, that warnings are nearly useless in practice and most users simply ignore
them. This in turn makes pinning useless as it is likely that a fraudulent certificate
will be accepted as a legitimate key change. Besides that, one cannot assume that
users can distinguish between legitimate and fraudulent certificates.
The TOFU approach is the only viable approach when considering pinning for
an unlimited scope of applications. As it implies that a possible attacker must
be present during the first connection establishment to a website, it provides a
clear security benefit by reducing the freedom of action for possible attackers. Yet,
legitimate key changes are still problematic as these are not clearly distinguishable
from fraudulent ones. Simply accepting a new key or falling back on the Web PKI
would nullify the security benefits from pinning.
Finally, all pinning approaches must be able to recover from a successful attack
or for example when a pinned key becomes unusable due to loss on the key owner’s
side. Then the question evolves how to inform the systems about such a case without
enabling attackers to make use of such a mechanism.
There also exist several proposals [87, 100] which allow the operator of a web host
to instruct clients which public keys they should accept in future connections. While
still relying on the Web PKI for the initial connection establishment, the approaches
handle legitimate key changes by informing clients in advance and installing backup
keys for potential errors. This aims at allowing hard-fails, when a non authorized
key change is detected. However, these proposals bear a high potential of server
unavailability due to misconfiguration or mismanagement of the keys, which is left
to server administrators. This concern is also reflected by the fact, that the proposals
come with fall back mechanisms such as limiting the lifetime of pinning information
in order to recover from configuration errors or even from pinning keys of an attacker
during the initial connection establishment. Due to these drawbacks, such server
assisted pinning solutions will rather stay niche solutions than being widely deployed.
Multi path probing and notaries
Multi path probing of certificates refers to the technique to contact a web server
through different network paths to retrieve and compare the certificates served by
the web server. The approach can detect man-in-the-middle attacks whenever there
exists a path to the intended web server that is not controlled by the attacker because
this leads to certificate mismatches. A clear advantage of multi path probing is the
freshness of the used information, meaning that mismatches do not occur due to
legitimate certificate changes. The difficulty is to establish such different paths as
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the web infrastructure is not designed to allow that routing is controlled by clients.
Thus, the connection to a server must be established starting from different entry
points within the Internet.
Such different entry points are often realized by certificate notaries. Notarial
solutions [145, 115, 171] may consist of single servers or a network of servers which
can collaborate or operate independently. These notary servers can be queried to
reconfirm certificates. The communication with the notary servers is secured by
pre-installed keys distributed within the corresponding software bundles. When
using notaries to evaluate the quality of certificates, trust is deferred from CAs to
the notaries or rather a majority of notaries. As notary servers are distributed
around the world, the resulting network paths to the target for which a certificate
is to be reconfirmed differ from each other. This allows multi path probing of
certificates. Additionally, notaries often maintain databases containing formerly
observed certificates. This data is collected through passive monitoring of network
traffic or active periodic monitoring of a given set of web servers.
On the one hand, multi path probing may suffer from false positives when different
certificates for the same domain are served. This can happen when multiple servers
are operated under the same domain as in CDNs. Then, a domain name does not
always resolve to the same server, but the actual server is chosen according to load
balancing rules or the geo location of the client. Well known examples for this are
Google and Facebook. In such cases, the probing end point may differ during multi
path probing and thus lead to certificate mismatches, even if all gathered certificates
are legitimate. On the other hand, certificate databases cannot provide information
about freshly deployed certificates or, when the reconfirmation of certificates of
servers which have not previously been monitored are requested. However, the
combination of certificate databases with multi path probing provides a robust set
up, as the techniques compensate their mutual weaknesses.
While allowing the reconfirmation of certificates the main drawback of notaries
is scalability and performance which prevents their broad application. For notaries,
the same holds as for OCSP (cf. Section 3.3.2). Hard-fails must be enforced in order
to provide protection against attackers that can potentially block connections to the
notaries. However, this requires a highly available infrastructure, which the OCSP
infrastructure fails to achieve since years. Furthermore, when multi path probing
is applied, additional delays are introduced due to the connection establishment to
a target server. These delays cannot be influenced by the notaries themselves. For
example, measurements for the Crossbear notary [171] and Perspectives [115], which
are used in the implementation of CA-TMS presented in Section 4.3, show varying
round trip times between 0.2 and 1.2 seconds. A further drawback is the additional
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network load, which is induced by multi path probing, which at least doubles the
number of TLS connections to the target server.
We note, that multi path probing independent from notaries has also been pro-
posed [3]. The proposal realizes multi path probing with the use of TOR. A second
connection through the TOR network is opened to a server in order to retrieve the
certificate and compare it to the certificate obtained in the normal connection. How-
ever, the approach can also not meet the performance requirements, as performance
is one of the major problems of TOR. Another approach, to ubiquitously integrate
multi path probing into the web infrastructure has been proposed in [B1] and is
ongoing research of the author of this thesis.
Public logs
Public logs are publicly accessible servers that maintain databases of public keys
and relate them to domain names. These servers can be used to look up the public
keys of web servers, similar to a global phone book. Two experimental proposals
currently exist, namely Certificate Transparency [98] and Sovereign Keys [123]. The
main difference of these proposals lies in the scope of the public logs. Certificate
Transparency aims at making all certificates issued by any CA of the Web PKI
publicly visible to allow public monitoring of CAs. The goal is to enable domain
owners to monitor the logs for fraudulent certificates issued for their domains in
order to be able to initiate counteractive measures like revocation.
Sovereign Keys aims at the registration of additional, so called sovereign keys
which are chosen and managed by domain owners themselves. Once a sovereign key
is registered, it is used by the domain owner to cross-sign the server’s TLS key or
alternatively a CA key contained in the certification path to the server’s key. Clients
can then verify the authenticity of the server’s key using the sovereign key registered
for a domain.
Both proposals require a complex infrastructure for monitoring and auditing in
order to prevent the manipulation of the public log servers and it is an open question
who can operate this infrastructure in a reliable manner. Besides that, Certificate
Transparency faces the same problem as OCSP and OCSP stapling. As long as
it is not a common standard and implemented by all server operators and CAs,
clients cannot reject connections simply due to the fact that a certificate is not
found on a public log, otherwise many services become unavailable. However, this
allows attackers to simply not report fraudulent certificates to prevent detection
by public monitoring. The Sovereign Keys project introduces a very complex key
management of the sovereign keys, which bears a high potential for misconfiguration
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and the eventual unavailability of web servers.
While Google pushes forward the implementation of Certificate Transparency and
implements a workaround by crawling the web to overcome the problem of limited
support at least for extended validation (EV) certificates, the Sovereign Keys project
is unmaintained since 2012. For none of the proposals a broad adoption is to be
expected, which is at least for Certificate Transparency a basic requirement for its
functioning.
DNS-based authentication of named entities (DANE)
An often discussed alternative to the Web PKI is the binding of certificates directly
to DNS resource records. These resource records are to be secured against manip-
ulation by DNSSEC. DANE [90] defines an additional TLSA-resource record. It
allows zone administrators to specify the public keys of the web servers that are
operated under the domain names managed in that respective zone. These keys are
provided by the web server operators to the zone administrators. DANE allows to
directly specify the web server’s certificate (including self-signed certificates) or CA
certificates which then need to be present within the certification path presented
during the TLS handshake. Thus, DANE allows to alternatively or even exclusively
validate server certificates based on the chain of trust given by the DNSSEC infras-
tructure. When comparing the DNSSEC infrastructure to the Web PKI, one can
compare the zone operators to CAs. Other than realized in the Web PKI, DNSSEC
has only one single trust anchor and each zone can only sign entries for a limited part
of the domain name space, namely its direct child zones. This is seen as the biggest
advantage over the Web PKI. However, despite being a strict hierarchy, DNSSEC
has similar problems as the Web PKI. The trust management problem remains. On
the one hand, each zone has limited power. On the other hand, there is absolutely
no possibility to distrust one of the zones, as alternative trust paths are impossible.
Thus, the system is even more susceptible to local law. Furthermore, it is important
to know, that the zone operators are mostly the same players as the CAs, as e.g.
Verisign for the top level domain .com.
Another drawback of DANE is the current deployment progress of DNSSEC,
mainly on the client side [7]. Compared to the Web PKI, DNSSEC is a young
technology and automatic support, e.g. to register server keys in resource records
is missing. Furthermore, most DNS resolvers on client hardware like computers
and smartphones are not capable to validate DNS records secured with DNSSEC
[49]. Thus, the validation is in general delegated to some DNS name server, which
simply indicates to the client if DNSSEC validation succeeded or not by setting a so
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called DO-Bit (DNSSEC OK) in its answer. However, this requires that the name
server must be trustworthy and the attacker must not be capable to manipulate the
connection to the name server. This is in general not guaranteed.
From these findings we conclude, that DANE is a valuable addition for security
and provides a means to reconfirm a web server’s certificate obtained during the
TLS handshake. However, it cannot be seen as a replacement for the Web PKI.
3.3.2 Proposals for the provision problem of revocation
information
As shown in Section 3.1.3, revocation must be combined with hard-fails in order
to be effective. Hard-fail means that a certificate must be evaluated as revoked if
its actual status is unclear. Yet, even if revocation checking fails in only 1% of the
connections, this prevents hard-fails from being implemented as the use of OCSP
has shown over the past [158, 161].
OCSP stapling (cf. Section 2.2.3) theoretically resolves this and allows hard-fails
[158], because the OCSP response is provided by the web server. This implies that
revocation information for a service is available if the web server itself is. Yet, an
attacker can remove the stapled OCSP responses. Once the deployment rate of
OCSP stapling approaches 100%, the absence of stapled OCSP responses can be
attributed to the presence of an attacker. However, according to the current SSL
survey of Netcraft [162], OCSP stapling is only implemented on 24% of the web
servers, which makes it impossible to decide whether an attacker blocked OCSP
stapling or the web server simply does not implement it. Thus, up to now hard-fails
are impossible.
The not yet standardized OCSP must staple extension [89] provides an opt in for
hard-fails for server operators as it allows to anchor the OCSP stapling within the
certificate. But still, protection relies on the deployment of OCSP stapling.
Because it is hardly assessable how long this will take, browser vendors like Google
and Mozilla [141, 159] implement revocation pushing strategies called CRLSet and
oneCRL. In both cases, these are aggregated CRLs which are pushed to browsers
on a daily basis using the browsers’ auto update features. Yet, as this approach
does not scale, Google focuses only on high value domains, while Mozilla puts the
focus on Sub CA certificates and extended validation (EV) certificates. While it
is not reported, which web pages are actually covered, one can assume that these
strategies are far from providing complete protection.
Besides that, blacklisting is another common approach to deal with the revocation
problem. However, it requires all browser vendors to be informed of fraudulent
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certificates which cannot be guaranteed as the incidents analyzed in Section 3.2 have
shown. In Chapter 4 it is shown how user-centric CA trust management resolves
the provision problem by enabling continuous monitoring of revocation information.
3.3.3 Proposals for the too-big-to-fail problem
Two closely related solutions exist for the too-big-to-fail problem. The first is to
apply multiple signatures [52] by independent CAs. This would allow to revoke one
of the involved CA keys, while certificates could still be verified based on the second
signature.
The second solution is to add a trusted time-stamp to each certificate, generated
by a TSA (cf. Section 2.2.7). The time-stamp would allow to securely identify which
certificates have been issued before a revocation and which afterwards, thus certifi-
cates issued before a revocation of the CA certificate could further be considered
valid.
Both approaches face several disadvantages. Firstly, they require the collabora-
tion of independent CAs or of a CA with a TSA during certificate issuance which
introduces overhead and requires the adaptation of currently deployed processes
and business practices. Secondly, they introduce overheads into certificate valida-
tion. As both signatures on the certificate have to be verified, including revocation
checking and path validation of independent certification paths, the overhead is
doubled. Furthermore, this would require the adaptation of current standards, and
their implementation on clients and web servers. These drawbacks have prevented
the deployment of such solutions so far and the hurdles to realize such broad scale
infrastructural changes will also do so in the future. Thus, these solutions are of
limited practical relevance. We provide a solution for the too-big-to-fail problem in
Chapter 6, which does not require infrastructural changes and is easily deployable
within the current Web PKI.
3.3.4 Wrap-up
We have discussed the most prominent proposals for the mitigation or the solution
of the problems described in Section 3.1.3 and it was shown, that none of these pro-
posals comes without its own drawbacks, sometimes completely preventing a broad
deployment. Other approaches are currently being deployed, however deployment
is a tedious process in large scale systems like the Internet. This has also become
evident in relation to the very serious Heartbleed vulnerability. It’s removal simply
required an update of the OpenSSL library on the affected servers. However, two
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month after the bug was discovered, only half of the 600,000 affected servers had
been patched. And security experts expect thousands of servers to be vulnerable
even in ten years [169].
In Chapter 4 we present our solution for the trust management problem as well as
the reliable provision of revocation information. The solution is based on the concept
of user-centric CA trust management. It does not require a broad application in
order to function. It makes use of several of the presented approaches without
imposing perfect availability requirements in the integrated systems. It employs
certificate pinning and notarial solutions, also additional mechanisms like Certificate
Transparency or DNSSEC can be integrated as additional validation services used
to reconfirm certificates.
3.4 The Web PKI from a user’s perspective
In the following, it is shown that user-centric CA trust management is a promising
solution for the trust management problem of the Web PKI. This is shown by ana-
lyzing real world browsing histories and examining how relying entities experience
the Web PKI. It is shown that relying entities individually only require a small sub-
set of the globally trusted CAs and that user-centric CA trust management has the
potential to reduce the attack surface spanned by the entirety of globally trusted
CAs by more than 95%.
3.4.1 The user-centric trust model for the Web PKI
In the user-centric trust model, trust decisions are made on a per user level. A
central aspect of the user-centric trust model is that trust settings are individually
set according to the requirements of the relying entity. Trust decisions further involve
the relying entity’s preferences and the subjective knowledge, the relying entity has
collected during previous interactions.
For the Web PKI, a user-centric trust model implies user-centric CA trust manage-
ment. Relying entities only trust the CAs they really need to validate the certificates
they observe during the daily use of the Internet.
In the following, the potential of the approach is shown. Based on a user study,
we evaluate how the currently deployed Web PKI is observed from a relying en-
tity’s point of view. We show, that the set of CAs relevant to a relying entity is
indeed highly dependent on the individual browsing behavior. Our findings confirm
that relying entities unnecessarily trust in a huge number of CAs, thus exposing
themselves to unnecessary risks.
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3.4.2 Web PKI user study - setup
For the pilot study whose results are presented in Section 3.4.3, we analyzed histories
of 22 volunteers. To support the user study, the tool called Rootopia was developed.
It automatically analyzes a relying entity’s browser history and extracts the data
regarding CAs the relying entity has observed in the past. Basically, it extracts the
hosts that were accessed via TLS and extracts the related CAs. For more technical
details on the tool please refer to [B4, 61].
An opt-in process was chosen for data collection, i.e., the users are required to
actively hand over the results of the analysis of their browser histories. Besides
that, we collected metadata using a questionnaire to be able to group the people
into different categories.
Four persons provided two histories, either from different browsers they use in
parallel, or different PCs. Thus, a total of 26 histories could be analyzed. All
participants currently live in Germany, but have different cultural backgrounds. 16
of the participants originate from Germany, 2 from Poland, 2 from Morocco, 1 from
Iran and 1 from China. The participants reach from IT experts to persons that only
occasionally use a PC. The participants are between 25 and 57 years old. All of the
participants either use Chrome or Firefox.
3.4.3 Findings
During the analysis of the collected data sets, user specific information as well
as similarities and differences among user groups were derived. Table 3.1 shows
aggregated numbers concerning history lengths and observed CAs. In the analysis
we distinguish between true Root CAs and CAs that were seen both as Root and as
Sub CAs (Root/Sub CAs). This resulted from cross-certification between Root CAs
or the occasional inclusion of superordinate CAs into the certification path, even if
one of the intermediate CAs is also present in the root store. As both Root and
Root/Sub CAs must be present in the root store to be able to validate all observed
certification paths, in the following we refer to them as the Root CAs.
Interestingly, none of the users – even those with a huge number of different TLS
hosts – did see more than 22 different Root CAs, which is about 13.4% of the 164
CAs included in the Firefox root store. Furthermore, a maximum of 75 Sub CAs
was reached. The absolute maximum of CAs in total seen by a single Internet user
was 96, which is 6% of the 1,590 trusted CAs of the Web PKI. Even fewer CAs were
found when only considering CAs that issued end entity (host) certificates. These
CAs represent the minimum number of CAs that need to be trusted by a user to be
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Criterion Average Min Max
Duration of analyzed period (months): 18 4 38
Total number of TLS hosts: 168 12 636
Total number of TLS connections: 18,475 162 159,882
Total number of Root CAs: 10 4 14
Total number of Root/Sub CAs: 4 0 8
Root + Root/Sub CAs: 14 4 22
Total number of Sub CAs: 36 11 75
Number of CAs that issued end entity cer-
tificates:
33 8 68
Table 3.1: History sizes and numbers of observed CAs
able to verify all the certificates of the hosts he connected to. The maximum value
of such CAs was 68 or 4.3% of the currently trusted CAs. The ratio of CAs issuing
end entity certificates was in the span of 50%-75% of the total CAs found for the
respective user and reached 63% on average.
Considering the total number of different Root and Sub CAs observed by the
whole group of participants, namely the union of all sets of CAs, leads to 28 Root
CAs and 145 Sub CAs. The numbers show that there is a high potential in limiting
the number of trusted CAs. Furthermore, for certain user groups, there is a high
overlap in the CAs (i.e. CAs that were observed by several persons). The overlap
is significantly higher for Root CAs than for Sub CAs. This is reflected in the set
union of Root CAs which is only 27% larger than the maximum number of Root
CAs of a single user, while in the case of Sub CAs the set union consists of twice
the number of Sub CAs seen by a single user. However, the significant differences in
the numbers for different users – reflected in the minimum and maximum values –
shows, that true minima for a single user can only be reached by individualization.
One influencing factor leading to a low number of different CAs is the fact, that
there are only few large CA companies with a high market share in the certification
business. However, the distribution we observed among those large players turned
out not to be according to the market shares from the Netcraft SSL Survey [162].
Most significantly, VeriSign, Inc. is involved in more than 20% of the certification
paths relevant for our user group, while it has only around 6% of the market share
in the Netcraft Survey. In contrast, Go Daddy with more than 20% of market share
was a Root CA in less then 4% of the certification paths in our data. This is another
indication, that it highly depends on the individual browsing behavior of the users,
which CAs are actually relevant for them.
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The observed CAs were also grouped by country. It turned out that – compared
to the total of 57 countries – CAs from only 14 different countries were relevant for
the considered user set. The overwhelming majority of CAs is from the US (US)
followed by Germany (DE), Great Britain (GB) and Belgium (BE). Considering the
other countries, less than 5 CAs were observed from those and only by very few
users.
Temporal evolution
In the following, we discuss our findings concerning the development of the individual
views on the Web PKI over time according to the dates when related hosts were
accessed. It turns out that the number of observed CAs does not grow linear but
shows limited growth with high growth rates in the first few months. Considering
Root CAs, the upper bound is reached after several months. However, growth rates
depend on the intensity of Internet usage or rather on the number of TLS hosts a
user connects to.
Considering users with high numbers of TLS hosts, the upper bound is reached
faster than for users that only connect to TLS occasionally. For Sub CAs, the
development is similar to the Root CAs, however, it is less significant. Thus, the
number of Sub CAs tends to keep growing over a long time. To build user groups,
we used the number of different TLS hosts averaged over the length of the analyzed
time span. The average was approximately 9 hosts per analyzed month.
For the ten users that use TLS connections less intensively (i.e., who used less
than 5 different TLS hosts per month), it takes a much longer time until the number
of CAs approaches an upper bound. Yet, the upper bounds are strictly below the
ones observed for users which use TLS a lot (i.e. the four users that used more than
18 hosts per month). On the other hand, there also exist users, that only connect
to a very limited number of hosts but where the upper bounds on CAs are reached
after very few months. This can be seen best in one data set, where the maximum
of 4 Root CAs is reached after 3 months and is constant afterward (16 months).
The picture for Sub CAs is nearly the same in that data set. A personal discussion
showed, that the data belongs to a person using e-banking and e-commerce services,
but besides that only occasionally surfs the Internet.
To summarize our findings on the development over time, we state that it is not
possible to give a concrete number of months after which all relevant CAs have been
seen and the number of CAs stagnates. This is highly depended on the individual
browsing behavior. In many cases – due to the regular deletion of the histories –
these are not long enough to derive the upper bound and the set of relevant CAs
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for the respective user completely. Yet, in general, our observations show that the
number of CAs tends towards an upper bound significantly below the total number
of existing CAs. This in turn shows the potential for the possible attack surface
reduction.
CA countries
As stated above, most of the observed CAs are from the US. The second most
observed country in our set of participants is Germany. However, this is also a user
group dependent outcome and results from the set of analyzed histories. A large part
of the participants is either from the scientific community or students at a university.
Building two groups, the first containing people with academic background and the
second one without, shows that German CAs occur much less often in the second
group. The percentage of German CAs is on average 18.3% of all observed CAs per
user in the first, and only 7.1% in the second group. It results from the fact, that
most universities have their own CAs, certified by the DFN Root CA. Those CAs
are completely irrelevant for the non-academic users. The distribution of CAs over
the other countries did not change significantly.
We also grouped the data into users that originate from Germany and those who
do not. Yet, interestingly this did not have significant effects on the distribution over
the countries. However, when considering single users, the relevant CA countries
can depend on the country of origin as we observed it for a user from Poland (PL).
Considering all data sets, there are some country codes that were observed for
most of the participants, yet where the respective CA was always one and the same.
These are SE, ZA, NL, and IE.
For the remaining countries (KR, PL, UK, BM, FR, AU) no fix pattern is observ-
able. From these, FR and BM are observed most often.
Relevance of CAs
The relevance of a CA for a user was measured based on the number of hosts related
to the respective CA. Interestingly, the number of Sub CAs that are related to only
one host lies between 20% and 60% of the total number of Sub CAs found for a
user, and is about 43% on average. This shows that Internet users observe many
CAs whose relevance is really low. Thus, it is highly questionable if the benefits for
the user due to fully trusting in those CAs counterbalances the imposed risks, not
speaking about the CAs a user never observes.
As it might occur that a single host is accessed extremely often by one user and
thus the related CA becomes more relevant to him, we also measured the number
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of visits, namely taking into account how often a host was accessed. As expected,
the number of Sub CAs only observed during a single connection is lower. But still,
rates of up to 38% of the total number of CAs for single users are reached and are
17.5% on average. This shows that many of the CAs are only observed by chance.
Furthermore, our data shows that a user observes the CAs most relevant for him
during the first months, while CAs which are found later are less relevant.
For each CA, we also averaged the CA’s relevance over all users that observed the
respective CA. It turns out, that there is a strong correlation between the number
of users that observed a CA, and the averaged relevance of the respective CA. From
these findings we conclude, that building user groups and taking the CAs which
most users of that group have in common can be a good starting point to set up an
individualized set of trusted CAs, e.g., for a user where no history data is available.
Number of CAs and overlaps
We computed the union of CAs for different user groups. To identify the similarity
of the views on the Web PKI within a group, we computed overlaps in the CA sets,
namely how many users have how many CAs in common. If not differently specified,
in the following with overlap we mean the ratio of CAs that all group members have
in common.
The group of the four users with most TLS hosts as specified in Section 3.4.3
jointly observed a total of 25 Root CAs and 108 Sub CAs. With 64% the overlap
of Root CAs is twice the overlap of Sub CAs (31%). That shows, that the set of
Root CAs relevant to a user is less dependent on the individual browsing behavior.
This also holds for the other groupings we analyzed and is as expected, as the total
number of existing Root CAs is nearly ten times smaller than the number of Sub
CAs. Comparing the 25 Root CAs and 108 Sub CAs with the complete set of CAs
jointly observed by all users, it turns out that the CAs seen by the users with most
TLS connections make up for 89% of all Root CAs and 74% of the Sub CAs. Thus,
most of the CAs required by the other users are also seen by the users with most
TLS connections.
When comparing the groups of academic and non-academic users, the first ob-
serves significantly more CAs (27 vs. 19 Root CAs and 140 vs. 63 Sub CAs). This
seems to result from the fact, that all the users with most TLS connections are also
part of the academic group. The overlaps in the academic group are higher than in
the non-academic group.
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3.4.4 Discussion of the results
With the study we showed that the risk to be affected by CA malfunctions is unnec-
essarily high in the system-centric setting. It turned out, that the individual views
on the Web PKI tend towards a stable individual set of CAs. The temporal evolu-
tion described in Section 3.4.3 actually shows different courses, thus confirming that
the set depends on a user’s individual browsing behavior. Our analysis indicates
that a reduction of the number of trusted CAs by more than 95% is possible with-
out restricting the respective user in his daily Internet use. We note, that a global
limitation of the trusted CAs is no viable solution. The sets of required CAs are too
distinct between different users. Thus, a global minimization of CAs cannot lead to
an optimal solution. Furthermore, it would lead to interoperability problems and
additional warnings whenever a certificate issued by an unknown CA is presented
to the user.
We also found large differences in the relevance of the CAs, which leaves further
room for improvement. However, it turned out that it is a challenging task to
completely define the set of relevant CAs for an individual user. One problem is the
unavailability of sufficient data about the user’s browsing history, e.g. because of its
periodical deletion. In such cases, grouping users and deriving group profiles can help
to provide a starting point for the limitation. The study has shown that such groups
exist, even though it is not possible to completely derive these groups from our data.
This indeed would require a large scale study with users revealing a multitude of
privacy sensitive information, which in turn prevents a broad participation in such
studies. In Chapter 5 we provide a reputation system which exploits the fact that
user groups exist, but realizes the grouping in a privacy sensitive manner without
the need of predefined user groups.
Furthermore, mechanisms are needed to deal with CAs that are newly observed.
Our data shows, that the number of CAs approaches a certain upper bound. How-
ever, new CAs can even occur after long time periods. Thus, views derived from
past browsing behavior might always lack some CAs that are required in the future.
In the next Chapter 4 we present our solution to locally and dynamically manage
an individualized set of trusted CAs.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, the defectiveness of the Web PKI was analyzed. The security and
the attacker model have been presented. The Web PKI has been explained, along
with its problems and how they support the described attackers. It was shown that
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the problems are the system-centric trust model and the and shortcomings in the
handling of revocation.
Afterward, CA security incidents have been analyzed. The described problems
indeed make millions of Internet users susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks.
The large impact of security incidents can be explained with the system-centric trust
model of the Web PKI, while the problems with revocation prevent fast and effective
countermeasures. The CA security incidents reach from the erroneous issuance of
certificates over CA system compromises to intentional CA misbehavior. Together
with the observed reactions to these security incidents by the CAs themselves this
shows the inadequacy of the system-centric trust model.
The scientific community is aware of the weaknesses of the Web PKI, thus many
proposals for their mitigation have been made. These proposals have been ana-
lyzed and their strengths and weaknesses have been discussed. It was shown that
the problems of the Web PKI are unsolved in practice. However, many of the
proposed approaches can be combined as building blocks for user-centric CA trust
management. Our solution will be described in the following chapter. The potential
of user-centric CA trust management has been shown by a user study, where real
world browsing histories have been analyzed. The study showed that the number of
trusted CAs can individually be reduced by around 95%, thus reducing the attack
surface of the Web PKI. Furthermore, as will be presented in the following chap-
ter, the fact that relying entities individually only require trust in a small sub set of
CAs of the Web PKI, user-centric CA trust management also enables the continuous
monitoring of revocation information.

4 CA-TMS: User-centric CA trust man-
agement
In this chapter, we present our solution for the trust management problem and how
to enable a reliable provision of revocation information. First, the realization of user-
centric CA trust management complemented with continuous revocation monitoring
is described. We call this system CA Trust Management System (CA-TMS). In the
second part we show how CA-TMS is implemented. The last part of this chapter is
concerned with the evaluation of CA-TMS.
In Sections 4.1 and 4.2 we present CA-TMS realizing user-centric CA trust man-
agement and continuous revocation monitoring. The components and mechanisms
of CA-TMS and the parameters that control the system behavior are described. For
these parameters, a parameter setting is presented.
The main idea of CA-TMS is to restrict the trust placed in CAs of the Web PKI
to trusting in exactly those CAs actually required by a relying entity. To achieve
this the certificate validation procedure is extended by trust validation. Trust vali-
dation is executed by a client program, the CA-TMS client. It communicates with
the browser via a browser plugin. As input, trust validation gets a user dependent
knowledge base called trust view. The trust view contains the user dependent in-
formation concerning required CAs and user preferences. The CA-TMS client also
provides the algorithms for trust establishment, learning processes and information
collection as well as bootstrapping. It allows the user to manage his trust view and
to control whom he trusts and to which extent. Continuous revocation monitoring
is implemented as an additional module. It becomes feasible due to the user-centric
CA trust management and the related information collected in the trust view. The
presented parameter setting is deduced from simulating CA-TMS based on real
world browser histories and analyzing the system behavior for different settings.
Section 4.3 is concerned with the implementation of CA-TMS. We present the
architecture and the modular design of CA-TMS. The implementation is available
as open source software.
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In Section 4.4 we evaluate CA-TMS regarding security and performance. It is
shown that CA-TMS provides the aimed attack surface reduction of more than 95%
compared to the standard system-centric setting as stated in Chapter 3. Also, it
is shown that the solution is practical. We give a security analysis based on the
attacker model presented in Chapter 3. To measure the attack surface reduction a
metric is presented. This metric is evaluated on data obtained from the simulation
of CA-TMS with real world browser histories using our proposed parameter setting.
The performance of CA-TMS is evaluated in terms of the overhead induced by trust
validation and additional certificate reconfirmations as well as continuous revocation
monitoring. Section 4.5 concludes this chapter.
The contributions of this chapter were published as parts of [B2, B5]. This chapter
extends the published contributions by continuous revocation monitoring and the
implementation of CA-TMS. Furthermore, the evaluation of CA-TMS was revised
and extended. The data sets used in the original evaluation were complemented
with additional browsing histories collected after the publication of [B2].
4.1 Trust view and trust validation
User-centric CA trust management means that CA-TMS restricts the trust placed
in CAs of the Web PKI to trusting in exactly those CAs actually required by a
relying entity. The number of trusted CAs is individually reduced. To achieve this,
the certificate validation procedure is extended by explicit trust validation in order
to evaluate the trustworthiness of a connection according to the security model
presented in Section 3.1.1. Different trust requirements for different applications
are considered during trust validation. For example, there is a difference in the
trust needed to visit a search engine and the trust needed to supply an online-
shopping web site with credit card information. The core of CA-TMS is the trust
view. It serves as a local and user dependent knowledge base for trust decisions.
We illustrate the mechanisms for the establishment and the management of the
trust view. Moreover, we implement learning processes and define decision rules for
automated trust decisions. Trust is represented by employing computational trust
models. The real trustworthiness of CAs is approximated by subjective probabilistic
trust values.
CA-TMS is focused on applicability, thus we only use data which is initially avail-
able or is collected over time. However, the system is open for extensions with
additional information sources. We build on existing techniques like public key pin-
ning and certificate notaries and combine different mechanisms that complement
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each other. Different from those existing mechanisms, CAs in the entity’s trust
view have different trust levels and may even be fully trusted depending on the con-
text. Furthermore, trust evaluation is based on local experiences of the entity, not
requiring recommended trust values embedded in certificates or the evaluation of
certificate policies and expert opinions. Thus, our solution can work autonomously
and does not require an additional check of every (new) certificate. CA-TMS pro-
vides a trade-off between overhead due to reconfirmations and solely relying on
CAs. Furthermore, the management of local experiences guarantees that CAs are
only trusted after they have previously been encountered and checked. A CA is
only trusted when the entity needs this CA to authenticate a web service – indepen-
dent from the CA’s global reputation. This protects the entity from malfunctions
of CAs that in general follow good security practices but are actually irrelevant for
the entity itself.
From the analysis of the Web PKI and the existing mitigations for its weaknesses
in Chapter 3, several constraints for the realization of user-centric CA trust man-
agement can be deduced. We present the challenges in the following.
4.1.1 Challenges
The set of CAs required by an entity is not fixed but changes over time. The
challenge is to establish and manage a trust view in a dynamic way. We identified
the following constraints for dynamically updating the set of trusted CAs as well as
for assigning trust levels to them:
1. Minimal user involvement: an informed assessment of the quality of a CA’s
certification processes is beyond the capabilities of the average Internet user
[30, 64]. Warnings should be omitted as far as possible, because users get used
to and tend to ignore them, even leading to a weakening effect.
2. Incomplete information on CA processes: data on the quality of a CA’s
certification process might be incomprehensible and non standardized, incom-
plete, or not available at all [23]. Also, published policies are no guarantee for
compliance [119].
3. Incomplete information on the relying entity’s requirements: in gen-
eral, the web services that an entity will contact in the future are unknown
and thus also the CAs that are required to verify the certificates of these web
services.
68 4 CA-TMS: User-centric CA trust management
4. Minimal latency for connection establishment and avoidance of block-
ing online verifications: in order to be accepted and used by relying entities,
the latency added to page loading must be kept as small as possible. Users
in general do not tolerate waiting time [56] or blocked connections due to the
unavailability of validation services (cf. Section 3.3.2).
4.1.2 Modeling trust validation
In the following we describe how trust validation is modeled. The final outcome of
trust validation is an estimate for the key legitimacy of the public key pk certified
in a certificate C. The key legitimacy of pk denotes the level of trust concerning its
authenticity, i.e., whether pk in fact belongs to the identity contained in the subject
field of C.
For a relying entity, in order to be convinced of the key legitimacy of pk, two
things are required [36, 54, 75]. First, the relying entity must be convinced of the
key legitimacy of the CA’s public key with which the signature on C is verified.
Second, the relying entity must trust the CA to issue trustworthy certificates. The
latter is called issuer trust in the CA.
In this thesis the CertainTrust trust model is used to represent trust. Please refer
to Chapter 2.4 for a detailed introduction and the definition of the related Certain-
Logic operators. CertainTrust together with CertainLogic provides the respective
operators required in our context. Recall, that CertainTrust expresses trust-related
information as opinions o = (t, c, f), where t represents the trust, c denotes the cer-
tainty about the correctness of t and f defines an initial trust value which represents
systemic trust.
With this, key legitimacy okl and issuer trust oit are represented as independent
opinions. The issuer trust assigned to a CA is further split into issuer trust for end
entity certificates oeeit and issuer trust for CA certificates o
ca
it . The key legitimacy of
a key is computed as the key legitimacy of the CA’s key in conjunction with the
issuer trust in the CA. In CertainLogic, the conjunction is realized with the AND
operator.
Now let C be an end entity certificate binding the public key pk to the subject E .
C was issued by the CA CA, i.e., it is signed with CA’s private key and the signature
can be verified with CA’s public key pkCA. Then, the key legitimacy of pk is denoted
with
okl,pk = okl,pkCA ∧ oeeit,CA.
The computation of the key legitimacy based on a certification path p = (C1, . . . ,
Cn) of length n > 1, follows directly from chaining this rule, while for intermediate
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certificates the respective issuer trust for CA certificates is used. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
let okl,i be the key legitimacy of the public key in Ci and oit,i the issuer trust assigned
to the subject in Ci (the subject in Ci is always the issuer of Ci+1). Then:
okl,n = okl,1 ∧ ocait,1 ∧ ocait,2 ∧ . . . ∧ oeeit,n−1.
The key legitimacy of keys distributed through an out of band channel can be
assumed to be complete. Thus, the key legitimacy of the first key pk1 in the path is
okl,1 = (1, 1, 1) because it is the Root CA’s key and distributed within the root store.
As for the AND operator holds: if oA = (1, 1, 1) then oA ∧ oB = oB, the formula for
the key legitimacy can be simplified to:
okl,n = o
ca
it,1 ∧ ocait,2 ∧ . . . ∧ oeeit,n−1.
In the following we describe trust views as the user dependent knowledge base that
contains the information trust evaluation is based on. Furthermore, we describe
the algorithms for initialization, information collection, bootstrapping and trust
validation in detail.
4.1.3 The trust view
For trust validation, entity E1 has a trust view View. The trust view is the local
knowledge base of E1 and contains all previously collected information about other
entities and their keys. It is built incrementally during its use for trust validation.
View consists of:
• a set of trusted certificates
• a set of untrusted certificates
• a set of public key trust assessments
The trusted certificates are all certificates that have previously been used to es-
tablish a trustworthy connection to another entity. The untrusted certificates are
those certificates, for which the connection was evaluated untrustworthy. Further-
more, there is one public key trust assessments for each known pair (pk∗, CA∗), i.e.
for which a certificate binding pk∗ to CA∗ was contained in a previously evaluated
certification path. A trust assessment represents all information collected for the
respective pair during prior trust validations.
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A public key trust assessment TA is a tuple (pk, CA, S, okl, o
ca
it , o
ee
it ), where
• pk is a public key.
• CA is the name of a certification authority.
• S is a set of certificates. It contains all the certificates with subject CA and
public key pk that have previously been verified by E1.
• okl is an opinion. It represents the opinion of E1 whether pk belongs to CA or
not (key legitimacy of pk).
• ocait is an opinion. It represents the trust of E1 in CA to issue trustworthy
certificates for CAs (issuer trust in CA when issuing CA certificates that are
verifiable with pk).
• oeeit is an opinion. It represents the trust of E1 in CA to issue trustworthy cer-
tificates for end entities (issuer trust in CA when issuing end entity certificates
that are verifiable with pk).
In order to decide whether the connection to entity E2 is trustworthy, entity E1
runs the trust validation algorithm (cf. Section 4.1.5). First we describe how trust
assessments are initialized.
4.1.4 Initialization of trust assessments
A trust assessment TA = (pk, CA, S, okl, o
ca
it , o
ee
it ) is initialized whenever a pair (pk
∗,
CA∗), for which there is no trust assessment in the trust view View, is observed within
a CA certificate C. We assume that a root store is available during initialization.
Then, TA is initialized as follows:
• pk = pk∗
• CA = CA∗
• S = {C}
• okl = (1, 1, 1) if the CA is a Root CA, else okl = unknown.
• The initialization of oxit for x ∈ {ca, ee} is the following:
1. If there exists T˜A ∈ View such that (C˜A = CA) ∧ ((CA is a Root CA) ∨
(the issuer of C equals the issuer of one C˜ ∈ S˜)), then set ocait = o˜cait and
oeeit = o˜
ee
it .
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2. If there exists no such T˜A then:
a) If for 1 ≤ i ≤ n there are trust assessments TAi ∈ View with Ci ∈ Si,
where the issuer of Ci is equal to the issuer of C, then compute f
x =
1
n
∑n
i=1E(o
x
it,i) and set o
x
it = (0.5, 0,min{maxF , fx}) for x ∈ {ca, ee}
and maxF = 0.8. min{a, b} denotes the minimum of the input values.
b) Else set ocait = o
ee
it = (0.5, 0, 0.5).
The key legitimacy is set to complete (okl = (1, 1, 1)) for Root CA keys as these
keys are confirmed via the root store. For other CA keys, key legitimacy is computed
during trust validation as long as key legitimacy is unknown. During the evolution
of the trust view, key legitimacy may be fixed and set to complete as soon as enough
evidence has been collected. We discuss this in Section 4.1.6.
Step 1 of the oxit initialization realizes the transfer of earlier collected information
about a CA to TA, which is especially relevant for CA key changes. The requirement
of either being a Root CA, i.e., being authenticated via the root store, or having the
same issuing CA ensures that the collected information undoubtedly belongs to the
CA in question.
Step 2 provides an initialization mechanism if no prior information about the
CA is available. If the new CA’s key is certified by a CA that certified keys of
several other CAs, i.e., there are siblings for which experiences have already been
collected, we use the average over the expectations of the respective issuer trusts
for initialization. The reason is that a CA evaluates a Sub CA before signing its
key, and thus, these Sub CAs are assumed to achieve a similar level of issuer trust,
like a stereotype [14]. While Burnett et al. apply machine learning techniques to
identify the features that describe stereotypes, the solution presented here assumes
that being certified by the same CA is the only relevant feature for stereotyping.
Therefore, all known CAs that are certified by the same CA form a stereotype.
We bound the initial trust value f by maxF in order not to overestimate a CA’s
trustworthiness (cf. Section 4.1.8 for a discussion of the effects of the parameter
choice for maxF ). If also no siblings are available in the trust view, the issuer trust
oxit = (0.5, 0, 0.5) reflects that no experiences have been collected and that the CA
may either be trustworthy or not.
Optimally, further information is collected for initialization. CA-TMS is open
for such extensions. In Chapter 5, we describe how to realize a reputation system,
which recommends the issuer trust of a CA to an entity based on the trust views
of other entities. Further information could be gathered from policy evaluation as,
e.g., proposed by Wazan et al. [69, 70]. A drawback of this approach is its need
for some kind of expert or expert system to evaluate the certificate policies and
72 4 CA-TMS: User-centric CA trust management
practice statements, because these documents cannot be processed automatically at
the time being [23]. So far, no such services are available in practice. Yet, given
such additional data, it can be mapped into an opinion and integrated into the
initialization process.
4.1.5 Trust validation
Now the trust validation algorithm is described. It takes the trust view of entity E1
and a certification path for the certificate of entity E2 as input and computes the key
legitimacy of E2’s public key to decide whether a connection established with E2’s key
is to be considered trustworthy. The decision depends on the security criticality of
the application that is to be executed between E1 and E2. The information available
in the trust view may not be sufficient to complete the trust validation. In such a
case, validation services are used as a fall back mechanism. Given a service provider
as described in Chapter 5 is available, untrusted certificates can be reported to it.
We include this optional step for completeness. For details on this functionality refer
to Section 5.3.1. We present the detailed trust validation algorithm in the following:
Input:
• The certification path p = (C1, ..., Cn) without intermediary self-signed certifi-
cates
• The trust view View of E1
• A security level l ∈ [0; 1] for Cn. l is selected by E1 and represents the security
criticality of the application that is to be secured by the connection from E1
to E2. The higher l, the more security critical is the application.
• A list of validation services VS = (VS1, ..., VSj) with outputs
Ri = VSi(C) ∈ {trusted, untrusted, unknown} for 1 ≤ i ≤ j on input of a
certificate C.
• (optional) A service provider SP (as described in Chapter 5) for the report of
untrusted certificates.
Output: R ∈ {trusted, untrusted, unknown}
The algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. If Cn is a trusted certificate in View then R← trusted
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2. If p contains a certificate that is an untrusted certificate in View then R ←
untrusted
3. If Cn is not a certificate in View then
a) For 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 set pki to the public key in Ci and CAi to the subject
in Ci.
b) Initialize the trust assessments for pairs (pki, CAi) for which there is no
trust assessment in View (as described in Section 4.1.4). Store the new
trust assessments in the temporary list TL.
c) For 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 2 set okl,i to the key legitimacy of pki and ocait,i to the
issuer trust (for CA certificates) assigned to pki in View.
d) Set okl,n−1 to the key legitimacy of pkn−1 and o
ee
it,n−1 to the issuer trust
(for end entity certificates) assigned to pkn−1 in View.
e) Set h = {max(i) : okl,i = (1, 1, 1)}
f) Compute okl,n = (t, c, f) = o
ca
it,h ∧ ocait,h+1 ∧ . . . ∧ ocait,n−2 ∧ oeeit,n−1
g) Compute the expectation exp = E(okl,n)
h) If exp ≥ l then R← trusted
i) If exp < l and c = 1 then R← untrusted
j) If exp < l and c < 1 then
i. For 1 ≤ i ≤ j query validation service VSi for Cn and set Ri =
VSi(Cn).
ii. Set Rc to the consensus on (R1, . . . , Rj), then R← Rc.
k) Update View (see Section 4.1.6 for details).
l) (optional) If R = untrusted trigger the report of p to SP
4. Return R
Security levels
Entity E1 assigns security levels to classes of applications according to their value-
at-stake (cf. [69] for a similar approach). That means, E1 defines which security
level the trust evaluation must achieve for the certification path in question in order
to be accepted without further reconfirmation. Note that E1 does not rate the
trustworthiness of applications.
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A security level is a real number between 0 and 1. The higher the security level
l is, the higher is the required key legitimacy for a connection to be evaluated
trustworthy. The assignment of security levels is a subjective process and depends
on the risk profile of E1, which is out of scope. We propose to apply three classes of
security levels lmax = 0.95, lmed = 0.8 and lmin = 0.6 (cf. Section 4.1.8 for details on
the choice of security levels and the associated effects). An exemplary assignment
of applications to the security levels could then be lmax for online banking, lmed for
e-government applications, and lmin = 0.6 for social networks.
Validation services
A certification path containing previously unknown CAs results in a low key legit-
imacy for the key certified in the end entity’s certificate. On the one hand this is
intended, as it leads to firstly distrusting in keys certified by unknown CAs. However,
this is not necessarily due to malicious behavior, but due to a lack of information.
Thus, whenever the key legitimacy is too low to consider a connection trustworthy,
and the certainty is less than one, validation services like notary servers (cf. Sec-
tion 3.3.1) are queried to reconfirm a certificate. Please refer to Section 4.3.1 for a
list of currently supported certificate notaries. The communication with validation
services is to be secured with keys distributed over out of band channels. This is
achieved with distributing the public keys of the employed notaries within the CA-
TMS software. Note that also solutions like certificate transparency or DNSSEC
could be integrated as validation services. If a certificate is reconfirmed to be le-
gitimate, the connection is considered trustworthy. If the validation services reply
with unknown, i.e., it is unclear if the certificate is legitimate or not, the algorithm
outputs unknown. Only in this case, the relying entity is asked for a decision.
In Section 3.3.1, latency introduced by validation services and their scalability
were stated to be the main drawbacks of these solutions. As part of trust validation,
these problems are circumvented. As will be shown in Section 4.4.3, reconfirmations
are only required occasionally. Delayed page loading due to a necessary reconfir-
mation once every 10 days is acceptable taking into account the security gain by
CA-TMS. Furthermore, the load on validation services is reduced drastically as only
less than 0.7% of an average relying entity’s TLS connections require a reconfirma-
tion which mitigates the scalability problems. Additionally, only little information
about the relying entity’s browsing habits is leaked to validation services.
User interaction
As stated in Section 4.1.1, CA-TMS aims at minimal user involvement. While there
exists a user interface for CA-TMS, where experienced users may change the system
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parameters described in Section 4.1.8, and also have direct access to the trust view,
this is not intended to be used during normal operation. Initialization of trust as-
sessments, trust validation and the trust view update is performed autonomously in
the background. It is built on passively collected local information (from past be-
havior and interactions) and input from validation services as well as the reputation
system presented in Chapter 5.
User interaction during normal operation is limited to the specification of the
security level the relying entity requires for the web site or web service he is about
to open. While an automatized decision on the security level by the determination of
the class of application together with a predefined rule set would be desirable, this is
out of scope of this thesis. Possible solutions can, for example, be based on content
filtering (as also used to detect phishing sites [74]) or based on analyzing the type
of entered data (cf. [53]). For now, the required security level can be specified by
the entity, using radio buttons that provide the different options for security levels
from which an entity may choose as part of the browser’s user interface.
Additional user interaction is only required as a fallback mechanism in cases where
neither the local information is sufficient nor validation services can provide a deci-
sion on the acceptance of a certificate. Then, the relying entity must decide upon
acceptance. In such cases no experiences are collected for the involved CAs, as the
lack of expertise makes user decisions unreliable. The certificates in question are put
on a watch list and experiences are collected after a later reconfirmation. This also
allows the system to react to wrong decisions by the user and prevents collection of
erroneous data. As the lack of expertise makes user involvement problematic, the
unknown case needs to be avoided whenever possible by the use of an adequate set
of validation services. The reputation system presented in Chapter 5 adds an ad-
ditional information source to fasten bootstrapping. Thus, the amount of external
reconfirmations and potential user interactions is reduced.
Apart from these cases no user interaction is required. In particular, relying en-
tities do not actively provide their personal assumptions about the trustworthiness
of certificates or CAs. This is also one of the main differences to other user-centric
approaches, like PGP [75], where users have to state their opinion about the trust-
worthiness of other users and the legitimacy of their public keys or the Web of Trust
[190], where users vote for the trustworthiness of provided content.
4.1.6 Trust view update
New information needs to be incorporated into the trust view to be available during
future trust validations. Based on the output of the trust validation, either positive
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or negative experiences are collected for the involved trust assessments. Repeated
experience collection for the same activity must be prevented. Therefore, for each
certificate it is checked whether it was contained in a certification path during earlier
evaluations. Given a service provider as described in Chapter 5 is available, a
recommendation for new CAs can be requested and incorporated into the trust view.
We include this optional Step 3 for completeness. For details on this functionality
refer to Section 5.2.1 in the following chapter. We present the detailed trust view
update algorithm in the following:
Input:
• A certification path p = (C1, ..., Cn) without intermediary self-signed certifi-
cates
• A trust view View
• An output of the trust validation R
• A list of new trust assessments TL
• A boolean value v ∈ {true, false} indicating whether Cn was validated by
validation services or not
• A list of validation services VS = (VS1, ..., VSj) with possible outputs
Ri = VSi(C) ∈ {trusted, untrusted, unknown} for 1 ≤ i ≤ j on input of a
certificate C
• (optional) A reputation system RS (as described in Chapter 5) which outputs
recommended issuer trusts RS(pk, CA) = (o˜cait , o˜
ee
it ) on input of a pair (pk, CA).
Output: The updated trust view.
The algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. If R = unknown then return View
2. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n−1 set pki to the public key in Ci, set CAi to the subject in Ci and
set TAi = (pki, CAi, Si, okl,i, o
ca
it,i, o
ee
it,i) to the corresponding trust assessments.
3. (optional) If (R = trusted) ∧ (v = true) then ∀TAi ∈ TL do:
a) Request RS(pki, CAi) = (o˜
ca
it,i, o˜
ee
it,i) from RS
b) If RS did not return unknown do:
If (i < n− 1) set ocait,i = (0.5, 0, E(o˜cait,i)), else set oeeit,i = (0.5, 0, E(o˜eeit,i)).
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4. If R = trusted then
a) For 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 do
i. If Ci /∈ Si then add Ci to Si
ii. If (i = n − 1) then update oeeit,i with a positive experience, else if
(TAi+1 ∈ TL) ∨ (Ci+1 /∈ Si+1) then update ocait,i with a positive expe-
rience.
iii. If TAi ∈ TL then add TAi to View.
b) Add Cn to View as trusted certificate.
5. If R = untrusted then
a) Set h = {max(i) : (TAi /∈ TL) OR (the consensus of (VS1(Ci), ..., VSj(Ci))
= trusted)}.
b) For 1 ≤ i ≤ h− 1 do
i. If Ci /∈ Si add Ci to Si
ii. If (TAi+1 ∈ TL) ∨ (Ci+1 /∈ Si+1) then update ocait,i with a positive
experience.
iii. If TAi ∈ TL then add TAi to View
c) If Ch /∈ Sh add Ch to Sh
d) If TAh ∈ TL then add TAh to View
e) If Ch+1 is not an untrusted certificate in View then: if (h < n−1) update
ocait,h else update o
ee
it,h with a negative experience.
f) Add Ch+1 to View as untrusted certificate.
6. Return View
Given a new certificate that was evaluated as trusted, a positive experience is col-
lected for the issuer. In case the certificate was evaluated as untrusted, a negative
experience is collected. For the calculation of the trust value alone, every negative
experience cancels out a positive one and vice versa. In many situations, negative
experiences should have a stronger influence on trust than positive ones: a certifi-
cate that failed the evaluation should not be trusted less but not at all. To meet
these concerns, the affected untrusted certificate is immediately added to the list
of untrusted certificates, in addition to the collection of a negative experience for
the CA that issued the certificate. Thus, the certificate will never be accepted in
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the future. Moreover, the actual impact of negative experiences on the final out-
come of the trust evaluation can be controlled by using adequate security levels (cf.
Section 4.1.5 and 4.1.8).
Example
An example of the evolution of a trust view is shown in Figure 4.1. It visualizes
the experience collection process, starting with an empty trust view. The arrows
represent observed certificates.
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Figure 4.1: Evolution of the trust view
(a) CA-TMS obtains the path Root CA1 → Sub CA1 → E2. Trust validation
returns trusted for E2’s certificate. A positive experience is added to each
involved CA.
(b) The path Root CA1 → Sub CA2 → E3 is obtained. Trust validation returns
trusted for E3’s certificate. A positive experience is added to each involved
CA.
(c) The path Root CA1 → Sub CA2 → E4 is obtained. Trust validation returns
untrusted for E4’s certificate. A negative experience is added to Sub CA2.
However, the certificate Root CA1 → Sub CA2 was approved during prior
observations, thus no negative experience is added to Root CA1.
(d) The path Root CA2 → Sub CA3 → E5 is obtained. Trust validation returns
untrusted for E5’s certificate. Thus, the certificate Root CA2 → Sub CA3
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must be checked. Assuming its reconfirmation, a negative experience is added
to Sub CA3, while a positive experience is added to Root CA2.
(e) The path Root CA1 → Sub CA2 → Sub CA3 → E6 is obtained. Trust vali-
dation returns trusted for E6’s certificate. A positive experience is added to
Sub CA2 and Sub CA3. Root CA1 → Sub CA2 was evaluated during prior
observations, no new experience is added.
Fixing the key legitimacy
Different from the issuer trust, which might change over time, key legitimacy the-
oretically is constant once it is approved. From that point on, the issuer trust in
superordinate CAs is of no further relevance. To consider this fact in the trust vali-
dation, key legitimacy is set to okl = (1, 1, 1) as soon as enough evidence for the key
legitimacy of a public key is available. We fix the key legitimacy after a CA’s key
was observed within several certification paths served by different web servers. This
strategy is similar to multi path probing applied by certificate notaries. To realize
the strategy, we introduce the parameter fix kl and set fix kl = 3, meaning that we fix
the key legitimacy after collecting three positive experiences for the respective trust
assessment. We refer the reader to Section 4.1.8 for an evaluation of the effects on
the trust view for different parameter choices.
Cleaning the trust view
To prevent a continuous growth of the trust view and to allow the adaptation to
current requirements (e.g., changed browsing behavior), a removal mechanism is
integrated. A trust assessment TA is removed from the local trust view after a fixed
time period has been passed since TA was last used within trust validation. The
length of this time period can be implemented as a system parameter, e.g., one year.
4.1.7 Bootstrapping
Despite the fact that an entity will often access the same services and see the same
CAs repeatedly, it takes a certain time until enough experiences are collected such
that the system may operate mainly autonomously (cf. Section 4.4.3 for details).
Therefore, a bootstrapping procedure is required to face possible delays and usability
problems due to the involvement of additional validation services as described in
Section 4.1.5.
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Bootstrapping is realized based on scanning the browsing history. This technique
has already been used to evaluate the potential of user-centric CA trust manage-
ment presented in Section 3.4.1. From the history, the hosts that have previously
been accessed via a TLS connection can be identified and the respective certification
paths can be downloaded. The paths are then used to bootstrap the trust view and
collect information about the CAs relevant to the relying entity. Bootstrapping does
not require additional algorithms. Trust evaluation along with certificate reconfir-
mations as described is executed on the certification paths obtained from history
scanning one after another. This initial bootstrapping is only to be performed once
and afterward, the system can mainly fall back on the collected experiences.
A limitation in the approach evolves from the fact, that many users delete their
history – partly or completely – quite often for privacy reasons. In such cases,
it is not possible to derive the CAs relevant to the user. Then, the trust view
has to be bootstrapped in parallel to normal browsing with the drawback of high
reconfirmation rates at the beginning of the trust view evolution. This problem is
solved with the reputation system presented in Chapter 5.
4.1.8 Parameters and system behavior
The system behavior is controlled through different system parameters. In the
following, the effects of these parameters on the system behavior is evaluated and a
parameter setting is deduced. This is done based on real world browsing histories
collected during the survey presented in Section 3.4.1.
Parameter n
The parameter n of CertainTrust opinions is the number of the expected average
number of experiences for a statement. It is a system-wide parameter. We propose
n = 10, which means that after collecting ten experiences for one of the opinions,
its certainty becomes 1.
Due to its impact on the certainty of an opinion, the parameter n of CertainTrust
influences the development of the expectation of opinions during the course of col-
lecting experiences. This is shown in Figure 4.2 for different values of n. While n
has only little influence on the expectation during the collection of the first three to
four experiences, n significantly influences the number of required positive experi-
ences to reach expectation values approaching the upper bound of 1. That means,
n in conjunction with the security levels can be used to adjust how fast CAs are
considered fully trustworthy, while n concurrently has only minimal influence on the
CAs that are approaching minimal security levels. Thus, increasing n mainly means
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Figure 4.2: The influence of n on the development of the expectation of a CertainTrust
opinion.
shifting CAs from the group of fully trustworthy CAs to medium trustworthy CAs
while the group of CAs that reach the minimal security level remains unaffected.
Security levels
The expectation value of CertainTrust opinions is continuous. Thus, the required
security level l for each application could also be chosen as any number between
0.5 and 1. We propose to assign applications to three distinct classes as already
presented in Section 4.1.5. Doing so makes the system clearer and easier to use for
potential users, as it reduces the complexity to decide which security level to require
for an application.
The security levels to which a user may assign applications are lmax = 0.95,
lmed = 0.8, and lmin = 0.6. Once the the expectation of the derived key legitimacies
for certificates issued by a CA exceeds lmax, the CA is referred to as fully trustworthy
(medium or minimally trustworthy respectively).
Given a complete key legitimacy of the CA’s key and n = 10, at least one posi-
tive experience has to be collected prior to reaching the minimal security level for
certificates issued by the CA. The medium security level requires three positive ex-
periences while the maximum security level requires seven. For the presented choice
of security levels, increasing n, e.g., up to n = 30 would have no influence on when
a CA is considered minimally or medium trustworthy, but twelve instead of seven
positive experiences would be required for the CA to be considered fully trustworthy.
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Parameter fixkl
In Section 4.1.6, we proposed to fix the key legitimacy of a CA’s key after observing
a CA’s key within fix kl certification paths. After the fixation of the key legitimacy,
superordinate CAs have no further influence on the evaluation of certificates issued
by the CA. Then it relies solely on the experiences made with the CA directly. We
propose to fix the key legitimacy after three positively evaluated encounters, i.e., set
fix kl = 3.
Similar to n, increasing fix kl mainly reduces the number of fully trustworthy CAs,
while the number of medium and minimally trustworthy CAs grows. This is shown
in Figure 4.3. It depicts, exemplary for the most evolved trust view from the data set
of the survey presented in Section 3.4.1, how the distribution of hosts associated with
CAs reaching the different trustworthiness levels changes for values from fix kl = 1
up to fix kl = 80. The distribution is measured for the bootstrapped trust view after
observing 604 different TLS enabled hosts.
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Figure 4.3: Percentage of total hosts that are assigned to fully, medium, mimimally
trustworthy and untrustworthy CAs for different values of fixkl. For one exemplary trust
view.
The effects yielded by fixing the key legitimacy is explained by the fact that
the expectation for the key legitimacy of issued certificates is not lowered by the
trustworthiness of superordinate CAs (which is due to transitively lowering the key
legitimacies along the certification path).
The value of fix kl also has influence on how fast a CA achieves its previous trust-
worthiness level after its key was changed. Directly after the key renewal, the derived
key legitimacy of certified end entity keys will be low, as the key legitimacy of the
CA’s key is computed based on the path from the root to the CA’s (new) certifi-
cate. After fix kl encounters of the CA’s key, the previous trustworthiness level is
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reestablished, i.e. the system solely relies on the experiences collected for the CA in
question.
Stereotyping and parameter maxF
Stereotyping is a means to derive trust for newly observed CAs based on experiences
collected for other CAs. This, on the one hand, allows to trust in CAs never observed
before. Thus, the number of required reconfirmations is reduced. On the other hand,
the anticipated trustworthiness of the CA is not based on the CA’s behavior directly
and information gained from stereotyping should not be overestimated to prevent
threats. Threats may evolve when a less trustworthy CA profits from the reputation
of its siblings. Therefore, we limit the influence of stereotyping by selecting the
parameter maxF = 0.8. This limits the certificates that are directly trusted due
to stereotyping to low security applications. The difference in the functioning of
stereotyping compared to fixing the key legitimacy is that the fist affects newly
observed CAs and the certificates issued by those, while the latter affects newly
observed end entity certificates issued by already known CAs.
4.2 Continuous revocation monitoring
In Section 3.1.3 the lack of a reliable provision mechanism for revocation informa-
tion in the face of an attack was identified for the Web PKI. Together with the
currently implemented soft-fail methodology in browsers, this may render revoca-
tion completely useless. In Section 3.3.2, OCSP stapling was discussed as a potential
solution to this problem. Yet, it was shown that because of deployment issues and
the related impossibility to enforce OCSP stapling by client software, this does not
solve the problem.
We now present a mitigation to this problem that can be implemented without
external support and without the requirement of a broad deployment and infras-
tructural changes.
As described in Section 4.1 all certificates trusted by a relying entity are collected
within his trust view. These certificates contain the CRL distribution points or
OCSP server addresses. Thus, the data collected within the trust view enables
to continuously monitor the revocation status for known hosts as well as known
CAs. Thus, the revocation status of certificates is already available at the time of
connection establishment in most cases.
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4.2.1 Functionality
To realize continuous revocation monitoring, CA-TMS maintains a list of revocation
access points. Whenever a new certificate is added to the trust view as trusted certifi-
cate, the revocation access points are extracted from the certificate’s extensions (CRL
Distribution Point and Authority Information Access extensions). These ac-
cess points are stored in the list. Concordant access points are aggregated, which
mostly happens for certificates issued by the same CA. Once a certificate expires or
is considered untrusted, the revocation access points of the certificate are discarded
from the list. This procedure keeps the list up-to-date.
On a daily basis, CA-TMS iterates through the list and fetches revocation in-
formation for the certificates in the trust view. Given one of the certificates is
revoked, the status of the certificate is set to untrusted within the trust view. If an
OCSP server or a CA’s server that provides the CRLs is unavailable at the time of
revocation checking, the request is delayed and later retried.
4.2.2 Advantages of revocation monitoring
The main advantage of this continuous revocation monitoring is, that it decouples
fetching of revocation information from browsing. It runs in the background, thus
does not block page loading, which makes longer round trip times acceptable. When-
ever a relying entity accesses a web server, revocation information is already avail-
able. Furthermore, despite not being impossible, it is much harder for an attacker
to block revocation checking as there is no direct relation between service access and
the retrieval of revocation information. Other than revocation pushing strategies as
discussed in Section 3.3.2, revocation monitoring covers all certificates relevant to
the relying entity, including CA certificates. Note that downloading CRLs from all
trusted CAs contained in the trust view additionally covers certificates issued by
these CAs but not yet observed by the relying entity.
4.3 Implementation of CA-TMS
This section is concerned with the implementation of CA-TMS. We present the
architecture and the modular design of CA-TMS. The source code is available under
the Apache Software License 2.0 [181] at https://github.com/ca-tms/CA-TMS.
Trust validation is executed by a client program, the CA-TMS client. It commu-
nicates with the browser via a browser plugin. The CA-TMS client is implemented
in Java [168]. As browser, the Firefox browser was chosen and an according plugin
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was implemented that realizes the communication between browser and CA-TMS
client. The CA-TMS client is designed to be application independent. The setup is
displayed in Figure 4.4.
Browser CA-TMS clientCA-TMSbrowser plugin
Figure 4.4: CA-TMS setup
The CA-TMS client maintains the user’s trust view and implements the algo-
rithms for trust validation, learning processes and information collection as well as
bootstrapping and revocation monitoring. Additionally, it allows the user to manage
his trust view and to configure the user preferences through a user interface.
Here, we focus on the system design and give an overview on the implemented
functionality. For implementation details and a manual for installation we refer the
reader to the project web page.
4.3.1 The CA-TMS client
In the following the architecture of the CA-TMS client is described. The client is
organized into different layers that group related functionality. The layers them-
selves are subdivided into different components. We first describe the top level
architecture and summarize the functionality of the layers. Afterwards, we give a
detailed specification of each layer and the contained components. The design is
based on the Layered Application Guidelines of the Microsoft Application Architec-
ture Guide [154].
The high level architecture is shown in Figure 4.5. It is structured into five
layers and a cross-cutting (CC) module. The layers are the presentation layer (PL),
the services layer (SL), the business layer (BL), data access layer (DAL) and the
support services access layer (SSAL). The PL contains all components to provide
user interaction. It enables user input and user information. The SL contains all
components to expose the functionality of the CA-TMS client to other applications.
The BL encapsulates the business logic of the CA-TMS client and implements its
core functionality. The DAL comprises the components related to data access and
representation of user-specific data. The SSAL provides access to support services
and implements components that enable the consumption and processing of data
provided by support services. The CC implements functionality that spans layers.
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Figure 4.5: High level architecture of the CA-TMS client
In the following we describe the layers and explain which functionality they im-
plement.
Presentation layer
The PL provides the means for user interaction, like input fields and dialogs. The
PL is divided into a graphical user interface (GUI) component and a presentation
logic component. The GUI implements the visual elements of the application like
buttons and message dialogs which are used to display information to the user and
accept user inputs. The GUI of the CA-TMS client is a management GUI, which is
not required during normal use.
The different processes for user interaction are encapsulated within the presen-
tation logic component. Thus, the presentation logic component defines the logical
behavior of the client during user interaction. Furthermore, it defines how data from
the underlying layers is presented to the user. This is realized in a platform inde-
pendent way using the interfaces provided by the GUI component. Furthermore, it
manages how the application reacts to user inputs.
The PL realizes a management GUI for the CA-TMS client and allows the user to
configure the CA-TMS client and execute initialization processes like bootstrapping.
It also provides the possibility to export the user’s trust view or to import an existing
trust view into the system. User interaction directly related to browsing, such as
warning dialogs and reconfirmation requests are realized through the browser plugin,
which extends the browser’s user interface.
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Services layer
The SL contains all components to expose the functionality of the CA-TMS client
to other applications. It defines how the client and other applications interact. The
service interfaces and the message types are defined here. On the other hand a
common interface is provided to the BL. Thus, the SL abstracts from the actually
supported service consumers.
The CA-TMS client exposes its services to other application via a web server
binding. The CA-TMS client implements a web server that can be queried by the
browser plugin with JSON encoded messages over HTTP.
Business layer
The BL encapsulates the business logic of the CA-TMS client. It implements the core
functionality of the client such as trust evaluation for given certification paths and
the management of the trust view. In particular, it implements the trust validation
and trust view update algorithms. Furthermore, the logic for continuous revocation
monitoring is implemented in this layer. The BL exposes the functionality of the
client to higher layers as PL and SL. For data access or information retrieval from
external services, the BL falls back on functionality provided by the lower layers,
namely the DAL and the SSAL. Furthermore, it manages escalation rules if no
decision can be made based on the available data. For example, the user can be
triggered and the decision can be requested if no automatized decision is possible.
For trust representation and computation the CertainTrust library [180] is integrated
into the client. It provides the necessary operators for combination and aggregation
of CertainTrust opinions.
Data access layer
The DAL comprises the components related to data access and representation. Be-
sides that it handles import and export of trust views for backup and recovery.
The DAL provides a common interface to retrieve and store user data from and to
different sources.
For example, through the DAL, the components of the BL can access data on
internal or external data sources. The CA-TMS client stores the trust view and the
user’s preferences within an SQLite [177] database. The encapsulation of data access
within the DAL allows a convenient integration of other storage technologies, as the
actual data source is transparent for the other client components. An example could
be a remote data base server or a cloud storage.
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Support service access layer
The SSAL provides common interfaces to access external support services such as
certificate notaries for the reconfirmation of a certificate or OCSP servers for re-
vocation checking. The SSAL allows to access different services in a standardized
manner. It manages the semantics of communication with the external services.
The SSAL is used by the BL components. Access to notary services is encapsu-
lated in a separate library, which is developed in a sub project and available at
https://github.com/ca-tms/sslcheck. At the time of writing, it implements
connectors for the Crossbear notary [171], Perspectives [115], Convergence [145],
ICSI [133] and SignatureCheck [175].
The encapsulation of external service access within the SSAL allows to extend
CA-TMS with additional services in a convenient way. In particular, the integration
of CA-TMS service providers as described in Chapter 5 can be realized within the
SSAL.
Cross-cutting
The client components use cryptographic functions and communication protocols.
This functionality is encapsulated within the respective cross-cutting components.
4.3.2 The browser plugin
The browser plugin has been implemented as a Firefox extension. The extension
manages the communication between the browser and the CA-TMS client. It im-
plements an SSL Listener, that is triggered whenever a web site is opened via the
HTTPS protocol. Path validation is left to the browser implementation. If path
validation has succeeded, the extension extracts the certification path and passes it
to the CA-TMS client for trust validation. The loading of the web page is blocked
until the validation result is obtained from the CA-TMS client. If trust validation
succeeds, the web page is loaded. Otherwise, a warning message is displayed which
informs the user about the outcome of trust validation and allows to temporarily
override the trust validation result if required.
Additionally, the extension provides a simple user interface to set the required
security level during browsing. The security level is transferred to the CA-TMS
client when trust validation is requested.
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4.4 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate CA-TMS regarding security and performance. We start
with the analysis of direct attacks against CA-TMS in Section 4.4.1. Afterward in
Section 4.4.2 we present an analysis of the reduction of the attack surface. Then in
Section 4.4.3, the performance analysis of CA-TMS is presented.
We show, that CA-TMS is robust against the manipulation of an entity’s trust
view. Furthermore, a metric is presented to measure the reduction of the attack
surface. With this metric it is shown that CA-TMS provides an average attack
surface reduction of more than 95% compared to the system-centric setting. The
performance of CA-TMS is evaluated in terms of the overhead induced by trust
validation and additional certificate reconfirmations as well as continuous revocation
monitoring. It is shown that the use of CA-TMS does not interfere browsing in
practice.
The attack surface and performance evaluation are based on simulations using
real browsing histories. The data was collected using the tool Rootopia which was
developed for the user study presented in Section 3.4.2. From the analyzed his-
tories, the web services (hosts) accessed via TLS connections have been extracted
along with the respective certification paths. These paths are available sequentially
ordered based on the date when they where first accessed. This sequentially ordered
paths allow to simulate the evolution of the respective trust views. Note that in the
simulation, the collection of experiences is limited to positive experiences. Due to
only collecting positive experiences, the resulting opinions on the issuer trusts form
an upper bound for the actually derived trustworthiness in real life applications.
The original evaluation of CA-TMS published in [B2] was based on twenty data
sets collected during the original user study. After the publication, additional data
was collected during a second user study. In total, data about browsing histories
from 64 different entities were collected. The evaluation was revised and extended
to the complete data set. We note, that the key findings from [B2] remain intact.
4.4.1 Attacks against CA-TMS
The security analysis is based on the attacker model presented in Section 3.1.2.
Recall that attacker A is an active man-in-the-middle attacker on the connection
between relying entity E1 and web server E2. A can generate certificates that are
signed by a CA of the Web PKI. The systems of E1 and E2 are assumed not to be
compromised, nor can A break the employed cryptographic algorithms. Also, the
validation services are assumed to function correctly.
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This section is focused on attacks against specific components of CA-TMS. The
attacks aim at the manipulation of E1’s trust view. Following from the attacker
model, the intention behind these attacks is to prevent detection whenA attacks E1’s
communication employing a fraudulent certificate. Following the analysis framework
of Hoffman et. al [31], the attack vectors are identified based on the separation into
formulation, calculation, and dissemination components of CA-TMS.
Formulation resembles the reputation metric and sources of input. A CA’s rep-
utation is stored as opinion, which is updated by positive or negative experiences.
The information source are observed certification paths along with the responses of
validation services. Thus, A can positively or negatively influence the trust in a CA
if he succeeds in serving manipulated certification paths.
Calculation concerns the algorithms that derive trust from the input information.
In CA-TMS, these algorithms are deterministic and executed locally. Thus, as E1’s
system is assumed not to be compromised, A cannot influence the calculation other
than by injecting manipulated input data.
Finally, dissemination concerns all transfer of data between system components.
The communication with validation services is secured using pre-established keys,
and cannot be manipulated. A may block or disturb the communication, which
is only relevant in case CAs are observed anew, or not enough information has
previously been collected. However, the unavailability of validation services does
not allow the manipulation of the trust view, even in case E1 manually accepts a
manipulated certification path (cf. Section 4.1.5).
Attack vectors
Following from the analysis, the possibilities to manipulate and influence the trust
evaluation of CA-TMS under the given assumptions is limited to injecting false input
data. We now explain the attack vectors A might use to inject false data into E1’s
trust view, and explain the respective protection mechanisms. We also discuss social
engineering which may serve as a auxiliary attack vector to support other attacks.
Certification path manipulation To directly inject information into the trust view,
A needs to inject manipulated certification paths into E1’s communication during the
connection establishment. In order to inject positive experiences (for a CA of which
A controls the private key), he must inject the CA’s certificate into certification
paths such that trust validation succeeds.
To inject the CA’s certificate, A can either replace the whole path, by generating
a new certificate for the web service with the CA’s key, or by issuing a certificate for
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one of the intermediary CAs contained in the original path sent by the web server.
Therefore, this certificate replaces only the part from the Root CA to the newly
issued Sub CA’s certificate. In both cases, standard path validation succeeds.
The first option is exactly from what CA-TMS shall protect and will be analyzed
in detail in Section 4.4.2. A may only succeed if the compromised CA is already
trusted by E1. This means that this attack vector may only be used to increase the
trust in CAs that are already trusted. The second path manipulation option will
not be detected as the end entity certificate remains unchanged. Yet, this way the
attacker can only increase the corresponding issuer trust for issuing CA certificates.
Injecting fraudulent certificates in order to generate negative experiences is im-
possible for CAs A does not control, as he cannot generate certificates in the name
of CAs of which he cannot access the keys.
Social engineering In general, social engineering means an attacker tries to ma-
nipulate other entities such that they behave differently than they would in the
absence of a social engineering attacker.
The direct influence of social engineering attacks on the reputation of a CA is
limited, as long as a relying entity does not use the management GUI of the CA-TMS
client to manipulate trust scores. Such an attacker cannot be prevented by technical
means and is therefore not considered further. However, we note that to prevent
such attackers educating relying entities to be security aware is indispensable.
CA-TMS does not intend relying entities to manually set the key legitimacy or
issuer trust assigned to a CA. User involvement is minimal. Relying entities only
have to make their own decision on the acceptance of a certificate if their trust view
does not contain sufficient information and at the same time all queried validation
services respond with unknown. However, if a relying entity manually accepts a
certificate, no experiences are collected. The only possibility to directly influence
the trust view of a relying entity is to lead the relying entity to web pages whose
certificates were legitimately signed by the CA controlled by the attacker. This
can either introduce additional CAs into the trust view or result in the (legitimate)
collection of additional experiences for a CA.
Another possibility for an attacker is to influence a relying entity to setting the
required security level l to a low value, which would increase the probability for the
attacker’s certificate to be accepted. Therefore, CA-TMS recommends a minimal
security level such that CAs are never trusted without at least one legitimate obser-
vation. To prevent misconfiguration, automatic detection of the required security
level according to a specific rule set in conjunction with the content of a web page
is an interesting future research direction.
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Also, an attacker could try to gain information about the relying entity’s browsing
behavior, for example by interviewing the relying entity. This in fact would help
the attacker to (partially) derive the relying entity’s trust view and subsequently
distinguish between those entities that are attackable with certificates issued by a
certain CA and those that are not. Anyway, these sorts of social engineering attacks
are limited to single relying entities and are thus costly to execute.
Attacker goals and defenses
The previous subsection discussed the attack vectors that A can use to manipulate
trust views. In this section, specific attacker goals, their possible realization, and
how they apply to CA-TMS are discussed.
Self-promoting Self-promoting describes actions ofA towards making him or a CA
under his control appear more trustworthy. This in fact is the attacker goal with
highest relevance as it increases the success probability of A when finally employing
fraudulent certificates to attack secure communication.
A self-promoting attacker can approach his goal by injecting manipulated certi-
fication paths. As shown above, certification path manipulation only works for the
issuer trust concerning the issuance of CA certificates. This might subsequently
allow A to issue CA certificates with high key legitimacy. However, he cannot in-
fluence the issuer trust concerning the issuance of end entity certificates, which in
fact is required to benefit from the attack. This is only possible for CAs that are
already trusted making the attack needless.
Slandering In opposition to a self-promoting attack, slandering aims at lowering
the reputation of a specific CA. As A does not directly benefit from decreased trust
in CAs, he might only aim at disturbing the proper functioning of CA-TMS. As
shown above, A cannot inject fraudulent certificates on behalf of CAs he does not
control, thus he cannot utilize the attack vector of manipulated certification paths
to inject negative experiences.
Whitewashing Whitewashing describes the approach of an entity with negative
reputation to re-appear under a new, clean identity.
If A controls a CA with negative reputation, he might want to give this CA a
new identity to issue certificates that will appear trustworthy. However, whitewash-
ing does not apply to CA-TMS. Newly observed certificates are not automatically
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trusted and thus, A gains no advantage from whitewashing. Moreover, whitewash-
ing is prevented by standard PKI mechanisms as for a CA to re-appear under a new
identity, its new CA certificate either needs to be added to the root stores or needs
to be certified by some CA which is already part of the Web PKI.
4.4.2 Attack surface evaluation
In this section, we evaluate how CA-TMS reduces the attack surface of the Web PKI.
When E1 uses CA-TMS, trust validation must succeed for a presented certification
path. Otherwise, validation services are queried and a potential attack is detected.
Recall that A might block the access to validation services to prevent a definite
detection. However, in such cases the connection is temporarily blocked and E1 is
informed about the suspicious certificate.
Trust validation can only succeed if the certificate is already a trusted certificate
in E1’ trust view View or if the involved issuers are contained in View. Furthermore,
those CAs must be considered sufficiently trustworthy for the required security level
of the application. Thus, A must compromise a CA with sufficiently high issuer
trust in order to be successful.
Attacking a specific group of entities requires the compromise of a CA with a
sufficiently high issuer trust in each of the group member’s trust views. The same
holds when attacking a specific service. In this case, the relevant set of trust views
are those of the group of service users. Otherwise, A risks an immediate detec-
tion of the compromise when the validation services are triggered. As shown in
Section 3.2, several past CA compromises have been detected in exactly that way
where the compromised CA was not trusted by the Chrome browser. As trust views
are specific to individual entities and not publicly visible, it is hard to identify such
a sufficiently trusted CA. Even if the identification is possible, it is questionable if
A can purposefully compromise that CA. In Chapter 5, a push service for CA warn-
ings is presented to also protect entities whose trust view already contains the CA
controlled by A as a trusted CA. The detection mechanisms is shown to be effective
even if only a small fraction of the targeted entities does not trust the compromised
CA.
Generally speaking, by the use of CA-TMS, A can hardly exploit accidental CA
failures. The possible damage is reduced due to the limitation of the number of
attackable entities accompanied by the increased compromise detection probability.
Furthermore, with CA-TMS, the damage a compromised CA may cause highly de-
pends on the CAs visibility in the certification business. The result of using CA-TMS
is a much more natural setting than each existing CA being equally critical.
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Measurement of the attack surface
The attack surface is individually reduced by CA-TMS by limiting the number
of trusted CAs. The attack surface is a measure for the individual risk to rely
on a fraudulent certificate. We measure the effectiveness of CA-TMS by adapt-
ing the metric of Kasten et al. [41], which measures the attack surface as AS =∑
CA∈PKI dom [CA], where dom [CA] is the number of domains which CA is allowed to
sign. PKI describes the set of all CAs which are part of the Web PKI. We adapt the
metric to:
AS(View) =
∑
CA∈View
(bCA1 · dommax + bCA2 · dommed + bCA3 · dommin)
with
bCA1 =
{
1 if for CA : E(okl,ee) ≥ lmax
0 else
,
bCA2 =
{
1 if for CA : E(okl,ee) ≥ lmed
0 else
,
bCA3 =
{
1 if for CA : E(okl,ee) ≥ lmin
0 else
,
where dommax, dommed, and dommin are the respective numbers of domains for
which the relying entity E1 requires a maximal, medium or minimal security level.
The input View represents the trust view of E1. A CA is contained in View, if
it contains the according trust assessment. Note that CAs not contained in View
are not considered, as these are not trusted by E1 to sign any certificate. okl,ee =
okl,CA ∧ oeeit,CA is the derived key legitimacy of keys certified by a certificate that was
issued by CA. The key legitimacy okl,CA of the CA’s key depends on the certification
path as described in Section 4.1.5.
Further it holds: dommax + dommed + dommin = dom. dom describes the total
number of validly signed domains, i.e., for which a valid TLS certificate exists. Note
that in our metric dom is not parametrized by the respective CA as the restriction
of domains for which a CA is allowed to issue certificates is not considered. This is
according to the current deployment of the Web PKI (cf. Section 3.1.3).
Attack surface measurements for real trust views
In the following, the reduction of the attack surface for the 64 trust views simulated
based on the data sets collected in the user studies is presented. For all simulations,
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the proposed parameter setting: lmax = 0.95, lmed = 0.8, lmin = 0.6, maxF = 0.8,
fix kl = 3, and n = 10 is used.
The calculation of the attack surface of the Web PKI in the system-centric setting
is based on the number of 1,590 CAs observed by Durumeric et al. [17]. With
the system-centric trust model for the Web PKI, all CAs are trusted for signing
certificates for any domain, thus AS = 1, 590 · dom, which equals the attack surface
computed with the original metric from [41].
The adapted metric enables the relative quantification of the reduction of the at-
tack surface resulting from the use of CA-TMS with the above specified parameters.
The relative attack surface for a trust view View is defined as:
ASrel(View) =
AS(View)
AS
.
Then, the reduction of the attack surface can be quantified as:
RedAS = 1− ASrel(View).
The distribution of the domains to dommax, dommed, and dommin depends on the
relying entity’s preferences. Data about the distribution of security levels to domains
is not available to us. The analysis is done for the three generalized cases where
either lmax, lmed or lmin is assigned to all domains. We denote the respective relative
attack surfaces with ASrel(View, lmax), ASrel(View, lmed) and ASrel(View, lmin). In
these cases, the relative attack surface results as the quotient of CAs in the trust
view that can issue certificates for the given security level, divided by the total
number of CAs of the Web PKI. Further details about the data sets can be found
in Tables 1 and 2 in the appendix.
For the 64 analyzed trust views we found 0 ≤ ASrel(View, lmax) ≤ 0.028, 0 ≤
ASrel(View, lmed) ≤ 0.049 and 0 ≤ ASrel(View, lmin) ≤ 0.057.
The minimum numbers result from the least evolved trust views where nearly no
CAs are trusted. In most cases this results from short histories and the related low
number of observed hosts. However, considering the 48 trust views resulting from
browsing histories with a minimum length of six months only slightly increases the
minimal relative attack surfaces to 0, 0.001 and 0.001. The averages for these 48 trust
views are ASavgrel (View, lmax) = 0.009, AS
avg
rel (View, lmed) = 0.019 and AS
avg
rel (View,
lmin) = 0.026.
This shows a reduction of the attack surface of at least 94.3%, even for the security
level lmin. On average, a reduction of 97.4% is achieved in our data sets.
To generalize these results, the relative attack surface is evaluated depending on
the number of observed hosts. The attack surfaces for the different security levels
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Figure 4.6: ASrel(View) for security levels lmax, lmed and lmin. (Real data.)
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Figure 4.7: ASrel(View) for security levels lmax, lmed and lmin. (Extrapolated for host
numbers larger than 466.)
are measured during the simulations after each observation of a new host. The
resulting attack surfaces are then averaged over all simulated trust views. The
results are shown in Figure 4.6. It shows an under proportional growth depending
on the number of different hosts that are accessed via TLS secured connections.
The gaps within the graph result from trust views ending with the according
number of observed hosts. Thus, the results for the high numbers of observed hosts
depend on a low number of trust views. In our data sets, only 7 trust views contained
more than 466 different hosts. Furthermore, the results for more than 639 hosts are
based on a single trust view with 1013 hosts in total. This trust view also formed an
upper bound for the number of observed CAs. Thus, the averaged results for high
numbers of observed hosts are biased towards a larger attack surface. To have an
estimate for the average relative attack surfaces, the data from the measured values
below 466 observed hosts is extrapolated. This is depicted in Figure 4.7.
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The extrapolation is done with an exponential estimator. The average rate of
change was computed with a sliding window of size 50. The resulting curve was
approximated with an exponential approximation function, which was used to ex-
trapolate values of the attack surface for more than 466 hosts. Figure 4.7 shows
that the relative attack surface on average stays below 0.05 even for the security
level lmin.
The reduction of the attack surface comes at the cost of querying validation ser-
vices whenever new CAs are observed or not enough trust experiences have previ-
ously been collected. In the next section we show, that the rate of reconfirmations
is kept in an acceptable range and does not interfere browsing in practice.
4.4.3 Performance of CA-TMS
The performance of CA-TMS is evaluated in terms of the overhead induced by
trust validation and continuous revocation monitoring. The evaluation is focused
on noticeable delays during the use of CA-TMS, i.e. during browsing. As all com-
putations are done locally, trust validation itself does not lead to a noticeable delay.
However, requesting reconfirmations from validation services introduces communi-
cation overhead and delays, as page loading is blocked until the certificate has been
reconfirmed. Thus, the performance of CA-TMS is evaluated based on the rate of
reconfirmations. The performance of continuous revocation monitoring is evaluated
in terms of daily OCSP requests.
Reconfirmation rates
The evolution of the 64 trust views is simulated based on the collected browsing
histories. For all simulations, the proposed parameter setting: lmax = 0.95, lmed =
0.8, lmin = 0.6, maxF = 0.8, fix kl = 3, and n = 10 is used. The reconfirmation
rate is measured during the simulations after each observation of a new host. The
reconfirmation rate is defined as:
RRate =
hr
h
,
with hr denoting the number of hosts where a certificate reconfirmation was required
and h denoting the total number of different hosts. The reconfirmation rates for the
three different security levels lmax, lmed and lmin are measured independently. The
results are averaged over all simulation runs of the 64 data sets.
Figure 4.8 shows the reconfirmation rates depending on the number of observed
hosts. It shows how the percentage of hosts, for which a reconfirmation is required,
98 4 CA-TMS: User-centric CA trust management
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 800 850 900 950 1000
   
 R
ec
o
n
fi
rm
at
io
n
 r
at
e
Number of observed hosts
Notary Query Rates
lmax lmed lmin
Figure 4.8: Reconfirmation rates: Percentage of observed hosts for which a reconfirmation
is required, concerning the security levels lmax, lmed and lmin.
develops on average over the course of the evolution of trust views. The rates of
reconfirmation continuously drop during the trust view evolution. Thus with each
additional observed host, CA-TMS increasingly relies on local information. While
for the first 50 observed hosts, the rates lie between 0.58 and 0.94 depending on the
chosen security level, these drop to 0.34 and 0.08 for trust views with 1000 hosts.
While Figure 4.8 shows the continuous change of reconfirmation rates, Table 4.1
depicts the average rate for a block of 100 hosts after a certain number of hosts has
already been observed. For example, given the security level lmin, 42% of the first
one hundred hosts have to be reconfirmed, while this is only the case for 14.5% of
the second one hundred accessed hosts.
The development of the reconfirmation rates shows the perceived improvement
due to bootstrapping, even for incomplete histories. Already a small number of
hosts leads to a significant drop in the reconfirmation rates. In Figure 4.9 it is
depicted, when the reconfirmations occur during the evolution of a trust view with
1000 hosts. It shows, that most reconfirmations happen at the beginning. For the
security level lmin 50% of all reconfirmations happen during the observation of the
first tenth of hosts, and for the security level lmax 56% of all reconfirmations have
Number of observed hosts
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
lmax 0.880 0.620 0.431 0.308 0.274 0.267 0.190 0.110 0.220 0.090
lmed 0.654 0.364 0.214 0.138 0.134 0.125 0.070 0.030 0.100 0.020
lmin 0.424 0.145 0.064 0.031 0.042 0.047 0.007 0.030 0.040 0.010
Table 4.1: Average rates of reconfirmation for blocks of 100 hosts during the evolution
of trust views for the security levels lmax, lmed and lmin.
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Figure 4.9: Percentage of the total number of reconfirmations during the evolution of
trust views, concerning the security levels lmax, lmed and lmin.
happened during the observation of the first 30% of all hosts.
Repeatedly accessing a host does not lead to additional reconfirmations. Con-
nections to new hosts on average make up for less than 1% of the total number
of TLS connections (see also Table 4.2 below). Together with the reconfirmation
rates presented above that means – depending on the security level – only between
0.27% and 0.69% of the TLS connections require a reconfirmation for an average
user. Thus, delays induced by CA-TMS are hardly recognizable.
The reconfirmation rates can further be lowered with a reputation system as
presented in Chapter 5. In the next section we evaluate the reconfirmation rates
concerning known hosts.
Marginal reconfirmation rates
Once a trust view is bootstrapped, the certificates for the hosts are known and
can be used during browsing without further checks or reconfirmations. However,
these certificates are renewed every one to two years, whenever their validity ends
or a new key is deployed on a server. Given that in most cases new certificates are
obtained from the same CA [17], the reconfirmation rates for known hosts can be
derived from the distribution of hosts to minimally, medium, and fully trustworthy
CAs. We call these reconfirmation rates marginal reconfirmation rates. These are
shown in Figure 4.10. For example, a trust view with 400 hosts only needs a second
reconfirmation for 20%, 6% and 2% of the certificate changes of known hosts when
browsing on the security levels lmax, lmed or lmin.
Assuming, the security levels are required for the same number of hosts, this
results in an aggregated marginal reconfirmation rate of 9.3%. With a certificate
renewal once a year, this implies one reconfirmation every 10 days. Thus CA-
TMS only leads to delays in page loading occasionally. A relying entity which only
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Figure 4.10: Marginal reconfirmation rates: Expected percentage of reconfirmations for
certificate renewals of known hosts, for security levels lmax, lmed and lmin, depending on
the number of different hosts associated to the trust view.
accesses a set of 100 different hosts via TLS secured connections is faced with higher
reconfirmation rates. However, this is compensated by the lower total number of
observed hosts. In this case, an aggregated marginal reconfirmation rate of 33%
leads to one reconfirmation every 11 days.
The effects of stereotyping and fixing of the key legitimacy
The effects of stereotyping and fixing of the key legitimacy are evaluated by compar-
ing the resulting reconfirmation rates during trust view evolution with and without
these mechanisms. Over all security levels, enabling stereotyping and fixing of the
key legitimacy reduces the reconfirmation rates by 50%-60%. However, for security
levels lmax and lmed the main part of the reduction results from fixing the key legiti-
macy. Less than 10% of the reduction results from stereotyping. Thus, the limitation
of the effects of stereotyping with parameter maxF to low security applications is
effective.
For security level lmin both mechanisms are equally effective. Equal parts of the
reduction result from stereotyping and fixing the key legitimacy. The effects of the
single mechanisms accumulate.
To sum up, using both strategies concurrently, significantly reduces the number
of hosts for which a reconfirmation is required.
Continuous revocation monitoring
For the evaluation of the overhead induced by continuous revocation monitoring,
we assume that the majority of certificates can be checked with OCSP. CRLs are
only downloaded if OCSP is not available for a certificate. The evaluation focuses
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min max avg
Number of daily TLS connections <1 407 61
Number of CAs 6 138 67
Number of hosts 2 1,013 214
Number of TLS connections 11 159,882 23,138
Table 4.2: Measurements for number of CAs, hosts and TLS connections from 64 browsing
histories.
on the number of OCSP requests. In the current deployment, OCSP requests are
sent during each TLS connection establishment. Thus, the number of daily OCSP
requests equals the number of daily TLS connections. The numbers of daily TLS
connections presented in Table 4.2 are averaged values over the total time periods
covered by the respective browsing histories.
For continuous revocation monitoring, we propose a daily update of the revocation
information. Thus, the daily amount of OCSP requests equals the number of CAs
in the trust view. This is because requests for different hosts can be aggregated into
one request when the same OCSP server is to be used (cf. Section 2.2.3), which in
general is the case when certificates were issued by the same CA.
The measurements in Table 4.2 show that continuous revocation monitoring intro-
duces additional OCSP checks if relying entities access few servers via TLS connec-
tions, and saves OCSP requests when many TLS connections are used. On average,
comparable numbers for OCSP requests can be observed. Thus, continuous revo-
cation monitoring does not introduce additional overhead. Even more, continuous
revocation monitoring allows load balancing, as the requests are independent from
the actual use and can be run in background.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, the user-centric CA trust management system CA-TMS was pre-
sented. It maintains a minimal set of trusted CAs. By this user-centric management
of trusted CAs, the attack surface of the Web PKI is reduced. With the presented
parameter setting, CA-TMS achieves a reduction of the attack surface of more than
95%. This prevents attacks induced by CA failures and compromises. By making
use of validation services, a relying entity’s trust view is dynamically adapted to the
individual needs, while user interaction can be kept to a minimum. Furthermore,
CA-TMS assigns different ratings to each CA, such that trust decisions can be made
depending on the context. Thus, the risk of relying on a fraudulent certificate can be
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governed by the assignment of adequate security levels to applications. This enables
more restrictive trust decisions for critical applications like e-banking, where secu-
rity is more important and less restrictive rules for less security critical applications.
These rules can be adapted to the relying entity’s risk profile.
The provision problem of revocation information was solved with continuous re-
vocation monitoring, which decouples revocation checking from the actual use of
certificates.
Additionally, an implementation of CA-TMS has been presented. It integrates
currently available solutions for certificate reconfirmation such as certificate notaries,
and allows the flexible addition of more information sources to further improve
reconfirmation and data collection processes. The core functionality of CA-TMS can
be implemented locally on top of the existing infrastructure without its alteration.
The performance evaluation showed that the need for reconfirmations fades out
the more local experiences are collected. This continuously reduces the overhead and
possible delays. Once the system is bootstrapped, reconfirmations on average occur
once every few days. A reconfirmation is only required for 0.27% to 0.69% of the
TLS connection establishments. In summary, this shows that the use of CA-TMS
does not interfere normal browsing. The performance analysis also showed that
continuous revocation monitoring can be implemented without additional overhead.
CA-TMS so far protects relying entities from CA compromises concerning CAs
not rated trustworthy in their trust views. Exploiting the individuality of these
trust views enables a detection mechanism for fraudulent certificates, which we
present in Chapter 5. Combined with a push service, this mechanism extends the
protection capabilities of CA-TMS to also protect from CAs which suddenly change
their behavior.
5 Service providers for CA-TMS
In Chapter 4, it was shown how to protect relying entities from fraudulent certificates
issued by CAs that are not part of their trust view. A bootstrapping of the trust view
based on a relying entity’s browser history was proposed and it was shown that the
presented system provides good performance once the trust view is bootstrapped.
However, problems evolve when no browser history is available for bootstrapping
or when CAs that are already considered to be trustworthy change their behavior
and become untrustworthy. The lack of a browser history implies that the trust
view needs to be bootstrapped on the fly during browsing, which then is performed
over the course of several months. This is problematic because the certificate checks
during bootstrapping lead to interruptions and delayed page loading. Furthermore,
the availability of external validation services is critical whenever a new service is to
be accessed. The problem with behavioral changes of CAs is, that relying entities
that consider a certain CA as trustworthy will accept certificates issued by that CA
without further checks. If such a CA suddenly starts to issue fraudulent certificates,
e.g., because of a compromise, this stays undetected by the group of relying entities
that trusts this CA.
In this chapter, we solve these two problems by extending CA-TMS with online
service providers to realize a centralized reputation system for CA trust scores and
a push service to warn relying entities. After a functional description, the services
are evaluated.
In Sections 5.1 - 5.3 we describe the functionality of the service providers. The
bootstrapping problem is solved with the reputation system. It makes the knowledge
of other relying entities available to a relying entity whenever his own experiences are
insufficient for decision making. With this mechanism, we speed up the bootstrap-
ping process. We describe the trust view selection and trust aggregation mechanisms
and show how protection against malicious recommenders is realized. The second
problem is solved with the push service. The service providers monitor the CA trust
scores collected within the reputation system. Upon detection of a CA becoming
untrustworthy, this information is pushed to all clients whose trust view contains
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the CA in question. We describe the detection mechanisms and how the pushed
information is processed on the client side.
In Section 5.4 the presented services are evaluated. First, we extend our attacker
model from Chapter 3 with additional attack vectors induced by the incorporation
of trust information provided by other relying entities, e.g., such as sybil attacks.
Then, we evaluate the security of the proposed services based on the extended
attacker model. The functionality and the performance is evaluated based on simu-
lations using real world browsing histories. We simulate the bootstrapping process
of trust views with and without the reputation system. The timings required for
bootstrapping as well as data loads and traffic overheads are compared between the
two settings. With the metric presented in Chapter 4 for the measurement of the
attack surface, we evaluate the effects of the inclusion of the reputation system on
the overall attack surface. The push service is evaluated in terms of an attacker’s
success probability for different attack scenarios. Section 5.5 concludes the chapter.
Parts of the contributions of this chapter were published in [B2], which covers the
concept of the reputation system. This chapter extends the published contributions
by the sections concerned with the push service and its evaluation. Additionally,
the performance evaluation for the reputation system was added.
5.1 Architecture and system model
To realize the reputation system and the push service to warn relying entities about
behavioral changes of CAs, we introduce online service providers to CA-TMS. This
is realized in a centralized architecture, which for scalability reasons can be ex-
tended to a network of service providers. The relying entities register at the service
provider and upload their trust views. Note that the authentication of a single ser-
vice provider is not considered a problem. E.g., its certificate may be hard coded
into the client software. Due to the registration, relying entities can be re-identified
when accessing the provided services.
Model For a common understanding, we extend the system model from Chapter 4
with service providers. Recall that there exists an entity E1 with trust view View
and another entity E2. E1 establishes a TLS connection to E2 and needs to decide
whether the connection is trustworthy or not.
Now, other entities U1, . . . ,Un (other Internet users) with trust views View1, . . . ,
Viewn and a network of service providers SP1, . . . , SPm are additionally included in
the model. The service providers are assumed to have pre-established trust relation-
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ships and are able to communicate securely, i.e. their keys are exchanged using an
out of band channel. The network of service providers does not need to be complete,
i.e., a service provider is not required to trust any other service provider. We assume
that E1 and U1, . . . ,Un have registered at SP1 and uploaded their trust views to the
database of SP1. In general, an entity can choose which service provider to use.
Thus, each service provider has its own customer base and set of trust views. The
clients’ local trust views are regularly synchronized with the ones in SPi’s database.
Figure 5.1 depicts the architecture.
SP3
SP1
 U2
U1
Ԑ1
Un
...
SPm
SP2
?
Ԑ2
Viewn
View2
View1
View
Figure 5.1: Service provider architecture
5.2 Reputation system for CA trust management
In Chapter 4, we have described how the trust view is established incrementally by
querying validation services for any certificates as long as not enough locally collected
information is available. In this section it is shown how to integrate an additional
reputation system to increase the amount of data that decisions are based on from
local experiences to aggregated opinions from people with similar browsing behavior.
The service provider realizing the reputation system aggregates the opinions from a
set of trust views in his database to a recommendation and provides it to a requesting
entity. While doing this, the trust views are kept minimal in order to adhere to
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the principle of least privileges, which is currently not followed in the Web PKI
[17]. Therefore, an entity’s requirements concerning CAs have to be considered
during the aggregation of the recommended issuer trust. Otherwise, experiences
collected for application uses completely irrelevant to the requesting entity might
lead to unnecessarily high trust values in this entity’s trust view. Furthermore,
the reputation system is only queried after the relevance of a CA for an entity
was approved due to the CA being part of a reconfirmed certification path (cf.
Section 5.2.1). The purpose of the reputation system is to improve the bootstrapping
of the trust view and to evolve an entity’s trust view towards a stable state. When
reaching a stable state, CA-TMS may work mainly autonomously, even for entities
that only collect few own experiences.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. First, the basic functionality
of the reputation system is described in Section 5.2.1. Afterward, in Section 5.2.2, we
present a strategy to select trust views for the computation of the recommended is-
suer trust. Then, it is shown how the selection of trust views is dynamically adapted
to the maturity of an entity’s trust view. In the case of insufficient information on
the reputation system’s side, a service provider handover may be performed as de-
scribed in Section 5.2.3. Finally in Section 5.2.4, we discuss privacy aspects that
arise from uploading personal trust views to the reputation system.
5.2.1 Functionality
The reputation system provides recommendations for the issuer trust assigned to a
CA. Whenever E1 updates his trust view View with a new trust assessment TA for
CA CA with public key pk, E1 requests a recommendation for the associated issuer
trust from SP1. SP1 aggregates the correspondent opinions for CA from j different
trust views by applying the conflict aware fusion operator cFUSION (cf. Definition
2.6). In case SP1 does not have information about CA with key pk, SP1 forwards the
request to other service providers he trusts.
The process is the following:
1. E1 establishes a TLS connection to SP1 and authenticates itself (e.g., by using
a user name and password).
2. E1 sends the pair (pk, CA) to SP1 using the secure connection.
3. Depending on View, SP1 selects j ≥ 0 trust views View1, ...,Viewj from its
database (see Section 5.2.2 for the selection strategy).
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4. If j > 0 do
a) For 1 ≤ i ≤ j SP1 extracts ocait,i and oeeit,i for (pk, CA) from Viewi.
b) SP1 aggregates the opinions on the issuer trust with the cFUSION oper-
ator: o˜cait = ⊕̂c(ocait,1, ..., ocait,j) and o˜eeit = ⊕̂c(oeeit,1, ..., oeeit,j).
5. If j = 0 (i.e., SP1 has no information for (pk, CA)) SP1 forwards the request to
another service provider it trusts. The other service provider responds with a
recommendation (o˜cait , o˜
ee
it ) or with unknown. This step may be repeated or run
in parallel for several service providers.
6. SP1 responds to E1 with either the aggregated issuer trust opinions (o˜cait , o˜eeit )
or, if no recommendation is available, with unknown.
7. E1 integrates the recommendation into View.
Before describing in detail how SP1 selects trust views for the aggregation and
how to aggregate opinions to a single recommendation, we recap how the reputation
system is integrated into CA-TMS on the side of E1. As described in Chapter 4,
E1 requests a recommendation for newly observed CAs as part of the trust view
update. We shortly recap Step 3 of the trust view update algorithm presented in
Section 4.1.6:
3. (optional) If (R = trusted) ∧ (v = true) then ∀TAi ∈ TL do:
a) Request RS(pki, CAi) = (o˜
ca
it,i, o˜
ee
it,i) from RS
b) If RS did not return unknown do:
If (i < n− 1) set ocait,i = (0.5, 0, E(o˜cait,i)), else set oeeit,i = (0.5, 0, E(o˜eeit,i)).
The trust view update algorithm ensures that two preliminaries are fulfilled before
the reputation system RS is queried and recommendations are integrated into E1’s
trust view View. First the outcome of trust validation for the certification path
in question is required to be trusted: (R = trusted). This ensures, that the
CAs for which a recommendation is requested are indeed relevant to E1 as parts of a
legitimate certification path. Second, the certification path has to be reconfirmed by
validation services: (v = true). This second condition ensures, that indeed external
information is required and not enough local information was already available for
trust validation. Thus, the principle of least privileges is realized as stated above.
E1 integrates the recommendations into View by setting the initial trust value f of
the according issuer trust opinions in View to the expectation of the recommended
issuer trust opinions (o˜cait,i, o˜
ee
it,i). With this, it is ensured that E1 only relies on external
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information as long as local information is missing. Recall that the influence of f
on the expectation of an opinion ceases with a growing amount of experiences.
Second, it prevents circular dependencies between locally collected experiences and
the recommendations, thus preventing a bias of the system.
5.2.2 Trust view selection and trust aggregation
First the selection and aggregation strategy is presented. Afterward, it is shown
how to apply clustering for pre-computation and efficiency improvements.
Trust view similarity weighting and cut off
The aggregation of the recommended issuer trust should consider an entity’s indi-
vidual requirements. This cannot be achieved by simply averaging the respective
opinions over all trust views in the service provider’s database. The recommendation
should be based on the trust views of entities that have comparable requirements
as the requesting entity, namely entities with similar browsing behavior and similar
security requirements. Because CAs mostly issue certificates for a limited set of
domains [41] and because trust views depend on the subjective browsing behavior
as shown in Chapter 3, we deduce that trust views reflect an entity’s requirements
in respect to the relevance of CAs. The correctness of this assumption will be shown
in Section 5.4.3.
Thus, the input opinions for aggregation are weighted according to the similar-
ity between the trust views from which they originate and the trust view of the
requesting entity. Furthermore, all opinions with a similarity below a certain lower
bound b ∈ R are cut off. Similarity of trust views can be measured with the Jaccard
similarity index [16].
Similarity of trust views The Jaccard similarity index is a measure for the simi-
larity of sets. Given two sets A,B, the Jaccard similarity index is defined as
J(A,B) =
|A ∩B|
|A ∪B| ,
where |A| is the cardinality of A. Informally speaking, J(A,B) is the number of
common elements divided by the total number of elements contained in the two
sets. Only considering the sets of trust assessments contained within trust views,
the Jaccard similarity index can be applied to trust views as follows. For this, we
consider two trust assessments as equal, if the contained CA name and key are
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identical. Then:
J(View1,View2) =
n
n1 + n2 − n,
where ni is the total number of trust assessments contained in Viewi, i ∈ {1, 2} and
n is the number of trust assessments shared by View1 and View2. Note that the
inclusion of certificates into the computation is omitted due to privacy issues (cf.
Section 5.2.4). In Section 5.4.3 we evaluate the suitability of the Jaccard similarity
and show that it fits the requirements.
Selection and aggregation To compute the opinions for the recommendation SP1
retrieves all trust views from its database that contain a trust assessment for (pk, CA)
specified in the request by E1. Let TV(pk,CA) be the set of these trust views. Then,
using E1’s trust view View, SP1 computes for each Viewi ∈ TV(pk,CA) the corresponding
weight wi = J(View,Viewi). Afterward, any trust view Viewi with wi ≤ b is discarded
from TV(pk,CA).
From the remaining j trust views, SP1 extracts the opinions on issuer trust o
ca
it,i and
oeeit,i for (pk, CA) and aggregates them using the cFUSION operator (cf. Definition 2.6)
using the corresponding weights wi. Thus, opinions originating from trust views that
are more similar to View have a stronger influence on the aggregated recommendation
than opinions from less similar trust views. Furthermore, if there exist conflicting
opinions on the trustworthiness of the CA, the cFUSION operator handles this by
lowering the certainty of the result.
Trust views with weights below the bound b are cut off in order to prevent trust
views that are highly dissimilar to View from being taken into account. This is
done because the cFUSION operator only considers weights relatively. In case that
solely trust views with a low Jaccard similarity are found, this would result in
relatively high weights. Cutting off those trust views may come at the cost of not
finding adequate trust views but prevents the recommendation of high issuer trusts,
if the importance of a CA to an entity is not plausible. Besides that, the similarity
weighting and cut off strategy provides protection against Sybil attacks which we
discuss in Section 5.4.2.
Because CA-TMS incrementally learns an entity’s trust view over time, the reflec-
tion of the browsing behavior is limited during the bootstrapping phase. In order
not to cut off trust views just because of the lack of local information, the bound
b is dynamically adjusted to the maturity of a trust view. This is described in the
following.
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Dynamic adaptation of the bound b
As soon as a trust view has a sufficient maturity, the Jaccard similarity can be
used to identify trust views of other entities with similar browsing behavior. Yet as
mentioned above, during the bootstrapping phase no or only limited information is
available about an entity’s own trust view and thus its browsing behavior. This has
two effects. First, the significance of the similarity to other trust views is limited.
Second, it results into low similarity values to evolved trust views that potentially
contain information about newly observed CAs, leading to their exclusion from
the aggregation of a recommendation if the bound b for similarity cut off is not
adequately set.
To overcome these problems, b is dynamically increased during the bootstrapping
of a trust view. This dynamic adaptation is chosen such that trust views resulting
from identical browsing behavior but with high maturity are not excluded from
recommendation aggregation.
A low value of b at the beginning subsequently leads to the inclusion of a broad va-
riety of trust views resulting in generalized recommendations. By the dynamic adap-
tation, the choice is increasingly focused on trust views from the same user group,
thus providing increasingly individualized recommendations. In parallel, similarity
weighting ensures, that already collected information is mirrored in the recommen-
dation aggregation and the input opinions from the more similar trust views have
stronger influence on the recommendation than opinions from less similar ones.
The adaptation function for b is derived from the set of 64 real world browsing
histories also used for the evaluations. From each of the histories the final state
of the associated trust view is derived and its evolution is simulated. During the
simulations, the Jaccard similarity to the trust view’s final state is computed after
each observation of a new host. The development of these similarities for each trust
view is displayed in Figure 5.2. For each number of observed hosts, the minimal
similarity value is extracted. This minimum forms the lower bound of similarities
for all sets. From the data series formed by the minimal similarity values, the
logarithmic approximate function is computed as:
f(h) = 0.2223 · ln(h)− 0.5036,
where h represents the number of observed hosts. f(h) is displayed as the blue
curve in Figure 5.2. The respective coefficient of determination is R2 = 0.9706. The
approximate function is used to dynamically compute b depending on the number
of observed hosts. We set b = f(h) for h < 352. The dynamic adaptation is stopped
at h = 352, where f(h) approaches 0.8. Afterward, the bound is fixed at b = 0.8 to
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Figure 5.2: Evolution of Jaccard similarities of 64 trust views. The similarities are
calculated between the final trust view state and the trust view after observation of x
hosts.
ensure that additional CAs are accepted within the trust views selected for opinion
aggregation.
Trust view similarity clustering
A drawback of trust view similarity weighting and cut off is the computational cost
and scalability. To identify the j trust views for aggregation, the Jaccard similarity
index needs to be computed for all trust views in SP1’s database that contain a
trust assessment for (pk, CA). This can be done more efficiently by clustering the
trust views and then performing a local search within the cluster to which View is
assigned.
Trust views can be clustered according to their similarity. The resulting clusters
can be used to find similar trust views by only measuring a trust view’s similarity to
a few cluster centers. Even though the result will in general be less precise compared
to computing the full set of similarities, it still contains nearby trust views. Clusters
can be used to realize a pre-selection of trust views and realize the cut off of distant
trust views more efficiently when the service provider’s database contains many trust
views. Now we explain how clustering is realized. Note that clustering can be done
as a pre-computation within regular time intervals.
K-means clustering With K-means clustering and the Jaccard similarity index for
trust views, κ clusters of similar trust views can be built. According to [29], the
main steps of K-means clustering are:
• initially select κ random trust views as cluster centers
• repeat the following steps until cluster center convergence:
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assignment: assign each trust view to the cluster center for which the Jaccard
similarity is maximal
update: reselect the cluster center within each cluster such that the arithmetic
mean of Jaccard similarities of the new center with all other trust views
in the cluster is maximized
K-means tends to make cluster sizes equal and each trust view is assigned to only
one cluster. Equal sized clusters have the advantage of always providing a certain
number of candidate trust views for the aggregation step, and the computational
effort is bounded during request.
On the other hand, K-means clustering often fails finding the natural partitioning
[35], where entities may belong to multiple groups and groups may have very different
sizes and shapes. Furthermore, K-means clustering only finds local optima.
To escape local optima, K-means clustering is normally run several times with
different initializations and for different sizes of κ. The outcomes are then compared
using the arithmetic mean of similarities to the cluster centers. For the selection
of the most suitable outcome, the criterion of maximizing the arithmetic mean of
similarities (which solely considered would lead to clusters of size one) and the
criterion of adequate cluster sizes for aggregation need to be balanced.
Initially, the parameter κ, which steers the number of clusters and thus their sizes,
is chosen such that searching for the right cluster and searching within a cluster is
balanced. Thus, given the service provider’s database contains n trust views, we set
κ =
√
n.
5.2.3 Service provider handover
In case the service provider SP1 has no trust views to compute a recommendation
for (pk, CA) – either there is no trust view with a trust assessment for (pk, CA) at all
or none that meets the minimal similarity constraint given by the bound b – SP1 can
request a recommendation from other service providers SP2, . . . , SPm it trusts.
SP1 queries SP2, . . . , SPm for their recommendation. If more than one answers
with a recommendation (o˜cait , o˜
ee
it ), the responses are aggregated using the cFUSION
operator with equal weights. Querying other service providers is transparent to the
requesting entity. If all service providers SP2, . . . , SPm respond with unknown, SP1
also responds with unknown to the requesting entity E1.
In order to enable SP2, . . . , SPm to locally perform the aggregation of opinions to
a recommendation as described in Section 5.2.2, SP1 hands over E1’s trust view. To
protect E1’s privacy, the trust view is shortened by all end entity certificates.
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5.2.4 Privacy aware data collection
Trust views contain the certificates of CAs and end entities that a user has had
contact with. The data from trust views can be used to profile users and their web
browsing habits at least concerning services that use secure connections. Thus, trust
views are sensitive data in terms of privacy which needs to be considered when this
data is not exclusively maintained locally but uploaded to a service provider.
In this case privacy protection has two aspects. First the privacy sensitive data
revealed to the service provider is to be kept minimal depending on the necessity.
The service provider only requires the trust assessments in plain to be able to realize
the reputation system as well as the push service presented in the following section.
To protect a user’s privacy, the parts of the trust view that reveal which services a
user consumes (namely the set of trusted and untrusted end entity certificates) are
stored encrypted with a user specific key. The privacy criticality of the information
associated with the trust assessments themselves is limited because CAs in general
sign certificates for arbitrary web services.
The second aspect of privacy protection concerns the information which is revealed
to other potentially untrusted third parties, which refers to the recommendations.
Recommendations are aggregated knowledge of several of the service provider’s
users. The recommendations are furthermore not linked to the source of infor-
mation. Thus, a recommendation reveals the trust in a single CA in an anonymous
fashion and therefore are not considered privacy critical. Trust views are never
revealed as a whole to the public.
5.3 Push service for behavioral changes of CAs
CA-TMS collects experiences concerning past behavior of CAs and uses this in-
formation to estimate the CA’s trustworthiness concerning future transactions. In
Section 5.2 a reputation system was described, that enables to speed up information
collection, finally enabling autonomous decision making by CA-TMS.
In this section we elaborate on the issue of behavioral changes of CAs and describe
a detection mechanism which enables a push service to inform relying entities about
such behavioral changes. Behavioral changes may lead to false decisions, because
then, collected experiences do not reflect the real behavior anymore at the time of
decision making. The slow adaptation to behavioral changes is a common property of
many computational trust models [67]. In the case of CA-TMS, only a sudden change
from trustworthy to untrustworthy is security critical. A change from untrustworthy
to trustworthy is not a problem. In this case the relying entity queries validation
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services to reconfirm certificates issued by the CA and finally learns the changed
behavior.
The problem with the first case is, that relying entities that already consider a
CA as trustworthy will accept certificates issued by that CA without further checks.
And if this CA suddenly starts to issue fraudulent certificates, e.g. because of
a compromise, this stays undetected. Furthermore, relying entities do not query
the reputation system regularly and update their trust scores accordingly. This
would weaken the individuality of the trust views. Thus, a relying entity might not
recognize the change even if others already detected it. Even if the misbehavior
is later detected and negative experiences are collected in retrospect, the attack
already occurred and because of the slow trust adaptation it is still possible, that
further wrong decisions are made.
Preventing relying entities from attacks therefore requires immediate measures.
This is solved by integrating the push service that informs users about behavioral
changes of CAs contained in their trust views. To overcome the drawback of slow
trust adaptation, we follow the proposal from [67]. Relying entities that are warned
about a CA directly suspend it and prune the CA’s performance history completely.
This way, the relying entity learns the actual trustworthiness anew and does not
rely on outdated information.
In the following Section 5.3.1, we describe how behavioral changes are detected
by the service provider in collaboration with its clients. Section 5.3.2 presents how
warnings are pushed to relying entities. In Section 5.3.3 it is described how relying
entities process such push messages.
5.3.1 Report functionality for behavioral changes
In order to detect untrustworthy CAs automatically, the fact that trust views differ
between relying entities is exploited. Let the target group be the group of relying en-
tities which are attacked, i.e., which use the service for which the attacker obtained
a fraudulent certificate. Our mechanism relies on the assumption, that a certain
fraction of the target group does not trust the issuer of the fraudulent certificate. If
this certificate is delivered to such an entity, it will subsequently be reconfirmed with
validation services and be evaluated as untrustworthy. If this happens, the entity
reports the certificate to the service provider as suspicious. The service provider
validates the correctness of the report and in case it is confirmed, it pushes warn-
ings to all its clients that have the issuing CA in their trust views. The detection
capability of this mechanism is evaluated in Section 5.4.4.
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Integration of the report functionality on the relying entity’s side
The report functionality is integrated into the trust validation algorithm (cf. Section
4.1.5) as Step 3.l and is executed, whenever the trust validation algorithm evaluates
a certification path as untrusted. The report protocol is the following:
Input:
• The certification path p = (C1, ..., Cn).
• The URL url of E2 from which p was obtained.
Output: Whether the reporting was successful or not.
The protocol proceeds as follows:
1. E1 establishes a TLS connection to SP1 and authenticates itself (e.g., by using
a user name and password).
2. E1 sends the tuple (p, url) to SP1 using the secure connection.
3. SP1 confirms the report to E1 with a success message.
If the protocol does not finalize with the success message, E1 puts the report
(p, url) into a queue and retries until the report can be sent.
Processing untrusted certificate reports on the service provider’s side
To prevent false warnings, service providers validate each untrusted certificate report
for correctness before pushing a warning to its clients. Note that costly reconfir-
mations are acceptable, as this is done by a single service provider and not by a
huge amount of relying entities. Furthermore, delays of several seconds or even min-
utes outweigh false warnings which lead to the erroneous suspending of CAs and
subsequently to non-justified page loading delays on the relying entity’s side.
When the service provider obtains a report (p, url) about an untrusted certificate
from one of its clients, it evaluates its correctness as described in the following:
Input:
• An untrusted certificate report (p = (C1, ..., Cn), url).
• A list of validation services VS = (VS1, ..., VSj) with outputs
Ri = VSi(C) ∈ {trusted, untrusted, unknown}, 1 ≤ i ≤ j on input of a
certificate C.
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Output: V ∈ {valid, invalid, unknown}.
The protocol proceeds as follows:
1. SP1 performs standard path validation (including revocation checking) on the
certification path p.
2. If path validation fails then V ← invalid
3. If path validation succeeds then
a) For 1 ≤ i ≤ j query validation service VSi for Cn and set Ri = VSi(Cn).
b) If ∃i ∈ {1, ..., j} with Ri = untrusted then V ← valid
c) Else if ∃i ∈ {1, ..., j} with Ri = trusted then V ← invalid
d) Else V ← unknown
4. Return V
If the report validation outputs valid, SP1 pushes a warning to its clients and to
the other service providers. If the report is invalid, it is discarded. In case the
validity of a report is unknown it is queued and retried later. Note that the unknown
case is very uncommon, when combining different types of validation services based
on different principles such as multi path probing and notaries that cache valid
certificates.
5.3.2 Pushing CA warnings to relying entities
Pushing warnings to clients is performed depending on the necessity. If the un-
trusted certificate report is valid, first the report is broadcast to all other service
providers. Furthermore, for each valid report (p = (C1, ..., Cn), url) (either obtained
by a client or another trusted service provider), SP1 searches its database for trust
views that contain a trust assessment for the key pk of CA CA certified in Cn−1. For
each such trust view, the CA warning (pk, CA, Cn) is pushed to the push address
of the according relying entity. The push address is defined, when a relying entity
registers at the service provider. The push service can be realized by implementing
a push server, e.g. using the SimplePush API [160] specified by Mozilla, to which
relying entities connect when they are online. Another possibility would be to use
existing infrastructure and realize the push service via email. In this case, the client
software would connect to the relying entity’s email provider and monitor the inbox
for push emails by its service provider. The latter option saves resources on the ser-
vice providers side, while the email providers’ infrastructures are in general already
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available and are designed to handle such requests, as common email clients such as
Thunderbird or Outlook synchronize the inbox every few minutes anyway.
5.3.3 Processing CA warnings
On receipt of an CA warning (pk, CA, Cn) pushed by the service provider, the relying
entity directly suspends CA, the issuer of Cn. This is done by resetting the opinions in
the respective trust assessment to the initialization values. Furthermore, a negative
experience is collected for CA. The untrusted certificate Cn is added to the relying
entity’s list of untrusted certificates. The CA’s certificate is not marked as untrusted.
With this, the relying entity learns the actual trustworthiness of the CA anew,
and even allows the CA to become trustworthy again. This is important, as the
issuance of a single fraudulent certificate may result from a temporary error. On
the other hand, no certificates issued by the CA will be trusted without a previous
reconfirmation until the relying entity learned that the CA is trustworthy again.
This has the effect, that a relying entity is also protected from further fraudulent
certificates issued by the same CA, even if they are not reported through the service
provider. Certificates that are already in the list of trusted certificates are kept, as
the current behavior the CA has no retroactive effects.
The whole process is transparent to the relying entity and runs in background
except for the case, that Cn is found in the list of trusted certificates. In this case,
an attack has already happened, and the relying entity must be informed about the
incident such that it can take adequate measures, as e.g., blocking his bank account,
to prevent further damage.
5.4 Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the reputation system and the push service. First, in
Section 5.4.1 the attacker model from Chapter 3 is extended with additional attack
vectors induced by the use of the reputation system. Then, in Section 5.4.2 we
evaluate the security of the proposed system based on the extended attacker model.
Afterward, in Section 5.4.3 the functionality and the performance of the reputation
system is evaluated based on simulations using real world browsing histories. It is
shown, that the Jaccard similarity index is adequate for weighting and trust view
pre-selection within the reputation system. Then, we show, that the reputation
system speeds up the data collection and improves the bootstrapping process. We
simulate the bootstrapping process of trust views with and without the reputation
system. The timings required for bootstrapping as well as data loads and traffic
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overheads are compared between the two settings. With the metric presented in
Chapter 4 for the measurement of the attack surface, we evaluate the effects of the
inclusion of the reputation system on the overall attack surface. Finally, in Section
5.4.4, the push service is evaluated in terms of an attacker’s success probability for
different attack scenarios.
5.4.1 Attacker model
The security analysis is based on the attacker model presented in Section 3.1.2.
Recall that attacker A is an active man-in-the-middle attacker on the connection
between relying entity E1 and web server E2. A can generate certificates that are
signed by a CA of the Web PKI. The systems of E1 and E2 are assumed not to be
compromised, nor can A break the employed cryptographic algorithms. Also, the
validation services are assumed to function correctly.
The incorporation of a reputation system RS into CA-TMS induces additional
attack vectors. The attacker has the following additional capabilities and limitations.
Additional capabilities A has all capabilities of regular entities. For example, the
attacker can register at a service provider and upload trust views to RS. Furthermore,
A may compromise some of the other users U1, . . . ,Un of RS.
Additional Limitations RS itself is assumed not to be compromised, i.e., A is un-
able to arbitrarily manipulate the database of RS or its computation processes. Even
further, it is assumed that the communication between E1 and RS is secure. Intru-
sion detection and attacks on user systems are separate fields of security research
and are out of scope of this thesis.
5.4.2 Attacks against CA-TMS
This section is focused on attacks against specific components of CA-TMS. It extends
the evaluation of Chapter 4 by attacks aiming towards manipulating the external
reputation system. This ultimately leads to a manipulation of E1’s local trust in-
formation. Following from the attacker model, the intention behind these attacks
is to prevent detection when A attacks E1’s communication employing a fraudulent
certificate. Recall that RS is only queried when a new trust assessment is initialized
after the legitimate use of the CA’s key has at least been reconfirmed once. Thus,
RS cannot be employed by A to introduce additional trust assessments into E1’s
trust view View. As in Chapter 4, the analysis is based on the framework from [31]
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and identifies the attack vectors according to the separation into formulation, cal-
culation, and dissemination components of CA-TMS. We shortly recapitulate their
meaning and explain where the incorporation of RS adds new components.
Formulation resembles the reputation metric and sources of input. RS extends
CA-TMS by an indirect information source regarding a CA’s reputation. The infor-
mation source for RS are trust views uploaded by its users. Thus, A can positively
or negatively influence the trust in a CA by influencing the recommendations served
by RS. RS itself may be influenced via uploading manipulated trust views.
Calculation concerns the algorithms that derive trust from the input information.
With RS, non-local calculations concerning the recommendations are added to CA-
TMS. The recommendations are calculated deterministically and centrally by RS.
Thus, as RS is assumed not to be compromised, A cannot influence the calculation
other than by injecting manipulated input data into the database of RS.
Dissemination concerns all transfer of data between system components. As
communication between user systems and RS as well as between different service
providers is secure, A cannot manipulate the communication. A may indeed block
or disturb the communication and thus, perform a denial-of-service (DoS) attack on
RS. In this case, CA-TMS falls back on local information. As a validated certifica-
tion path is always checked by validation services before RS is queried, a DoS does
not introduce a direct threat. The blocked information can be resent later. DoS
attacks are therefore of limited relevance for security and are not considered further.
Attack vectors
Following from the analysis, the possibilities to manipulate and influence the trust
evaluation of CA-TMS under the given assumptions is limited to injecting false input
data. We now explain the attack vectors A might use to inject false data indirectly
via the RS, and explain the respective protection mechanisms. Note that the attack
vectors discussed in Chapter 4 are basic tools for A to influence RS’s data, as the
directly manipulated trust views are finally uploaded to RS.
Sybil attacks When targeting RS, A needs to inject manipulated trust views into
the database of RS to finally manipulate the recommendations. This is done using
the scheme of a Sybil attack. Performing a Sybil attack means A forges or controls
a large amount of entities and acts on behalf of them. Also, a large amount of
entities that act in a coordinated manner when uploading manipulated trust views
resembles a Sybil attack. Whereas a single entity acting maliciously only has limited
influence, as its opinions would be overruled by a majority of honest entities.
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Whenever A is able to register itself with several forged identities at RS (or A can
control the systems of already registered entities), A can upload manipulated trust
views in their name to RS. As RS generates its opinions based on the trust views of its
users, A can influence the recommendations either negatively or positively by adding
a suitable trust assessment for the targeted CA to the trust views he controls. If A
controls a large enough fraction of RS’s user base, A effectively controls the content
of the recommendations generated by RS.
There are several defense mechanisms to prevent Sybil attacks. Countering Sybil
attacks usually includes making the registration of new users costly to prevent at-
tackers from generating and registering fake identities. Popular mechanisms include
user authentication upon registration, a registration fee or computationally com-
plex registration processes, e.g., CAPTCHAs. As our reputation system requires a
registration of its users anyway, these are adequate measures.
Furthermore, the selection strategy for the computation of recommendations using
similarity weighting (cf. Section 5.2.2) provides protection against Sybil attacks (cf.
[68] for a similar approach). When RS is requested to calculate a recommendation on
the issuer trust for a CA, only those trust views are selected that are similar to the
one of the requesting entity E1. However, E1’s trust view in general is unknown to
A. A trust view uploaded by A is only by chance considered during the calculation.
This makes it difficult for A to generate and submit trust views to manipulate
the recommendation without knowing the E1’s trust view. The trust view is only
communicated over secured connections. Thus, gathering information about trust
views requires observing the TLS traffic of the E1 or sophisticated social engineering
attacks. Even if A manages to tailor the manipulated trust views for one target
entity, the overall success is limited.
Moreover, proactive techniques can be implemented to protect RS against Sybil
attacks. The upload of a large amount of trust views within a certain time interval or
sudden changes of a CA’s issuer trust within trust views can be statistically detected
as shown in [73]. Besides that, Sybil attacks can be lessened when RS considers only
trust views or trust assessments of a certain minimal age. The presented techniques
significantly increase the costs of an attack, as they increase the time span during
which the attack is to be executed. This helps to bridge the gray period. After the
fraudulent certificate has been revoked or blacklisted, the attack is anyway without
effect.
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Attacker goals and defenses
The previous subsection discussed the attack vector of Sybil attacks that A can use
to manipulate the recommendations provided by RS. In this section, specific attacker
goals, their possible realization, and how they apply to CA-TMS are discussed.
Self-promoting Self-promoting describes actions ofA towards making him or a CA
under his control appear more trustworthy. This in fact is the attacker goal with
highest relevance as it increases the success probability of A when finally issuing
fraudulent certificates to attack the secured communication.
A self-promoting attacker can approach his goal by a Sybil attack on RS. To use
a Sybil attack, A must overcome the above described defense mechanisms. Addi-
tionally, as RS is only queried when a trust assessment is newly initialized, the CA
controlled by A must be new to E1. On the other hand, due to the use of valida-
tion services, the CA must be legitimately observed first, which in fact can hardly
be steered by A for multiple entities. Even for a single entity, this requires social
engineering coordinated with the Sybil attack and perfect timing.
Slandering In opposition to a self-promoting attack, slandering aims at lowering
the reputation of a specific CA. As A does not directly benefit from decreased trust
in CAs, he might only aim at disturbing the proper functioning of CA-TMS.
The only possibility is to use a Sybil attack on RS. Again, A must overcome the
defense mechanisms and may only influence newly initialized trust assessments on
E1’s side. During the bootstrapping of a trust view, this has a certain impact, but
afterward, the attack is of limited relevance. Furthermore, the attack in the worst
case increases the number of required reconfirmations. In this case, local experi-
ences are collected, which leads to a fade out of the influence of the manipulated
recommendation.
Whitewashing Whitewashing describes the approach of an entity with negative
reputation to re-appear under a new, clean identity. Whitewashing was already
shown not to apply to the Web PKI in Chapter 4.
5.4.3 Reputation system performance
The performance evaluation is based on simulations using 64 real browsing histories
also used in Section 4.4. To evaluate the effects of the reputation system, the
evolution of each trust view is simulated with and without the use of the reputation
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system and the resulting trust views are compared. For the simulation, the 63 trust
views derived from the remaining browsing histories serve as the knowledge base
from which the reputation system aggregates the recommendations.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. First, we show the suitability
of the Jaccard similarity index, which is a central tool to the reputation system for
trust view pre-selection and weighting during the computation of recommendations.
Then, the improvements of information collection provided by the reputation system
are presented. Third, the influence of the reputation system on the attack surface is
evaluated. The last part of this section is focused on data loads and communication
overheads.
Suitability of the Jaccard similarity index
In the following, we show that the Jaccard similarity index is a suitable measure to
facilitate opinion aggregation.
Suitability for pre-selection We first show that the Jaccard similarity index is
suitable for pre-selecting trust views as potential input for the aggregation of a
recommendation. To test this, the probability that a trust assessment for a requested
CA is contained within the pre-selected trust views is evaluated depending on the
Jaccard similarity.
The tests are as follows: One trust view Viewi serves as the one of the requester
and one of the trust assessments in Viewi serves as the requested trust assessment TA.
TA is removed from Viewi and the Jaccard similarity J(View
∗
i ,Viewj) of the modified
trust view View∗i to all other trust views Viewj, j 6= i is computed. Now, for x ∈ {0,
1, . . . , 19} let the intervals Ix be defined as Ix = ]ax, bx] with ax = x · 0.05 and
bx = (x+ 1) · 0.05. Further let MIx,TA = {Viewj|J(View∗i ,Viewj) ∈ Ix ∧TA ∈ Viewj}
and MIx = {Viewj|J(View∗i ,Viewj) ∈ Ix}. Then, the probability to find TA in the
considered trust views is computed as:
pr(TA) =
|MIx,TA|
|MIx|
.
The test is repeated for each trust assessment in Viewi as well as for each possible
choice of Viewi. The computed probabilities are averaged.
The results of this test are shown in Figure 5.3. The probability to find TA in a
pre-selected trust view grows with growing Jaccard similarity. From the results it
can be deduced that pre-selecting trust views based on the Jaccard similarity and
subsequently not considering trust views with low similarity does not lead to a loss
of information.
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Figure 5.3: Probability pr(TA) to find a trust assessment for a newly observed CA in
another trust view depending on the Jaccard similarity.
Suitability for similarity weighting We show that the Jaccard similarity is suitable
to group trust views according to user groups within which the trust values are com-
parable. This is directly related to the recommendation quality, when using weights
wi = J(View,Viewi) to aggregate a recommendation as defined in Section 5.2.2.
To test this, the deviation of the expectations depending on the Jaccard similarity
of the trust views is measured. We first compute the similarity between each pair
of trust views J(Viewi,Viewj), i, j ∈ {1, ..., 64}, i 6= j and group them pairwise
into GIx = {(Viewi,Viewj)|J(Viewi,Viewj) ∈ Ix} with Ix as defined above. Then,
within each GIx the average deviation of the expectation values for the issuer trusts
∆E(ocait ) and ∆E(o
ee
it ) over all pairwise joint trust assessments is computed.
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Figure 5.4: Average deviation of (a) E(ocait ) / (b) E(o
ee
it ) depending on the Jaccard
similarity.
The results are shown in Figures 5.4a and 5.4b. With growing Jaccard similarity
the deviation of the expectation of opinions concerning common trust assessments
shrinks. That means trust views with similar CA sets on average also contain
similar opinions on the common CAs. Thus, the Jaccard similarity index is suitable
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for similarity weighting during the aggregation of a recommendation. It puts the
more weight on opinions, the better they reflect the requesting entities final opinion.
From these results, we conclude that the Jaccard similarity is suitable to pre-
select the relevant trust views for the aggregation of recommendations and provides
a natural weighting for the influence of single opinions into the aggregated recom-
mendation.
Improvement of information collection
We show that the use of the reputation system significantly improves the information
collection of CA-TMS and thus speeds up the bootstrapping of an entity’s trust
view. This is shown based on reconfirmation rates. The need for reconfirmations
represents the absence of sufficient information for decision making. Thus, lower
rates imply that more information is available to the system at a certain point in
time, while achieving the same rate at an earlier point in time shows the speed up
in information collection.
We measure the average reconfirmation rate with and without the use of the
reputation system. For each simulation run, we select one of the 64 browsing histories
and simulate the evolution of the trust view. The 63 trust views derived from the
remaining 63 histories form the knowledge base of the reputation system. The
reconfirmation rates for the three different security levels lmax = 0.95, lmed = 0.8
and lmin = 0.6 are measured independently. The simulation results are averaged
over all simulation runs.
Figure 5.5 shows the improvements achieved with the reputation system con-
cerning reconfirmation rates. It shows how the percentage of hosts, for which a
reconfirmation is required, develops on average over the course of the evolution of
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Figure 5.5: Percentage of observed hosts for which a reconfirmation was required with
and without the use of the reputation system, concerning the security levels lmax, lmed
and lmin.
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trust views. This is shown for the three different security levels.
For each of the different security levels, the reconfirmation rate with the use of
the reputation system lies significantly below the rate without reputation system.
For example, given a required security level of lmin, the use of the reputation system
reduces the reconfirmation rates for the first one hundred hosts from 42% to 20%.
The differences of the respective rate with and without the reputation system after a
given number of observed hosts are depicted in Figure 5.6. Note that several histories
in our data set end at around 630 hosts leading to the gap in the averaged rates.
The differences are higher in the early phase of the trust view evolution because the
rates themselves also drop with a growing number of observed hosts. This means
that the reputation system has the strongest effects at the beginning of the trust
view evolution where an accumulation of reconfirmations occurs and thus is most
important for the user experience. In summary, the reconfirmation rates drop faster
and stay below the rates without reputation system. Hence, a user of CA-TMS is
confronted with less delays due to reconfirmations during the bootstrapping phase.
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Figure 5.6: Differences in reconfirmation rates for security levels lmax, lmed and lmin.
A second measure that shows the bootstrapping speed-up by the reputation sys-
tem is the difference of hosts that need to be accessed until a comparable level of
the reconfirmation rate is reached with and without the reputation system. As a re-
confirmation represents the lack of information for decision making, reconfirmation
rates indirectly measure the amount of collected CA trust information. Figure 5.7
depicts the differences of required hosts until certain target reconfirmation rates are
achieved. The differences are given as percentage of the hosts that need to be ac-
cessed when no reputation system is used. Figure 5.7 shows that the numbers of
required hosts for experience collection are 50% - 85% lower due to the reputation
system. This shows the speed-up of the bootstrapping due to the reputation system.
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Figure 5.7: Differences in required hosts to reach target reconfirmation rates for security
levels lmax, lmed and lmin.
Effects on the attack surface
In this section it is shown, how the reputation system affects the individual size of the
attack surface. Again this is based on simulations based on the 64 browsing histories.
Recall that in the simulations no negative experiences are included, meaning the
results lead to an upper bound for the attack surface.
Figure 5.8 shows the measurements for the average difference in the expectation of
issuer trust opinions assigned to the CAs between simulation runs with and without
the reputation system. The deviations have their maximum for trust views of low
maturity, namely between 10 and 30 observed hosts. Afterwards, the deviations
fade the more experiences are collected. This shows that the reputation system
does not simply lead to an increase of the trust values, but boosts them towards
their final state. Besides that, the deviation is always smaller than 0.2. This means
that the trustworthiness of a CA is at most increased to the next security level by
the reputation system.
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Figure 5.9 shows the average number of CAs trusted for the different security
levels with and without the reputation system. These numbers directly correspond
to the size of the attack surface (according to the metric presented in Section 4.4.2)
for the three extreme cases where either lmax, lmed or lmin is assigned to all domains.
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Figure 5.9: Number of CAs trusted to issue certificates concerning the required security
levels lmax, lmed and lmin with and without reputation system.
Figure 5.9 shows that the speed-up achieved by the reputation system comes at
the cost of a slight increase of the attack surface compared to CA-TMS without
reputation system. This results from the additional trust information which allows
that some CAs reach the next security level at a lower number of observed hosts.
The highest difference is observable for the security level lmed, while the effect on the
attack surface concerning the security levels lmax and lmin are much smaller. This
shows, that mainly CAs are shifted from the class of minimum trustworthy CAs
to the class of medium trustworthy CAs. The differences in the sizes of the attack
surfaces fade, the more experiences are collected, i.e. the more evolved the trust
views are. This again shows, that the reputation system evolves the trust views
towards their final state.
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Figure 5.10: Growth of the attack surface due to the reputation system concerning the
required security levels lmax, lmed and lmin in relation to the attack surface spanned by
the 1,590 trusted CAs of the Web PKI.
Figure 5.10 depicts the effects of the reputation system on the attack surface
in relation to the system-centric setting with 1,590 trusted CAs, where the attack
surface is defined as AS =
∑
CA∈PKI dom [CA]. dom [CA] is the number of domains
which CA is allowed to sign. PKI describes the set of all CAs which are part of the
Web PKI. Figure 5.10 shows that the set of CAs additionally trusted due to the use
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of the reputation system makes up for less than 1% of the attack surface AS. The
maximum attack surface increase again is reached for the security level lmed.
In summary, the reputation system provides a speed-up of the bootstrapping of
more that 50% while leading to minimal increases of the attack surface of less than
1%.
Data loads and communication overheads
The use of the reputation system reduces the number of reconfirmations. However,
the reputation system is queried for recommendations. We compare the traffic
overheads and data loads in the two settings during browsing. We assume, that
the user is registered at the reputation system and its current trust view is already
available to the reputation system. Thus, requesting a recommendation for a new CA
requires the transmission of the CAs name and its public key, which can be realized
by sending the CA’s certificate to the reputation system. A reconfirmation request
to a validation service also requires the transmission of the certificate in question.
The exact message sizes depend on the respective implementation, however wlog. it
can be assumed that the message sizes of the requests are of comparable size. The
same holds for the size of the response messages. Thus, the evaluation focuses on
the number of requests and their timing criticality.
The number of reconfirmations is counted during the simulation runs, while the
number of queries to the reputation system is given by the number of CAs. We
present the differences depending on the number of observed hosts in Table 5.1. It
shows that the absolute number of queries to the reputation system is higher than
the number of saved queries to validation services, which yields additional traffic.
This has several reasons. First, newly observed CAs are always reconfirmed whether
or not the reputation system recommends the CA as trustworthy to guarantee that
adding a new CA to the trust view is always justified. Furthermore, despite a
recommendation the derived trust level might not be high enough for the acceptance
of a certificate.
However, there is a fundamental difference between requests to validation services
and requests to the reputation system. The first are blocking, i.e., browser page
loading must be delayed until the response of the validation services is obtained,
while requests to the reputation system provide information for future browsing and
can be done in the background. These requests can even be delayed if the reputation
system is temporarily not available as they are transparent to the user.
The overall traffic considering requests to the reputation system per time interval
depends on the number of users and the number of new CAs they observe on average.
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Number of observed hosts
25 50 100 200 400 600
lmax
req(VS) 25 47 88 150 224 278
reqRS(VS) 21 36 60 97 140 182
∆ req(VS) 4 11 28 53 84 96
req(RS) 27 41 57 79 99 122
lmed
req(VS) 21 39 65 102 137 163
reqRS(VS) 16 26 41 63 84 110
∆ req(VS) 5 13 24 39 53 53
req(RS) 27 41 57 79 99 122
lmin
req(VS) 18 29 42 57 66 75
reqRS(VS) 12 16 21 27 31 40
∆ req(VS) 6 13 21 30 35 35
req(RS) 27 41 57 79 99 122
Table 5.1: Numbers of requests to validation services and the reputation system for
the required security levels lmax, lmed and lmin. req(VS) denotes the number of requests
to validation services in the setting without reputation system, reqRS(VS) the respective
number when the reputation system is used. ∆ req(VS) denotes how many requests to
validation services are saved due to the use of the reputation system and req(RS) denotes
the number of requests to the reputation system.
In our data sets we found an average of seven new CAs per month. Thus, the
reputation system is on average queried seven times a month per registered user.
For example, assuming a user base of one million users would yield 162 requests
per minute. Peaks that might come up, e.g., because of day and night rhythms,
can easily be balanced because the requests to the reputation system are not time
critical.
5.4.4 Push service evaluation
In this section the proposed push service is evaluated in terms of success probabilities
of an attacker. We compare the system-centric setting with the user-centric setting
without and with the push service and show the security gain by such a service.
First, the detection capability for behavioral changes of our system depending on
the class of the compromised CA is evaluated. Based on these findings, the success
probabilities of an attacker are presented.
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Detection of behavioral changes
The performance of the detection mechanism is evaluated in terms of successfully
attacked entities until the service provider SP detects the maliciously issued certifi-
cate due to reports send by its clients. For the analysis we consider an attacker A
according to the attacker model given in Section 3.1.2. A possesses a fraudulent
certificate C for the web service S issued by CA. A uses C to attack relying entities
when connecting to S. Thus, we consider the users of S as the target group G of
attacked relying entities. A could also attack several web services in parallel, yet
this would only increase the size of the target group. Thus, for the analysis we
assume, that A only attacks one web service at a time.
Let q be the percentage of entities G that consider CA as trustworthy to issue
certificates for S in the user-centric setting. Trusting CA to issue certificates for S
means that CA reaches a sufficiently high issuer trust for end entity certificates in
the respective trust views. We call q the trust rate. Then, the probability that for
entity E∗, randomly chosen from G, trust validation outputs trusted for C is q and
the probability that it outputs untrusted and E∗ subsequently reports the attack
to SP is (1 − q). Thus, the probability that the n-th entity detects the fraudulent
certificate when connecting to S is prdet(n) = qn−1 · (1− q). The expectation value
for the number of successfully attacked connections to S until a detection occurs,
can be computed as:
Expcon =
∞∑
n=1
prdet(n) · n =
∞∑
n=1
qn−1 · (1− q) · n = 1
1− q
2
From this follows, that given q per cent of the entities trust CA, A on average can
successfully attack Expcon − 1 = 11−q − 1 entities until the attack is detected and
reported to SP. Table 5.2 shows the average number of successfully attacked entities
for different values of q. The numbers show that an attacker must compromise a
CA that achieves a trust rate approaching one within the target group in order not
to be rapidly detected. Even for q = 0.99 an attack is on average detected after 99
successfully attacked entities.
q 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.95 0.99
Expcon − 1 0.111 0.429 1 2.333 9 19 99
Table 5.2: Number of on average successfully attacked connections depending on q
2
∑∞
n=1 q
n−1 · (1 − q) · n = ∑∞n=1 qn−1 · n −∑∞n=1 qn · n = ∑∞n=0 qn · (n + 1) −∑∞n=1 qn · n =∑∞
n=0 q
n·n+∑∞n=0 qn−∑∞n=1 qn·n = q0·0+∑∞n=1 qn·n+∑∞n=0 qn−∑∞n=1 qn·n = ∑∞n=0 qn = 11−q
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p lmin lmed lmax
≥ 0.1 82 (26.8%) 63 (20.6%) 30 (9.8%)
≥ 0.2 57 (18.6%) 42 (13.7%) 24 (7.8%)
≥ 0.3 40 (13.1%) 29 (9.5%) 15 (4.9%)
≥ 0.4 30 (9.8%) 16 (5.2%) 9 (2.9%)
≥ 0.5 19 (6.2%) 13 (4.2%) 8 (2.6%)
≥ 0.6 16 (5.2%) 11 (3.6%) 5 (1.6%)
≥ 0.7 12 (3.9%) 7 (2.3%) 2 (0.7%)
≥ 0.8 7 (2.3%) 4 (1.3%) 0 (0.0%)
≥ 0.9 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)
Table 5.3: Number of CAs (per cent of total) for which at least the trust rate q is reached
for different required security levels for the attacked web service. The percentage refers to
the CA super set of 306 CAs found together in the analyzed 64 trust views.
Table 5.3 shows how many CAs achieve a certain trust rate q in our data set of
64 trust views. The super set of CAs found together in the 64 trust views contains
306 different CAs. For example, it can be observed that if entities require a security
level lmin for S, then only 26.8% of the CAs in the super set reach a trust rate of
q ≥ 0.1. For lmax this even shrinks to 9.8%. None of the CAs reaches a trust rate
of q = 0.9. Additionally, all CAs not contained in the super set are not trusted by
any entity in the target group. Thus, a fraudulent certificate issued by one of those
CAs would be immediately detected. In summary this shows, that in practice, it
is very improbable that A can identify and compromise a CA that achieves a high
trust rate in the target group, which would prevent an immediate detection of the
attack. Even compromising the CA which issued the legitimate certificates for the S
is no guarantee for a high trust rate, because the trust views of the attacked entities
might lack additional positive experiences for this CA for other web services.
Attacker success probabilities
The success probability of A is evaluated based on the trust rate q of the CA from
which A obtained the fraudulent certificate. In the previous section it was shown,
after how many attacked connections the attack is detected on average. With the
use of the push service, A’s success probability depends on the number of attacked
connections and drops to zero once the attack is detected. Most important, this
bounds the absolute number of entities that can be successfully attacked independent
from the size of the target group.
In the user-centric setting without a push service, the success probability directly
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depends on q, while the success probability in the system-centric setting is 100%.
This is depicted in Table 5.4. The evaluation concerns the time period between the
issuance of the fraudulent certificate and its revocation, from which on the certificate
cannot be used for an attack in any setting. However, while a revocation of the
fraudulent certificate protects from the misuse of this single certificate, a warning
by the push service leads to suspending the CA, which means further fraudulent
certificates issued by the same CA will also be detected.
Setting: system-centric user-centric user-centric
with push
service
Success probab. 100% q qn
Table 5.4: Success probability for an attack depending on q reached by the CA that
issued the fraudulent certificate. n denotes the number of entities A has attacked prior to
this attack.
5.5 Conclusion
To conclude this chapter we summarize the results. Service providers for CA-TMS
realizing a reputation system and a push service for CA warnings were presented.
The services have been evaluated in terms of security and performance. It was
shown that the reputation system speeds up the information collection and thus the
bootstrapping by more than 50% while only minimally increasing the attack surface
by less than 1% compared to the strictly local information collection. Differences in
trust views resulting from the use of the reputation system fade out, the more evolved
a trust view becomes. This shows, that the reputation system fastens the evolution
of trust views while not changing their individual character. Traffic overheads are
kept at a low rate of approximately seven requests per month on average per user
of the reputation system. These requests are non-blocking and thus do not lead to
any delays during browsing.
The presented push service solves the problem of relying entities making decisions
based on outdated information in case a CA changes its behavior from trustworthy
to untrustworthy. It was shown that the presented detection mechanism is capable
to detect maliciously behaving CAs, even if a majority of relying entities already
trusts the CA in question. Moreover, the push service puts an absolute bound on
the number of entities that can be attacked until the attack is detected. A detection
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leads to an immediate warning of the relying entities and the elimination of the
threat. For our test group of Internet users, the analysis showed that there does
not exist a single CA which is trusted by at least 90% of the group members. This
illustrates the detection and attack prevention capability in practice. Even a trust
rate of 90% in the target group of the attack on average leads to a detection after 9
attacked entities.
In summary, the proposed service providers highly improve the user experience of
CA-TMS because of the speed-up of information collection and thus the prevention
of delays and the reduction of the dependence on external validation services. At the
same time, service providers impose strong security benefits by adding highly effi-
cient detection mechanisms for fraudulent certificates and the subsequent prevention
of attacks.

6 CA revocation tolerant PKI
In this chapter, we present a solution for the too-big-to-fail problem of CAs. This
problem refers to the impossibility to revoke the key (and the according certificate)
of a large CA, even if actually required from a security perspective. In public key
infrastructures, revocation of a certificate is required whenever a key needs to be
invalidated before the end of its validity period. For example, in order to prevent
misuse when a key was compromised. However, the revocation of a CA’s key subse-
quently invalidates all certificates that contain the revoked key in their certification
path. This in turn means, that all services using such an invalidated certificate
for authentication become unavailable until their certificates are exchanged by new
ones. In many scenarios, such a temporal unavailability of services is not acceptable
and thus, either requires that the revocation of a CA key is considerably delayed or
even completely avoided. In Chapter 3, it was shown that this behavior is a huge
problem in practice and leads to security flaws.
In Section 6.1, we present a solution to the too-big-to-fail problem of CAs. The
problem is solved with forward secure signature schemes (FSS). FSS provide a (par-
tial) chronological ordering of the signatures generated with one key. It is guar-
anteed, that even an adversary that compromises the key cannot manipulate the
ordering of previously generated signatures. This property allows to revoke a key
without invalidating former signatures, thus the unavailability of dependent ser-
vices is prevented. We provide the concepts and implementation details concerning
changes in the standard path validation and revocation mechanisms and protocols.
We show how to implement the solution in the Web PKI in Section 6.2.
In Section 6.3, the solution is evaluated in regard to practicality. For the evalua-
tion we use a reference implementation of XMSS [12], a hash-based FSS. It is shown
that our solution provides good performance and practical data loads by present-
ing runtimes as well as certificate and signature sizes. These are compared to the
standard setup where common signature schemes like RSA or (EC) DSA are used.
Furthermore, we compare our solution to an alternate approach based on time-
stamps and show that time-stamps are not a viable solution to the too-big-to-fail
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problem. Section 6.4 concludes this chapter.
The contributions of this chapter were published as parts of [B10]. The publication
covers the theoretical results presented in Section 6.1. This chapter extends these
results with implementation details and an evaluation regarding the practicality of
the solution.
6.1 Realizing CA revocation tolerance with forward
secure signatures
In Chapter 3 it was shown that the too-big-to-fail problem results from the implicit
revocation of all certificates that rely on a revoked CA certificate, i.e. that have the
revoked CA certificate in their certification path. To resolve this problem, revocation
of CA certificates and the according revocation checking must be realized such that
legitimately issued certificates stay valid despite a revocation of superordinate CA
certificates. This requires the possibility to securely distinguish between legitimate
signatures and such generated by an attacker who compromised a CA’s private
signing key. We call a PKI that realizes the property of preserving the validity
of legitimately issued certificates in the face of CA certificate revocations a CA
revocation tolerant PKI.
In the following, a CA revocation tolerant PKI is achieved by replacing the con-
ventional signature schemes used for certificate signing by forward secure signature
schemes (cf. Section 2.1.2) in combination with an adapted version of the chain
model for path validation. End entities further use conventional signature schemes,
such as RSA and (EC) DSA, to minimize the deployment efforts. For authentica-
tion purposes, one does not gain a benefit from using FSS because signatures are in
general verified in close temporal proximity to signature creation. An extension of
the CA revocation tolerant PKI to FSS also being used by end entities in scenarios
where non-repudiation is required is presented in Chapter 7.
An exemplary certification path given a CA revocation tolerant PKI realized with
an FSS is shown in Figure 6.1. In each certificate an FSS public key is certified
except for the end entity certificate. The signatures on all certificates are generated
using the FSS.
In the following, we present the solution in detail. First, it is explained how FSS
enable to securely distinguish between legitimate signatures and such generated by
an attacker. Then, fine grained revocation is presented, which makes use of the
FSS’ special properties during the revocation of a certificate. Finally, we present
the adapted version of the chain model for path validation.
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6.1.1 The chronological ordering of signatures
Recall that in FSS, as presented in Section 2.1.2, each signature is accompanied by
an index specifying the interval of the key pair’s lifetime in which the signature was
generated. By this index, the signatures are chronologically ordered. Concerning
signatures generated prior to a compromise, this ordering is immutable. Manip-
ulating the ordering would require the generation of signatures for past intervals.
This is prevented by the forward security property. Thus, given the index of the
interval in which a key compromise occurred, distinguishing between legitimate and
fraudulent signatures can be done by comparing indices. How to identify the index
of the interval in which the key compromise occurred depends on the way how the
intervals are defined for the used FSS. This is discussed in Section 6.2.2.
If the used FSS allows multiple signatures to be generated in one interval, the
ordering is only a partial ordering. For the signatures generated in the same inter-
val, fraudulent and legitimate signatures cannot be distinguished based on indices.
Therefore, FSS that evolve the key after each signature generation are optimal re-
garding this property. However, even for FSS that allow multiple signatures in one
interval, the number of signatures for which the origin is unclear is limited.
6.1.2 Fine grained revocation
The forward security property allows to handle revocation in a fine grained manner.
In case of a key compromise, the forward security property guarantees that all
signatures created prior to the compromise originate from the certificate owner.
So there is no need to render these signatures invalid. As all signatures contain
the index of the interval they were created in, the validity of the certificate is not
revoked in general, but only for all intervals starting from the interval when the key
was compromised. Given the compromise happened in the interval with index c, the
revocation starts at index c. A signature including index i is accepted as valid if i < c
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and invalid if i ≥ c. Thus, a revocation of a certificate additionally has to include a
revocation index. How this can be realized with current revocation mechanisms is
shown in Section 6.2.2. For FSS which allow multiple signatures in one interval, fine
grained revocation invalidates all signatures whose origin is unclear. This may also
affect a limited number of legitimate signatures but is required to maintain security.
6.1.3 Adaptation of the validity model
The chronological ordering of signatures and fine grained revocation must be consid-
ered during path validation to realize a CA revocation tolerant PKI. An appropriate
validity model is given in Definition 6.1, which we call chain model for FFS with
time limitation. It is an adapted version of the original chain model combined with
properties of the shell model. Both were given in Definitions 2.1 and 2.3 in Sec-
tion 2.2.4.
For the definition let n ∈ N be the length of the certification path p = (C1, . . . ,
Cn). C1 is the self-signed certificate of the Root CA. Cn is the certificate of the
end entity. We denote by Ti(k) the starting date of the validity period of Ck and
by Te(k) its expiration date. Additionally, let Is(k) be the signing index used to
sign certificate Ck and Ir(k) a possible revocation index for certificate Ck. Further
let Ir(k) =∞ in case there is no revocation for certificate Ck. Note that Is(k) and
Ir(k − 1) are indices belonging to the same key pair. The revocation of end entity
certificates is done in the conventional way.
Definition 6.1 (Chain model for FFS with time limitation). Given all signature
schemes involved in the certification path are FSS except for the end entity scheme,
then a certification path is valid at verification time Tv if:
1. Cn is valid at verification time Tv: Ti(n) ≤ Tv ≤ Te(n) and Cn is not revoked
at Tv.
2. Every CA certificate in the path is valid at the verification time Tv: Ti(k) ≤
Tv ≤ Te(k) and not revoked for the signing index Is(k + 1) used for the subor-
dinate certificate in this path: Is(k + 1) < Ir(k) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1.
The adapted validity model is required, because the shell model, which is the
standard validity model in the Web PKI [83], does not allow the consideration of
a chronological ordering of signatures. The validity of all certificates in the cer-
tification path is evaluated at the time of signature validation and no individual
differentiation is made for the signatures that are verified along the certification
path. In the chain model, this is addressed based on the signature generation times.
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The chain model considers a certificate as valid if it is not revoked nor expired and
was issued before a potential superordinate CA certificate revocation or expiration.
As a consequence, subordinate certificates remain valid, even after the invalidation
of superordinate certificates. However, the original chain model (cf. Definition 2.3)
has a drawback. It allows signature validation at any point in the future. This
implies that the according revocation information for each involved certificate must
be stored for an indefinite time, because the time when a potential attacker makes
use of a compromised key cannot be controlled. However, in the Web PKI the
availability of revocation information is in general only guaranteed until the expiry
of the according certificate [81]. The chain model for FFS with time limitation re-
solves these issues. Certification paths are invalidated upon the expiry of one of the
included certificates, while revocations are handled in the fine grained manner as
described above.
6.2 Implementation in the Web PKI
In this section, it is shown how the Web PKI can be transitioned to a CA revoca-
tion tolerant PKI. We note that a standardization of the FSS itself is required to
allow interoperability. This standardization is not part of this thesis. However, we
highlight where standardization is required.
First the representation of FSS keys within X.509 certificates is explained. Then,
the adaptation of revocation mechanisms in order to cover fine grained revocation
is presented. Finally, we discuss necessary changes in path validation specified in
RFC 5280 [83] and give an overview over deployment efforts.
6.2.1 FSS and X.509 certificates
At first we consider the use of FSS in X.509 certificates. It is shown how keys
are represented and how this can be mapped to the requirements of FSS. X.509
certificates are specified in the abstract syntax notation version 1 (ASN.1)[96]. List-
ing 6.1 shows the ASN.1 representation of an X.509 certificate. There are three
fields, where signature algorithm and key information are stored in a certificate: the
signatureAlgorithm field and the signature and subjectPublicKeyInfo fields
within the tbsCertificate element. The first two fields are of type Algorithm-
Identifier and contain the identifier for the cryptographic algorithm used by the
CA to sign this certificate. Signature algorithms that are supported are listed in
[80, 105, 99]. However, it is explicitly allowed to support additional signature algo-
rithms.
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C e r t i f i c a t e : := SEQUENCE {
t b s C e r t i f i c a t e TBSCert i f i cate ,
s ignatureAlgor i thm A l g o r i t h m I d e n t i f i e r ,
s i gnatureVa lue BIT STRING }
TBSCert i f i cate : := SEQUENCE {
ve r s i o n [ 0 ] EXPLICIT Vers ion DEFAULT v1 ,
ser ia lNumber Cer t i f i ca t eSe r i a lNumber ,
s i g n a t u r e A l g o r i t h m I d e n t i f i e r ,
i s s u e r Name,
v a l i d i t y Va l id i ty ,
s ub j e c t Name,
sub jec tPub l i cKeyIn fo SubjectPubl icKeyInfo ,
i s suerUniqueID [ 1 ] IMPLICIT U n i q u e I d e n t i f i e r OPTIONAL,
−− I f present , v e r s i on MUST be v2 or v3
subjectUniqueID [ 2 ] IMPLICIT U n i q u e I d e n t i f i e r OPTIONAL,
−− I f present , v e r s i on MUST be v2 or v3
ex t en s i on s [ 3 ] EXPLICIT Extens ions OPTIONAL
−− I f present , v e r s i on MUST be v3 }
SubjectPubl icKeyInfo : := SEQUENCE {
a lgor i thm A l g o r i t h m I d e n t i f i e r ,
subjectPubl icKey BIT STRING }
A l g o r i t h m I d e n t i f i e r : := SEQUENCE {
a lgor i thm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ,
parameters ANY DEFINED BY algor i thm OPTIONAL }
Listing 6.1: X.509 certificate [83]
The subjectPublicKeyInfo field contains the public key, that is certified with
this certificate and additionally the algorithm to be used with the certified key. The
algorithm in the subjectPublicKeyInfo is as well of type AlgorithmIdentifier.
Thus, whether the CA’s signing key or the certified key is to be used with a FSS,
this is specified in the same way.
The algorithm identifier is used to identify a cryptographic algorithm using an OID
and optionally allows to specify parameters. These parameters may vary depending
on the algorithm.
There are two possibilities to specify parameters for an algorithm. Either they
are encoded within the OID of the algorithm as proposed in [101], meaning there is
a standard set of parameters for the given algorithm. Or, they are explicitly stated
within the parameters field of an AlgorithmIdentifier [83].
Thus, the use of FSS is covered by the X.509 standard and does not require
any changes. The FSS algorithm itself needs to be standardized and have an OID
assigned. This OID needs to directly identify the required parameters or, this stan-
dardization must include a definition of required parameters to be included in respec-
tive AlgorithmIdentifier fields in the certificate. For examples of such parameter
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sets please refer to [80]. Concerning FSS, the parameters might in particular include
the maximum number of allowed intervals for the certified key.
6.2.2 Adaptation of revocation mechanisms
CRLs and OCSP are the standard mechanisms to provide revocation information
as described in Chapter 3. Thus, it must be possible to provide a revocation index
within these data structures to enable fine grained revocation checking as described
in Section 6.1.2.
In general, a revocation of a certificate is published as a CRL entry within a CRL
or within an OCSP response. For the purpose to provide auxiliary data associated
to a CRL entry or an OCSP response, CRL entry extensions have been defined [83].
These can be included in the crlEntryExtensions field as part of an CRL entry
(cf. Listing 6.2) as well as into OCSP responses within the singleExtensions field
as shown in Listing 6.3 [104].
C e r t i f i c a t e L i s t : := SEQUENCE {
tb sCe r tL i s t TBSCertList ,
s ignatureAlgor i thm A l g o r i t h m I d e n t i f i e r ,
s i gnatureVa lue BIT STRING }
TBSCertList : := SEQUENCE {
ve r s i o n Vers ion OPTIONAL,
−− i f present , MUST be v2
s i g n a t u r e A l g o r i t h m I d e n t i f i e r ,
i s s u e r Name,
thisUpdate Time ,
nextUpdate Time OPTIONAL,
r e v o k e d C e r t i f i c a t e s SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
u s e r C e r t i f i c a t e Cer t i f i ca t eSe r i a lNumber ,
revocat ionDate Time ,
c r lEntryExtens ions Extens ions OPTIONAL
−− i f present , v e r s i o n MUST be v2
} OPTIONAL,
c r l E x t e n s i o n s [ 0 ] EXPLICIT Extens ions OPTIONAL
−− i f present , v e r s i o n MUST be v2
}
Listing 6.2: CRL [83]
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Sing leResponse : := SEQUENCE {
cert ID CertID ,
c e r t S t a t u s CertStatus ,
thisUpdate GeneralizedTime ,
nextUpdate [ 0 ] EXPLICIT General izedTime OPTIONAL,
s i n g l e E x t e n s i o n s [ 1 ] EXPLICIT Extens ions OPTIONAL }
Listing 6.3: OCSP single response [104]
The definition of an according extension for the revocation index enables its X.509
standard conform transmission. Listing 6.4 shows an X.509 extension and the pro-
posed definition of the revocationIndex extension. An extension is associated
with an OID to identify it. Optimally, the OID should be a member of the id-ce arc
(2.5.29) for ISO/ITU-T jointly assigned OIDs for certificate extensions. The number
represented by the placeholder ‘XXX’ needs to be requested during the standard-
ization procedure.
Extens ions : := SEQUENCE SIZE ( 1 . .MAX) OF Extension
Extension : := SEQUENCE {
extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER ,
c r i t i c a l BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
extnValue OCTET STRING
−− conta in s the DER encoding o f an ASN. 1 value
−− cor re spond ing to the extens i on type i d e n t i f i e d
−− by extnID
}
id−ce−r evocat ionIndex OBJECT IDENTIFIER : := { id−ce XXX }
RevocationIndex : := INTEGER ( 0 . .MAX)
Listing 6.4: Revocation index extension
The revocationIndex extension is to be a non-critical extension in order to guar-
antee backward compatibility. A client not supporting the extension would then
ignore it and consider the complete certificate as revoked.
The revocation index needs to be identified, when a certificate is to be revoked.
Considering a revocation because of a CA compromise, the identification of the
revocation index depends on the type of FSS. Either, the index depends directly
on the date of the compromise, or on the index of the last signature which was
legitimately generated with the compromised key. Therefore, the certificate owner
has to keep track of his key updates. In case of a CA, this can be done by logging the
last used index with the current date to a write once memory during key update.
Then, given the date of the key compromise, it is possible to determine the last
index used before the compromise.
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6.2.3 Adaptation of path validation
Given the revocation index is provided along with a revocation, the path validation
needs to be adapted such that the revocation index is evaluated during revocation
checking.
The implementation of the validity model given in Definition 6.1 only requires
minor changes of the path validation specified in RFC 5280 [83] in order to con-
sider revocation indices. Revocation checking is part of Section 6.1.3. Basic
Certificate Processing in RFC 5280. According to the shell model, in step
(a) (3), it is checked whether the certificate (called current certificate) is revoked
at the current time or not. In order to realize the chain model for FFS with time
limitation a differentiation between certificates that certify an FSS key and common
certificates needs to be done. If the current certificate certifies an FSS key, it must
be checked that the signature index extracted from the signature on the subsequent
certificate in the path is smaller than a potential revocation index. Otherwise it
must be checked that the certificate is not revoked at the current time.
This way, path validation is fully backward compatible and even certification
paths where CAs do not exclusively use FSS can be processed. In particular, this is
relevant when transitioning a PKI to a CA revocation tolerant PKI.
6.2.4 Deployment
For the deployment of a CA revocation tolerant PKI, the standardization of FSS is
required in order to ensure interoperability. This must happen before CAs can start
to employ FSS, as standardization is a preliminary for implementation on the client
side. The client applications (e.g. web browsers) have to support the used FSS
first. Otherwise clients become unable to verify certification paths once CAs employ
the new schemes. Given standardization has happened, the verification algorithms
of the FSS as well as the adapted path validation have to be implemented within
major libraries and crypto providers, as e.g. OpenSSL [167] and NSS [155]. Once
supported in major libraries, CAs can start to employ FSS for certificate issuance.
On the side of web servers, changes are only required if client authentication is
done based on certificates. Otherwise no changes are required due to the use of
conventional signature schemes for end entities. This in particular means, that no
changes in the TLS specification are required.
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6.3 Evaluation
In the following, the proposed solution is evaluated regarding practicality, which
includes the availability of an appropriate FSS. We show that the eXtended Merkle
Signature Scheme (XMSS) [12], a hash-based FSS, fulfills the requirements regarding
efficiency and security. Runtimes, key sizes and signature sizes are presented, which
show that a CA revocation tolerant PKI realized with XMSS provides good perfor-
mance and practical data loads in comparison to the standard setup with common
signature schemes like RSA or (EC) DSA.
6.3.1 eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS)
Although our proposal works with arbitrary FSS, we propose to apply XMSS. It is
as fast as RSA and (EC) DSA although it is forward secure and it provides practical
key sizes. These are the major requirements for a practical implementation of a CA
revocation tolerant PKI. Furthermore, at the time of writing, the standardization
process for XMSS has already been started [91, 130].
Besides that, XMSS comes with additional properties that bring additional bene-
fits for the Web PKI besides solving the too-big-to-fail problem of CAs. We shortly
summarize the properties of XMSS. It is hash-based and thus a post quantum sig-
nature scheme. Furthermore, XMSS can be realized with any secure hash function.
For XMSS, an interval is hard linked to one single signature and the key is auto-
matically updated by the signature algorithm. In case of a CA, this allows the most
fine grained revocation handling that is possible.
Thus, the deployment of XMSS for the Web PKI brings the additional benefit
that an alternative to RSA (which is currently used by more than 99% of all CAs
for certificate signing [17]) is available once quantum computers are realized. Then,
RSA as well as (EC) DSA become insecure and an alternative must be available
anyway. Furthermore, XMSS brings the possibility to base security on different
mathematical problems without requiring different signature schemes by using dif-
ferent hash functions for instantiation. This allows diversity without the additional
standardization efforts for further signature schemes.
Furthermore, with XMSS the probability of a sudden breakdown caused by ad-
vances in cryptanalysis can be efficiently minimized [12]. On the one hand, it requires
minimal security properties to be secure, thus the break of harder properties can
be seen as an early-warning system. On the other hand, so-called hash combiners
(i.e. see [19]) can be used, such that the resulting combination is secure as long as
at least one of the hash function families is secure. Such a property is especially
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relevant, when considering end entity signatures requiring long term verifiability as
presented in Chapter 7.
The following evaluation is based on the efficiency of XMSS to show that the
realization of a CA revocation tolerant PKI is practical.
6.3.2 Practicality of the CA revocation tolerant PKI
To evaluate the performance of our solution, it is analyzed, where the use of an FSS
leads to computational overheads and additional data loads. Overheads may evolve
from the use of the signature scheme itself and during the transmission of keys. Thus,
we evaluate the performance of key generation, signature generation and verification.
Concerning data loads, differences to the current setup may evolve from certificate
sizes. The additional data resulting from the revocation index extension in CRLs and
OCSP responses is considered negligible as it consists of a single integer value. The
evaluation is based on [34], which provides an in depth analysis of the performance
of XMSS and different parameter settings. An excerpt of timings and key sizes is
presented in Table 6.1. The timings are measured with a C implementation, where
XMSS is instantiated with hardware accelerated AES (AES-NI) using 128 bit keys.
The bit security for XMSS deduced from known attacks is 128 bit in all cases. In
brackets, a lower bound on the provable security is given. Note that such proofs do
not exist for RSA and DSA. For RSA and DSA to reach a bit security of 128, a key
length of 4440 bit is required according to the heuristic of Lenstra and Verheul with
updated equations [48, 47]. A bit security of 128 is assumed to be secure until the
year 2090, which shows that the chosen parameter setting is suitable to be used in
the practice regarding security.
Signature generation and verification
For signature generation, and most important signature verification XMSS provides
better timings than RSA2048 and DSA2048. This performance gain would even be
stronger for longer key sizes in the case of RSA and DSA. Thus, XMSS provides a
performance gain during path validation.
Limited number of signatures and key renewal
With XMSS the limited number of possible signatures has to be considered. How-
ever, while this would be a drawback when XMSS was used by end entities during
a TLS handshake for authentication, in the case of certificate issuance this is no
hindrance in practice.
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t Timings (ms) Sizes (byte)
Alg. (*1,000) Keygen Sign Verify Secret key Public key Signature b
XMSS 1 55 0.24 0.07 804 596 2,292 128 (101)
XMSS 1 77 0.33 0.06 804 564 1,236 128 (88)
XMSS 65 3,505 0.41 0.07 1,332 788 2,388 128 (92)
XMSS 65 4,915 0.56 0.06 1,332 756 1,332 128 (82)
XMSS 1,000 56,066 0.52 0.07 1,684 916 2,452 128 (84)
XMSS 1,000 79,196 0.71 0.06 1,684 884 1,396 128 (78)
RSA 2048 - 3.08 0.09 ≤ 512 ≤512 ≤256 90-95
DSA 2048 - 0.89 1.06 ≤512 ≤512 ≤ 256 90-95
Table 6.1: XMSS performance for different parameter settings, instantiated with AES-
NI. Measurements on a computer with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2520M CPU @ 2.50GHz
and 8GB RAM. t denotes the number of possible signatures with one key pair. b denotes
the bit security, numbers in parentheses denote a lower bound on the provable security.
AES-NI is used with 128 bit keys. [34]
CA keys are exclusively used to sign certificates and CRLs. Thus, 1,000,000
possible signatures before a key renewal is required is considered sufficient. For
example, one of the most active CAs in the certification business has signed around
90,000 TLS certificates directly [5]. Assuming a yearly renewal of TLS certificates
and a weakly issuance of CRLs this implies that a CA can use its key pair for
more than ten years. For Root CAs and Sub CAs that do not issue end entity
certificates even one thousand signatures might suffice, as the number of Sub CAs a
CA issues certificates for is normally limited to a few tenth. Note that an extension
of XMSS, namely XMSSMT is available, that allows for a virtually unlimited number
of signatures [34].
Key generation timings are of limited relevance. XMSS key generation can be
performed in less than 1.27 minutes as shown in Table 6.1. Taking into account,
that this is only done once and it is an oﬄine task, this does not interfere the use
of XMSS.
Certificate sizes
Assuming the parameters are encoded within the OID that identifies the signature
algorithm, the impact on certificate sizes by the employed signature scheme results
from the subject public key and the CA’s signature on the certificate. An XMSS
public key is only included within CA certificates. Depending on the respective
parameter setting, Table 6.1 shows that signature sizes are one to two kilobytes larger
than those generated with RSA or DSA, while public key sizes are at most doubled.
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Regarding certificate sizes this leads to a growth by 1-2.5 kilobytes. However, once
key sizes of RSA and DSA need to be increased to 4096 bit, this disadvantage
shrinks. We note that EC DSA would allow for shorter key lengths. However, less
than 0.3% of the trusted CAs of the Web PKI make use of EC DSA keys [17]. Thus,
EC DSA has no relevance for the comparison.
For an exemplary certification path that includes 2 Sub CAs, the data overhead
during a TLS handshake due to certificate sizes is approximately 3,524 bytes. Note
that the Root CA certificate needs not be transmitted during the handshake. This
shows that the use of XMSS for certificate signing is practical. The average size of
a web page listed in the Alexa Top 1 Million is 1.8 MB [9]. Thus, the additional
data due to certificate sizes on average would make up for less than 0.2% of traffic
overhead.
Hardware requirements
In [34], it has been shown that the use of XMSS does not require special hardware.
The timings presented above have been measured on a standard computer, and even
the applicability on a smart card has been shown.
The larger size of the private key in comparison to RSA or DSA is of minimal
relevance. It is only to be stored and used on the CA’s hardware security module,
which is unproblematic for the key sizes given in Table 6.1.
Organizational changes
Required organizational changes is another aspect which is important for the de-
ployment in practice. As the use of FSS for certificate signing simply requires the
exchange of the used signature algorithm, no procedural changes for certificate re-
quests and issuance are required. However, it should be noted that CAs must ensure
the appropriate update of the private key according to the specification of the inter-
vals of the key pair’s lifetime. Using XMSS, this is ensured by an automatized update
after each signature generation. However, as the correct key update is indispens-
able to achieve a CA revocation tolerant PKI deployment, this update requirement
should be reflected in the CAs’ policies and the approval of the implementation of
adequate measures should become part of regular security audits.
6.3.3 Comparison to time-stamping
An alternate approach to distinguish between legitimately and maliciously issued
certificates in the face of CA compromises is to add time-stamps by an independent
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trusted TSA. The time-stamping approach has been proposed to implement the
chain model in a secure way [6]. We shortly summarize, why time-stamps are not a
practical solution for the too-big-to-fail problem.
To implement the chain model based on time-stamps, a time-stamp for any cer-
tificate in the certification path would be required [6]. With this, for each certificate
it could be securely distinguished whether a certificate existed before a compromise
and thus can be considered as legitimately issued. However, the approach has serious
drawbacks and performance issues.
Firstly, the setup and maintenance of an additional and independent TSA infras-
tructure and the trustworthiness of the TSAs to apply the correct date and time is
required. The time-stamping service may be provided by a CA, however this CA
must be independent from the CAs in the certification path that is to be protected.
Otherwise, a compromise that invalidates the certification path also invalidates the
time-stamp. This means for each time-stamp in the certification path, an additional
certification path has to be verified to authenticate the TSA’s certificate. In the
best case when all CAs use the same time-stamping service, at least one additional
certification path has to be processed. However, this case is hardly imaginable with-
out highly limiting the flexibility of the PKI because the time-stamp needs to be
requested during or directly after the certificate issuance. This means, on the CA’s
side the certificate issuance processes would have to be adapted, as well as different
CAs would have to cooperate in order to prevent different TSAs for the protection
of one certification path.
Furthermore, besides the time-stamps, the additional certification path(s) have
to be delivered to the clients for path validation. Thus, the amount of transmitted
certificates as well as the efforts for revocation checking during the TLS handshake
would at least be doubled. The additional provision of time-stamps and independent
certification paths also requires the adaptation of current standards. Furthermore,
the independent paths need to be processed by the clients, requiring the adaptation
of path validation algorithms.
Finally, time-stamps relying on electronic signatures themselves face the same
problems concerning compromise and expiration as common electronic signatures
do. Time-stamps only defer the problem to the TSA infrastructure and do not solve
it. That is, upon the compromise of a TSA or any superordinate CA, the issued
time-stamps become invalid which then would require their renewal facing the same
problems as certificate renewal in case of CA compromise. All together, we deduce
that time-stamps are only a theoretical solution for the too-big-to-fail problem but
not applicable in practice to realize a CA revocation tolerant PKI.
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6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, it was presented how to realize a CA revocation tolerant PKI using
forward secure signature schemes. The CA revocation tolerant PKI preserves the
validity of legitimately issued certificates in the face of CA certificate revocations. It
prevents the undifferentiated invalidation of all certificates that rely on a revoked CA
certificate and the associated unavailability of dependent web services. Thus, CA
certificates can be revoked in case of a compromise to prevent misuse by a attacker.
Moreover, due to the precise impact of revocation in the CA revocation tolerant PKI,
a certificate can even be revoked on suspicion of a compromise. It was shown, that
the Web PKI can be transitioned to a CA revocation tolerant PKI with minor efforts
once forward secure signature schemes are standardized. No organizational changes
are required, thus allowing a transition parallel to normal operation. All changes
can be realized fully backward compatible and are covered by current standards.
The proposal has been evaluated regarding practicality and performance. It was
shown that with XMSS an appropriate FSS is available, which in fact is currently
being standardized. XMSS allows the implementation of a CA revocation tolerant
PKI without limitations. The only drawback is slightly increased data loads during
the TLS handshake, while no special hardware is required and signature verification
speed can even be increased. The usability and the computational effort to use the
PKI services is equal to conventional signature schemes. Thus, the presented CA
revocation tolerant PKI is a practical solution to the too-big-to-fail problem of the
Web PKI.

7 Providing non-repudiation and long
term verifiability
Public key infrastructures provide the possibility to verify the authenticity of public
keys at the time the keys are being used. In the previous chapters, we have shown
how to maintain this guarantee in practice. However, digital signatures as used
today do not provide non-repudiation and long term verifiability. These properties
require additional mechanisms.
Conventional signature schemes such as RSA and DSA cannot guarantee non-
repudiation as there exists no possibility to distinguish between signatures generated
by the legitimate key owner or an attacker that compromised the key. This fact can
be exploited by the key owner to repudiate formerly generated signatures by pre-
tending that his key has been compromised. Long term verifiability has two aspects.
First it requires an alternate validity model, called the chain model. The second
aspect is the preservation of the security of signatures. Signature schemes become
insecure over time. Thus, in the future an attacker might be able to forge signatures
without knowing the according key. At that point, all signatures generated with
the affected signature scheme become insecure because of the indistinguishability of
legitimate and forged signatures.
Today, both problems are solved with time-stamps generated by time-stamping
authorities. Yet, this solution is costly and therefore has prevented the broad appli-
cation of digital signatures as a replacement for handwritten signatures so far.
In Section 7.1, we present a solution based on FSS, adopting the mechanisms used
in Chapter 6. Non-repudiation is achieved by preventing back dated revocation.
To do so, we exploit the chronological ordering of signatures provided by FSS. The
state of the signature key is securely tracked by a trusted third party. This approach
additionally allows reconfirmations for signature generations, e.g. similar to mTAN
as known from online banking, which prevent unnoticed key misuse. Long term
verifiability is addressed in Section 7.2. Firstly, FSS allow the application of the
chain model without time-stamps. The second aspect of long term verifiability
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is addressed with the use of XMSS, a hash-based FSS. We present possibilities
to prevent the sudden break down of the security of signatures based on special
properties of XMSS.
In Section 7.3, our solution is evaluated. The correctness is shown with a for-
mal PKI model. The efficiency is evaluated by comparing the presented solution
to the time-stamping based one. We evaluate data loads, runtimes and security
requirements in the different setups and show that the FSS based solution has clear
advantages. Section 7.4 concludes this chapter.
The contributions of this chapter were published as parts of [B6, B7, B8, B10].
7.1 Guaranteeing non-repudation
In this section we show how to achieve non-repudiation with FSS. First, an intro-
duction to the non-repudiation scenario is given and the difficulties are explained in
Section 7.1.1. Afterward, it is shown how to generally apply FSS for end entities in
Section 7.1.2 and the model for signature validation is presented in Section 7.1.3. To
eventually be able to guarantee non-repudiation, the secure tracking of key states of
end entities is required. This is solved with the Sign & Report approach presented
in Section 7.1.4. Finally, it is shown in Section 7.1.5, how to extend the Sign &
Report approach with a compromise detection mechanism using a reconfirmation
procedure.
7.1.1 Non-repudiation – motivation and problems
Over the past few years, the importance of e-business and e-government has been
steadily growing. More and more processes are handled online without physical
interaction. To guarantee for authenticity and non-repudiation in such processes,
digital signatures are used. Moreover, many countries allow to replace handwritten
signatures by digital signatures and consider these as legally binding [106]. This
theoretically allows to transfer many processes to the digital world that formerly
required a media disruption, e.g. in many countries applying for a bank account.
However, there are several hurdles that lead to a rather low adoption of digital
signatures as a replacement for handwritten ones over the past years.
Other than in authentication scenarios as considered in the previous chapters
where the validity of a signature is only to be checked once at the time of authenti-
cation, for use-cases that require non-repudiation the validity of a signature must be
provable as long as the signature is of any interest. In many cases, non-repudiation
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must be preserved for ten years and more by law, which also directly links to long
term verifiability covered in Section 7.2.
Now, there is a fundamental difference between handwritten and digital signa-
tures. While handwritten signatures are naturally bound to a single person, the
binding between digital signatures and a person is artificial and thus fragile. This
binding, which is provided by PKIs is only temporary, terminated either by expiry
of the certificate or its revocation. And this is where the non-repudiation property,
which is guaranteed by the digital signature in theory fails in reality if there are
no additional measures. The private key, required to generate signatures, can be
applied by anyone who knows it or has access to it, without any possibility to dis-
tinguish which signature has been generated by whom. And because in principle a
compromise is possible, a key owner can simply claim that his key was compromised,
ascribing the generation of signatures to an attacker and thereby repudiating valid
signatures. To prevent such a repudiation attack, a provable chronological order of
events is required and must be considered during signature validation. A signature
should then be verified as valid, if it was generated before a key compromise.
In the following we show how to establish a provable chronological order of events
and maintain non-repudiation based on FSS. The use of FSS enables us to get rid
of the drawbacks connected to the current solution with time-stamps.
7.1.2 FSS for end entities
In Chapter 6, it was shown how to employ the chronological ordering of signatures
given by FSS to prevent the invalidation of legitimately issued certificates upon a
CA certificate revocation. In this section, this mechanism is applied for end entity
signatures in order to prevent the invalidation of legitimately generated signatures
upon revocation of an end entity certificate.
Basically, the extension of the mechanism is achieved by additionally replacing
the conventional signature schemes used by end entities with FSS and realizing fine
grained revocation for end entity certificates analogously to Section 6.1.2.
However, in the case of end entities, the issue of triggering the key update algo-
rithm must be taken into account. Recall that on-time key updates are indispensable
to preserve forward security. The key update algorithm can either be called manu-
ally by the user, scheduled to run at the end of a certain time period, or be part of
the signature algorithm, depending on the way the intervals of the key pair’s lifetime
are defined.
For end entities, FSS where the periods are based on the number of signatures are
to be used. FSS based on the number of generated signatures have the advantage
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that key update can be performed automated, based on a counter contained in the
key holding device. The drawback is, that the key indices are not linked to real
time, which complicates correct revocation in practice. This is because the index
at the time of compromise must be traceable. Yet, this is achievable as shown in
Section 7.1.4.
In comparison, the key update problem of FSS where intervals are defined in terms
of time periods makes their application problematic. For these schemes, where e.g.,
one time period corresponds to one day, the key update algorithm must be triggered
periodically. This can only be automated on systems that have an internal clock
and that are active each time an update is necessary. On smartcards, which are the
common place to store end entity signature keys, a manual update is required and
thus does not allow any guarantees for on-time key updates.
In the following we assume an FSS that evolves the key after each signature
generation. With XMSS an efficient scheme of this type is available as shown in
Chapter 6.
7.1.3 Adaptation of the validity model
Extending the use of FSS to the end entity case requires a slight adaptation of the
validity model given in Definition 6.1 to also consider the end entity signature. The
adapted version is given in Definition 7.1.
For the definition let n ∈ N be the length of the certification path p = (C1, . . . ,
Cn). C1 is the self-signed certificate of the Root CA. Cn is the certificate of the
end entity. We denote by Ti(k) the starting date of the validity period of Ck and
by Te(k) its expiration date. Tv is the time of signature verification. Additionally,
let Is be the index used for end entity signature generation, let Is(k) be the signing
index used to sign certificate Ck and Ir(k) a possible revocation index for certificate
Ck. Further let Ir(k) = ∞ in case there is no revocation for certificate Ck. Recall
that Is(k) and Ir(k − 1) are indices belonging to the same key pair.
Definition 7.1 (Chain model for FFS with time limitation – signature validation).
A digital signature with index Is is valid at verification time Tv if:
1. Cn is valid at verification time Tv: Ti(n) ≤ Tv ≤ Te(n) and Cn is not revoked
for Is: Is < Ir(n) .
2. Every CA certificate in the path is valid at the verification time Tv: Ti(k) ≤
Tv ≤ Te(k) and not revoked for the signing index Is(k + 1) used for the subor-
dinate certificate in this path: Is(k + 1) < Ir(k) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1.
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This validity model still limits the validity of signatures to the validity periods
of the involved certificates to guarantee the availability of revocation information.
Thus, it does not allow long term verification which requires the time limitation to
be dropped. This will be considered in Section 7.2.
The application of FSS for end entity signatures solves the unintended invalidation
of legitimately generated signatures. However, the assumption of dishonest end
entities aiming at repudiating their own signatures leads to an additional challenge.
Namely how to guarantee the correctness of the revocation index. This is solved
with the Sign & Report approach presented in the following section.
7.1.4 Sign & Report
With the use of FSS for end entity signatures and the validity model given in Defini-
tion 7.1 legitimate signatures are not invalidated by a revocation, given the revoca-
tion index is correct. In order to guarantee non-repudiation, the PKI must ensure the
correctness of the revocation index. In particular, a PKI that offers non-repudiation
must not allow back dated revocation (for a formal proof refer to Section 7.3.1).
However, when considering the facets of back dated revocation there are different
security goals that contradict each other. This conflict needs to be resolved, and is
discussed in the following. Afterwards, we present the Sign & Report approach to
effectively prevent back dated revocation.
Back dated revocation
There are certain scenarios that require back dated revocation. Namely, whenever
it is possible that the signature key might get compromised and maliciously used
without being noticed immediately by the key owner. For example, consider a
classical setup for digital signatures where the private key is stored on the user’s
system (e.g., PC). Here, the detection of a key compromise may take some time
in which the attacker who stole the key may already have generated signatures.
Then, it is clearly impossible to prohibit back dated revocation because back dated
revocation is required to invalidate the signatures generated by the attacker before
the compromise detection.
However, as back dated revocation contradicts non-repudiation, scenarios with
such a (possibly large) gray phase must be excluded or the gray phase must be
eliminated by technical means. Therefore, the secret key has to be protected in
a way that prevents unnoticed compromises. A common solution that allows for a
minimal gray phase is to store keys on smartcards, trusted platform modules (TPM)
etc. Private keys are not extractable from these devices and can only be used when
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the according secret, such as a PIN, is known. This allows for the assumption
of immediate key compromise detection and subsequently the prohibition of back
dated revocation in the sense that an attacker is not able to immediately crack
the additional secret and thus use the stolen key before the key compromise, i.e.
disappearance of the key storage device, is detected. In Section 7.1.5 we describe
how the Sign & Report approach can be extended to explicitly support the detection
of illegitimate key uses. This further justifies the assumption of a marginal gray
phase, thereby eliminating the need for back dated revocation.
Sign & Report
To prevent back dated revocation, the responsible CA must know the current index
of an end entity’s key pair and be able to verify its correctness. To achieve this,
the Sign & Report approach for FSS is defined. The basic idea is that the current
index is reported to the CA after signature generation. This procedure enables the
CA to keep track of the signing index and prevent the key owner from back dated
revocation and repudiation of signatures. The index reporting protocol is presented
in the following. Recall that an FSS is applied that evolves the key after each
signature generation. Thus, each signature is directly linked to a unique index.
Index reporting protocol The index can be reported either by the signer or the
verifier. This might be chosen depending on the specific application. The first
case is desirable when the verifier is oﬄine. However, then the signer needs to be
able to prove the reporting. This can be realized by a validity token obtained from
the CA and additionally serving as proof for the absence of a revocation making
additional revocation checking obsolete. In the second case, reporting can directly
be performed in one combined step during online revocation status checking and
would reflect the natural ambition of the verifier to obtain non-repudiation.
Figure 7.1 shows the protocol for the first case, but the adaptation to the second
is straight forward. After signature generation (Step (a)) the signature σ is sent to
the CA together with the message m and an identifier ID of the signer (Step (b)).
The ID can in particular be the certificate serial number of the signer’s certificate.
Recall, that in general, the hash of the message h(m) is signed instead of signing
m directly. If the signature scheme applied by the signer uses this initial hashing
only for compression, but it would also be secure to sign messages directly, then it
suffices to send h(m) to the CA in Step (b) instead of m. This conceals m from the
CA and in general prevents data overhead.
The CA checks the signature for validity (Step(c)) and generates a validity token
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CA Signer Verifier
(a) σ = Sign(sk,m)
(b)
ID,σ,m←−−−−−
(c) If Verify(pk, σ,m) and
(pk is not revoked):
generate proof pi
(d)
pi−−−−−→
(e)
σ,pi,m−−−−→
(f) If Verify(σ,m) and
(g) (pi is valid): accept
Figure 7.1: Index reporting protocol
pi for the signature index contained in σ to confirm the logging. The signature
verification ensures, that the signer’s certificate is not revoked. Additionally, the
reporting as well as the confirmation of wrong index information is prevented. pi is
sent back to the signer and subsequently transmitted (together with σ and m) to
the verifier (Steps (d)-(e)), who can now validate the signature and the token.
By the index, the validity token is bound to a specific signature. Thus, it can be
used for all future verifications without further online requests. Additionally, due to
the forward security, the token for a certain index i can serve as a validity token for
all preceding indices. Thus, if several signatures have to be validated, the logging
request can be aggregated to only one, by requesting the token for the highest index.
The validity token can be realized as (public key, index) pair signed by the CA. A
convenient realization is shown in the following.
Integration into OCSP The index reporting can be integrated into OCSP. The
OCSP standard allows extensions according to the extension model for X.509 cer-
tificates for OCSP requests as shown in Listing 7.1.
Request : := SEQUENCE {
reqCert CertID ,
s ing l eReques tExtens i ons [ 0 ] EXPLICIT Extens ions OPTIONAL }
Listing 7.1: OCSP (single) request [104]
The definition of an appropriate extension allows the reporting of a new signature
(index). The proposed definition of the indexReport extension is shown in List-
ing 7.2. The extension can then be included in the singleRequestExtensions field
of an OCSP request.
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id−pkix−ocsp−indexReport OBJECT IDENTIFIER : := { id−pkix−ocsp XXX }
IndexReport : := SEQUENCE {
messageValue BIT STRING,
s ignatureVa lue BIT STRING }
Listing 7.2: Signature index report extension
The extension is associated with an OID to identify it. Optimally, the OID should
be a member of the id-pkix-ocsp arc (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1) for ISO assigned OIDs for
OCSP. The number represented by the placeholder ‘XXX’ needs to be requested
during the standardization procedure, which is out of scope of this thesis. The
extension contains the message m (in general represented by the hash value h(m))
in the messageValue field and the signature σ in the signatureValue field. The
signature index is contained within σ. The certificate and thus the signer’s public key
is identified by the CertID contained in the OCSP request. With this information,
the OCSP server can verify the signature and subsequently generate the validity
token.
The validity token pi is the standard OCSP response containing good as certificate
status and the highest so far reported index for this certificate incremented by one
in the revocationIndex extension defined in Listing 6.4.
Note that the OCSP server needs to implement the index logging functionality
and requires access to the CA’s certificate database. Furthermore, there can exist
multiple OCSP responses for one certificate specifying different revocation indices
as long as the response contains good as certificate status. Once the certificate is
revoked, the OCSP response contains revoked as certificate status and the revoca-
tion index must not be changed anymore. However, even a response declaring the
certificate as revoked can serve as a validity token for lower signature indices due to
the forward security property of the signature scheme applied by the signer.
7.1.5 Incorporation of compromise detection
The Sign & Report approach makes it possible to monitor key usage and support
end entities in the detection of illegitimate key usage and trigger revocation. Thus,
the justification for immediate revocation can be strengthened. Compromise detec-
tion and the prevention of gray periods can be addressed by adding an additional
reconfirmation procedure for signature generation. Before confirming the logging of
the index, the CA can request a reconfirmation from the key owner. A possibility
to do so is to apply mobile transaction numbers (mTAN) as commonly known from
e-banking or similar to the usage presented in [B11].
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The protocol flow with reconfirmation is shown in Figure 7.2. In Step (c) a random
transaction number TAN is generated instead of the validity token pi. The TAN is
sent to some out of band device (OOBD) of the signer, e.g. its smartphone (Step
(d.1)). The signer reads the TAN ∗ from the OOBD and then sends it back to the
CA if he indeed used his private key and wants to report this to the CA (Steps (d.2)
- (d.3)). Sending back the TAN ∗ reconfirms the will of the signer to report a new
index. If TAN ∗ sent back by the signer equals TAN sent by the CA, then the CA
generates the proof pi and hands it to the signer (Steps (d.4) - (d.5)). The rest is
analogue to the protocol shown in Figure 7.1.
As the signer is actively involved into the logging process and is informed about
key usage via an independent channel, unintended key usage can be discovered.
Thus, undetected usage of the key is significantly less probable, and even such cases
can be detected, where e.g., the smartcard is left unwatched for a certain time span.
Even reconfirmation of the actually signed message can be realized. By sending
the message m in plain instead of its hash h(m) to the CA, m could additionally
be sent back and displayed on a smartphone for verification. A drawback of the
reconfirmation procedure is that it cannot be integrated directly into OCSP, because
OCSP is not designed for an interactive challenge response approach.
CA Signer OOBD Verifier
(a) - (b) as shown in Figure 7.1
(c) If Verify(pk, σ,m) and
pk is not revoked:
generate TAN
(d.1)
TAN−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(d.2) Display TAN ∗
to signer.
(d.3)
TAN∗←−−−−
(d.4) If TAN
?
= TAN ∗
generate proof pi
(d.5)
pi−−−−−→
(e)
σ,pi,m−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(f) - (g) as shown in Figure 7.1
Figure 7.2: Index reporting with reconfirmation
7.2 Long term verifiability of end entity signatures
In this section, it is described how long term verifiability is achieved. First, in
Section 7.2.1, it is explained how the time limitation of the validity model presented
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in Definition 7.1 can be dropped in order to support long term verifiability. Then,
in Section 7.2.2, the second aspect of long term verifiability – the preservation of the
security of signatures – is addressed with the use of XMSS. We present possibilities
to prevent the sudden break down of the security of signatures based on special
properties of XMSS.
7.2.1 Chain model without time limitation
The chain model for FSS without time limitation is given in Definition 7.2. It allows
the verification of a signature independent from the verification time, thus allowing
long term verifiability. As mentioned in Section 7.1.3, the availability of revocation
information is a particular challenge, when considering the validity of signatures
upon the expiry of the certificates in the according certification path. So far, this
availability was indirectly ensured by the time limitation. As this is not the case
when the time limitation is dropped, the availability of revocation information is
added as an explicit requirement.
For the definition let n ∈ N be the length of the certification path p = (C1, . . . ,
Cn). C1 is the self-signed certificate of the Root CA. Cn is the certificate of the end
entity. Tv is the time of signature verification. Let Is be the index used for end
entity signature generation, let Is(k) be the signing index used to sign certificate Ck
and Ir(k) a possible revocation index for certificate Ck. Further let Ir(k) = ∞ in
case there is no revocation for certificate Ck. Recall that Is(k) and Ir(k − 1) are
indices belonging to the same key pair.
Definition 7.2 (Chain model for FSS – signature validation). A digital signature
with index Is is valid at verification time Tv if:
1. A valid revocation status is available for all certificates in the path p.
2. Cn is not revoked for Is: Is < Ir(n) .
3. Every CA certificate in the path is not revoked for the signing index Is(k + 1)
used for the subordinate certificate in this path: Is(k + 1) < Ir(k) for all
1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1.
Preserving revocation information
In order to allow long term verifiability valid revocation information must be avail-
able. In general it can be assumed that the initial verification of a signature is in
close temporal proximity to the signature generation. As the verifier is always in-
terested in obtaining a valid signature, he will never accept and store a signature
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without validating it. Due to this temporal proximity, the initial validation can
be performed according to Definition 7.1, thus guaranteeing the availability of re-
vocation information. To prevent the possibility of good statements for non-issued
certificates, non-repudiation scenarios should require that revocation information is
obtained from OCSP servers that respond with revoked to requests for non-issued
certificates. Such OCSP responders must include the extended-revoke extension
according to RFC 6960 (cf. Section 4.4.8 in [104]). For the end entity signature,
the validity token as defined in Section 7.1.4 is to be used. It directly states, that
the signature in question has been reported to the CA and the according certificate
is not revoked. Note that the signatures on the revocation information also need to
be verified. Thus, in case the CA delegated the provision of revocation information,
the according certificate must be stored in addition.
Then, the verifier can preserve the revocation information by storing it along with
the obtained signature and the signed document. Thus, path validation according
to Definition 7.2 is possible at any point in the future as long as the involved sig-
nature schemes are considered secure. This refers to the second aspect of long term
verifiability and will be addressed in the following section.
7.2.2 Preventing the sudden break down of signature security
Having solved the theoretical aspect of long term verifiability with FSS, in this sec-
tion we address the issue of signature schemes becoming insecure over time. This is
especially relevant in scenarios, where the validity of signatures and the authentic-
ity of stored data must be preserved over decades or even many generations. Many
such scenarios exist, for example digital records in land registers, medical data or
tax statements [B3, 66].
One major reason requiring preservation mechanisms for digital signatures is, that
cryptographic algorithms underlie an aging process. Because of continually growing
computational power and progress in cryptanalysis algorithms become weak over
time. Thus, in the future an attacker might be able to forge signatures without
knowing the according key. At that point, all signatures generated with the affected
signature scheme become insecure because of the indistinguishability of legitimate
and forged signatures. In practice, this aging process is counteracted with the adap-
tation of security parameters such as increasing the key lengths. The signatures
that already have been generated and whose security needs to be preserved, have to
be renewed whenever the employed parameters are about to become insecure. Re-
newal means, that existing signatures are signed together with the document by a
trusted third party using a secure signature scheme and parameters. For this aspect,
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a multitude of archival solutions exists that face this continuous aging of signature
algorithms [66].
However, there is another aspect. Signature schemes can, as any cryptographic
algorithm, suddenly become insecure. This happens, when unexpectedly an algo-
rithm is found that solves the underlying mathematical problem in an efficient way.
For example, once quantum computers can be built, all currently used signature
algorithms become insecure because quantum computers can solve the discrete log-
arithm and the factorization problem [62]. In such a case not only the parameters
need to be adapted, but the complete signature algorithm needs to be replaced.
Even more severe, if such a break happens unexpectedly, there might not be enough
time to maintain the validity of signatures with signature renewal.
With XMSS the probability of a sudden break down caused by advances in crypt-
analysis can be efficiently minimized. Being a hash-based signature scheme, XMSS
is constructed using hash function families as building blocks. In particular, the
construction of XMSS requires a second-preimage resistant hash function and a
pseudorandom function family. These two required properties are strictly weaker
security assumptions than collision resistance as discussed in Section 2.1.1. How-
ever, collision resistance is normally required from a hash function in order to be
considered as secure. Being a strictly harder security assumption, collision resis-
tance of a hash function is normally broken before there are attacks against the
second-preimage resistance or pseudorandomness. Thus on the one hand, the break
of harder properties such as collision resistance can be seen as an early-warning
system. Once an attack against collision resistance of an employed hash function is
available, there is still time for signature renewal.
On the other hand, so-called hash combiners can be used to replace the used hash
function family. Hash combiners use two families per property, such that the result-
ing combination is secure as long as at least one of the families is secure. There are
folklore hash combiners for these properties (i.e. see [19]). Denote the message input
of a function by m and the key input by k. Given two second-preimage resistant
hash functions h1, h2, the Concatenation-Combiner H
h1,h2
|| (m) = (h1(m)||h2(m)) is
known to guarantee second-preimage resistance, as long as at least one of the used
hash functions has this property. Similarly, for pseudorandom function families f1,
f2 the XOR-Combiner H
f1,f2
⊕ (k,m) = (f1(k,m) ⊕ f2(k,m)) is known to guarantee
for pseudorandomness, as long as at least one of the used functions has this property.
As these hash combiners themselves are (hash) functions, they can be easily plugged
into XMSS. So there is no need to use two different signature schemes to base the
security on two different mathematical problems. One only has to use two different
(hash) functions, based on different problems or with different constructions.
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With this approach, signatures stay secure even if one of the underlying primi-
tives becomes insecure which keeps enough time for signature renewal. Furthermore,
signature renewals have to be performed less often, only depending on the contin-
uous development of computational power and not on the anticipation of potential
breakthroughs in cryptography.
7.3 Evaluation
In this section we evaluate our solution. First, a formal PKI model is presented
that allows to model revocation and formally define non-repudiation. Within this
model, we prove the correctness of the Sign & Report approach and that it indeed
guarantees non-repudiation. The practicality to replace contemporary signature
schemes by XMSS has already been shown. Please refer to Section 6.3.2 for this
issue. The over all efficiency of our solution is evaluated based on a comparison
to the application of time-stamps, which is the current standard to provide non-
repudiation and long term verifiability [85, 86]. Data loads, runtimes and security
requirements in the different setups are evaluated and it is shown that the FSS based
solution has clear advantages.
7.3.1 The Sign & Report approach provides non-repudiation
In the following it is shown, that Sign & Report provides non-repudiation. To show
this, a new extension to the formal security model introduced by Maurer in [54] is
presented. In the analysis, CAs are assumed to be trustworthy and non compro-
mised. It is focused on non-repudiation, which is an issue concerning malicious end
entities. Following this assumption, the model only considers relations starting from
Sub CAs that sign end entity certificates. How to handle attacks against CAs such
that these do not invalidate legitimate signatures was presented in Chapter 6 and
integrated into the solution as presented in Section 7.1.
Formal PKI Model
The model by Maurer [54] was extended by Marchesini et al. [51] and Bicakci et al.
[10]. The model presented here is built upon [51] as they introduce a smooth notion
of how to handle time. We generalize their model in the sense that we do not depend
on real time, but allow any indexing that admits a chronological ordering. This still
includes the usage of real time information for indexing. While all former models are
static, meaning they model one snapshot of a PKI, we introduce transitions between
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snapshots of the PKI, making the model dynamic. Then, explicit definitions of
revocation handling and end entity signatures are added. This allows to discuss
non-repudiation using our model. Those parts of former models used to model a
web of trust are dropped.
A PKI is modeled as View of a potential user at a specific time t. A user’s View
is a set of statements. We define six different statements. Trust expresses the trust
in a (Sub) CA, obtained according to the higher hierarchy or by explicitly trusting
this CA. Cert says that the user has seen an end entity certificate of the respective
person. If a user has seen a certificate once, it remains in his view. The same holds
for Signature and Revoc, which model that a user has seen a document signature
or revocation information, respectively. Furthermore, there are two different Valid
statements, which model that a user is convinced of the validity of an end entity’s
certificate Cα,β,γ,ε or document signature Sζ,η,δ. These two Valid statements can
be inferred from other statements, using inference rules defined later. As we allow
transitions between views, every View is indexed with a time t ∈ N. Note that
indices used inside statements might be independent from the indices of the views.
We write Viewt for the View at time t and View if no specific t is needed.
Definition 7.3 (Statements). Let CA denote a (Sub) CA, E an end entity’s identity,
D a document and I a (time) interval. A Viewt = {stmt1, . . . , stmtn} at point in
time t consists of n ∈ N statements stmti. There exist the following six statements:
Trust(CA, I) denotes the belief that, during the interval I, CA is trustworthy for
issuing certificates, i.e. models the axiomatic trust in (Sub) CAs.
Cert(CA, E , i, I) denotes the fact that CA has issued a certificate for E at index i,
which, during I, binds E’s public key to the certificate.
Signature(E , D, i) denotes the fact that E has signed a document D at index i.
Revoc(CA, Cα,β,γ,ε, i) denotes the fact that CA has revoked the certificate Cα,β,γ,ε, rep-
resented by statement Cert(α, β, γ, ε), at index i.
Valid(Cα,β,γ,ε, i) denotes the belief that certificate Cα,β,γ,ε is valid at evaluation index
i.
Valid(Sζ,η,δ) denotes the belief that signature Sζ,η,δ, represented by statement Signature(ζ,
η, δ), is valid.
A statement is valid if and only if it is in the View or can be derived from it
using one of the inference rules defined below.
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Signature Validation Definition 7.4 gives the inference rules used to validate sig-
natures, i.e. derive valid for a Signature. The rules depend on the validity model
used for certification path validation, and are according to the chain model given in
Definition 7.2.
Definition 7.4 (Inference Rules). Statements can be derived from an existing Viewt
according to the following rules:
Certificate Validity ∀ CA, E , ir ≤ iv, ic ∈ I1, iv ∈ I2 : Trust(CA, I1),Cert(CA, E , ic,
I2), (¬Revoc(CA, CCA,E,ic,I2 , ir)) ` Valid(CCA,E,ic,I2 , iv)
Signature Validity ∀ CA, E , D, is ∈ I2 :
Valid(CCA,E,ic,I2 , is), Signature(E , D, is) ` Valid(SE,D,is)
Dynamization of the model So far the model is static. To allow the definition of
non-repudiation transitions between views are introduced. The transitions model
that new information enters a user’s View in form of certificates, signatures or revo-
cation information. Besides that, a user might trust a new (Sub) CA.
Definition 7.5 (Time & Transitions). Let Viewt be the View at time t and Viewt
trans−−−→
Viewt+1 denote the transition from Viewt to Viewt+1. Let CA denote a (Sub) CA, E
an end entity’s identity, D a document and I an interval. We allow the following
four transitions between views:
• Viewt Sign(E,D,i)−−−−−−→ Viewt+1 adds Signature(E , D, i) to View.
• Viewt issue(CA,E,i,I)−−−−−−−−→ Viewt+1 adds Cert(CA, E , i, I) to View.
• Viewt trust(CA,I)−−−−−−→ Viewt+1 adds Trust(CA, I) to View.
• Viewt revoke(CA,Cα,β,γ,ε,i)−−−−−−−−−−−→ Viewt+1 adds Revoc(CA, Cα,β,γ,ε, i) to View.
Derived statements are temporary. After a transition between two views, the
inference rules are used again, to obtain the full set of statements. With View we
denote the set of all statements that can be inferred from View. So, if stmt ∈ Viewt
it does not have to be the case that stmt ∈ Viewt′ for t 6= t′. For example, if a
certificate gets revoked, Valid might be inferable beforehand but not after Revoc has
been added to the View.
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Non-repudiation and back dated revocation
Now, the classic non-repudiation definition [94] is given in the presented model. This
allows a more precise analysis of repudiation adversaries.
Definition 7.6 (Non-repudiation). A PKI offers non-repudiation if the following
implication is always true, even in presence of a malicious end entity that might
sign arbitrary messages, request new certificates and ask any CA to revoke any of
his certificates at anytime.
∀ i, t ≤ t′ : Valid(SE,D,i) ∈ Viewt ⇒ Valid(SE,D,i) ∈ Viewt′ .
We briefly discuss the implications of this definition. The left part of the impli-
cation – Valid(SE,D,i) ∈ Viewt – implies that
{Signature(E , D, i),Trust(CA, I1),Cert(CA, E , ic, I2)} ⊆ Viewt
with ic ∈ I1, i ∈ I2 according to the previously given inference rules and definitions.
Furthermore, Revoc(CA, CCA,E,ic,I2 , ir) 6∈ Viewt for all I2 3 ir ≤ i. In other words,
three things must be in Viewt: (i) trust in the certification authority CA that issued
the end entity certificate for the document signing entity E , (ii) the certificate of
E that has been issued while CA has been trusted, (iii) a signature on the verified
document D that has been issued by the end entity E while his certificate has been
valid, i.e. was not revoked or expired. The right part of the implication only differs
in the time of inference of the Valid statement. Thus, everything above must hold
for all future points in time t′.
Accordingly, the goal of the repudiation attacker is to produce a valid document
signature Signature(E , D, i) such that there exists a point in time t′ where the sig-
nature is verified as invalid, after it has been verified as valid. Therefore, we define
back dated revocation and show, that its prevention implies non-repudiation and
vice versa in the chain model.
Definition 7.7 (Back dated revocation). Let Viewt be the View at time t and Viewt+1
denote the view after a transition. According to the revocation transition, back dated
revocation is defined as:
Viewt
revoke(CA,CCA,E,ic,I ,ir)−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Viewt+1, if ∃ Viewt∗ 3 Valid(SE,D,is), with t∗ ≤ t ∧ is ≥ ir.
Theorem 7.8 (Non-repudiation ⇔ no back dated revocation). A PKI offers non-
repudiation according to Definition 7.6 if and only if it does not allow back dated
revocation according to Definition 7.7.
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Proof. ⇐: If there was a successful repudiation attack, then there must exist two
views Viewt ⊇ {Valid(SE,D,is),Trust(CA, I1),Cert(CA, E , ic, I2)} and Viewt′ ⊇ {Trust(CA,
I1),Cert(CA, E , ic, I2),Revoc(CA, CCA,E,ic,I2 , ir)}, with t ≤ t′, ir ≤ is. As Valid(SE,D,is)
is contained in Viewt, it can not contain Revoc(CA, CCA,E,ic,I2 , ir). Hence, Revoc(CA,
CCA,E,ic,I2 , ir) must have been added later, which exactly corresponds to Definition
7.7.
⇒: If the PKI allows back dated revocation, the attacker is allowed to ask CA to add
Revoc(CA, CCA,E,ic,I2 , ir) with ir ≤ is to the Viewt
′
.
The Sign & Report PKI provides non-repudiation
Now the Sign & Report PKI is defined. Then, it is shown that it provides non-
repudiation.
Definition 7.9 (Sign & Report PKI). A Sign & Report PKI implements the model
defined in Section 7.3.1 replacing the abstract indices and intervals as described
above. Let R denote a trusted third party in the PKI, e.g. a CA, which is responsible
(and exclusively able) to issue the revocation of an end entity E’s certificate CCA,E,ic,I,
when requested by E. Whenever E generates a signature, the used key index i∗
is reported to R that stores i∗. On input of revocation request by E, R publishes
Revoc(CA, CCA,E,ic,I , i
∗ + 1).
We next show that a Sign & Report PKI provides non-repudiation, assumed that
the index reporting is secure.
Theorem 7.10 (Sign & Report PKIs provide non-repudiation). A Sign & Report
PKI as defined above provides non-repudiation according to Definition 7.6.
Proof. If the index reporting is implemented in a secure way, i.e. it is not possible
for an end entity to manipulate the reporting, back dated revocation is efficiently
prevented. This is the case, because the index used for revocation is greater than
any index used by this end entity before. The non-repudiation property follows from
Theorem 7.8.
7.3.2 Comparison to time-stamping
In this section we compare our solution to the common approach of time-stamping.
In Section 6.3.3, it was already shown, that time-stamps are inadequate to implement
a CA revocation tolerant PKI.
Therefore, the evaluation is focused on a time-stamping approach that only pro-
vides non-repudiation and long term verifiability, but no CA revocation tolerant PKI
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capabilities. Thus, the time-stamping approach is therefore inferior to the solution
presented in this chapter. During the evaluation, we assume that TSAs also use
conventional signature schemes. Basically, a time-stamp is added to an end entity
signature directly after signature creation. The time-stamp also includes the certifi-
cation path of the end entity certificate. The certification path must be included in
order to prove its existence at the time of signature creation, otherwise a later CA
compromise would necessarily invalidate the signature. As the time-stamp shows
the time of signature creation, back dated revocation of the end entity certificate can
be prevented by including the current time into the revocation, thus achieving non-
repudiation in the face of repudiation attackers. Note, that in general the approach
enables the validation according to the extended shell model (cf. Section 2.2.4).
The main drawback of the time-stamping approach is, that the TSA must be
independent from all CAs involved into the certification path in order not to be
affected in case of a CA compromise. Thus, the setup and maintenance of an
additional and independent TSA infrastructure and the trustworthiness of the TSAs
to apply the correct date and time is required. This independent infrastructure is
not required in the solution based on FSS, as the forward security guarantees for the
validity in case of CA compromises. In Section 7.1.4, it has been shown that even
the index reporting can conveniently be integrated into the OCSP infrastructure.
Considering the validation of signatures, the independence requirement implies
that for the verification of time-stamp signatures at least one additional certification
path has to be processed. This doubles the runtime for signature validation. The
FSS based solution does not introduce additional overhead for signature validation
as shown in Section 6.3.2. The verification of the validity token is included in
revocation checking as shown in Section 7.1.4, which is necessary anyway.
During signature generation, an additional online request to the TSA to generate
the time-stamp is required. Such an online request can be completely omitted in the
FSS based solution, if the verifier reports the signature during revocation checking.
If the index reporting is realized by the signer, the online request during signature
validation can be saved because of the provision of the validity token. Besides that,
in the TSA solution signer and verifier need to agree on a TSA which is trusted by
the verifier, while the FSS based solution is covered by the anyway trusted CAs.
Considering the data that has to be stored for future signature validations it
is comparable in both cases. The TSA approach requires the storage of the two
signatures (the document signature and the time-stamp) as well as two certification
paths and related revocation information. The FSS based solution comes with only
one signature and one certification path however increased signature and certificate
sizes (cf. Section 6.3.2). But, compared to the validity token the storage of the
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time-stamp is critical. If it is lost, the proof of existence of the signature is lost and
can only be renewed for a later point in time. For a validity token, this is not the
case as it can be obtained anew by requesting the revocation information (at least
as long the end entity certificate has not expired).
This also shows a further issue with the TSA approach. Time-stamps relying
on digital signatures themselves face the same problems concerning compromise as
common digital signatures do. Upon the compromise of a TSA or any superordinate
CA, all issued time-stamps become invalid and the proof of existence is lost. Thus,
requiring the renewal of time-stamps which can only be made at a later point in
time if no additional measures had been taken to guarantee the legitimacy of the
time-stamps themselves.
For the long term preservation of signatures beyond the time when the involved
signature algorithms might become insecure both solutions require archival systems.
We refer the reader to [66] for an overview on common solutions. Basically, common
solutions also apply time-stamps with up to date signature schemes. Such archival
solutions are not covered in this thesis, we only remind the reader that the applica-
tion of XMSS can protect from the sudden and unexpected break down of signature
security as presented in Section 7.2.2. This is especially relevant for defining the
frequency of repeated time-stamping.
7.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, it was presented how to achieve the non-repudiation property and
long term verifiability for end entity signatures. This was realized by extending
the mechanisms presented in Chapter 6 for the implementation of a CA revocation
tolerant PKI to the end entity case. FSS were employed for end entity signatures.
Together with tracking key states of end entity keys, non-repudiation can be guar-
anteed without any need for an additional trusted third party. This makes the
presented solution clearly superior to the time-stamping based solution. Other than
this, our solution comes with virtually no overhead as even the tracking of key states
can be integrated into the revocation checking. Furthermore, it allows for a conve-
nient integration of an additional reconfirmation step to detect compromises of end
entity keys and to improve the overall security. In the evaluation, the existing formal
models for a PKI have been extended such that it became possible to describe the
non-repudiation property. The model was then used to prove the correctness of the
presented solution.
Long term verifiability is achieved as FSS support signature validation according
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to the chain model in a natural way. Besides that, the use of XMSS allows to prevent
the sudden break down of signature security by basing the security on different
underlying mathematical problems. This helps to minimize efforts in scenarios were
signatures have to be archived for indefinite time periods and provides protection
against sudden advances in cryptanalysis.
8 Conclusion
In this thesis we introduced CA-TMS to realize user-centric CA trust management
for the Web PKI. Further we have shown how to combine FSS with today’s PKIs
in order to first build a CA revocation tolerant PKI, and second to establish non-
repudiation as an inherent guarantee provided by PKIs.
For our proposed solutions the efficiency and practicality has been evaluated. The
results have shown that the solutions are ready to use. As non of the proposals re-
quires fundamental changes in the PKI processes, they can be implemented parallel
to normal operation. Furthermore, none of the solutions requires broad deployment
to be effective. CA-TMS, for which we provided an open source implementation, be-
ing installed on a single computer already protects that relying entity from malicious
CAs. The use of FSS within PKIs solely requires that client systems do support the
FSS. For deployment in the Web PKI standardization of the FSS is a preliminary.
However, the expected benefits justify this effort.
CA-TMS reduces the attack surface by more than 95% for an average relying
entity, thus providing protection from attacks based on fraudulent certificates. Other
than existing solutions, CA-TMS on the one hand is dynamic and adapts to the
changing requirements of a relying entity using certificate reconfirmation if it lacks
sufficient local information for decision making. On the other hand, reconfirmations
are only required for a small fraction of a relying entity’s TLS connections, namely
for approximately 0.27% to 0.69%. This solves scalability issues and limits the
overhead as well as possible delays due to reconfirmations. We have also shown, that
the user-centric data collection enables continuous revocation monitoring where for
all certificates relevant to a relying entity the revocation status is at least checked
once a day. It turned out that the expected load on OCSP servers is in the same
range compared to online revocation checking as used today. The introduced service
providers are an optional extension to CA-TMS. While providing valuable additions,
these service providers are no preliminary for CA-TMS to work. By the realization
of a reputation system, bootstrapping can be speed up by more than 50%. The
individuality of trust views is preserved such that the use of the reputation system
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only leads to a minimal increase of the attack surface by around 1%. Additionally,
we have presented a push service for CA warnings to deal with behavioral changes.
The related detection mechanism exploits the individuality of trust views and it
has been shown to be highly efficient. Even if 90% of the members of the group
of attacked entities trust the CA issuing the fraudulent certificates, on average this
still leads to a detection after 9 attacked entities. We remind the reader, that in our
test group of 64 relying entities, not a single CA achieved to be trusted by 90% of
the entities.
Further we have shown how to build a CA revocation tolerant PKI by the applica-
tion of FSS. The CA revocation tolerant PKI preserves the validity of legitimately
issued certificates in the face of CA certificate revocations. Thus, CA certificate
revocations need not be delayed but CA certificates can even be revoked on suspi-
cion of a compromise. A secure state of the PKI can be reestablished immediately
once a threat through a misbehaving CA or a CA failure has been detected. It
was shown, how to transition the Web PKI into a CA revocation tolerant PKI. The
performance analysis backs the claim that the proposed solution is practical and can
be implemented without limitations.
The mechanisms of the CA revocation tolerant PKI have been adopted for sce-
narios where non-repudiation is required. Non-repudiation was established as an
inherent guarantee provided by the PKI. This guarantee is preserved as long as the
used signature scheme is considered secure. This makes time-stamps obsolete, thus
saving the related overhead during signature generation and verification. The need
for time-stamps can be postponed until the natural aging of the signature scheme
makes a signature renewal necessary. In order to protect from unforeseeable develop-
ments and the sudden break down of signature security we have presented solutions
based on hash-combiners, given XMSS is used as signature scheme. This ensures,
that there is always enough time for signature renewal in scenarios were long term
verifiability is required beyond the lifetime of the signature scheme itself.
Future work Still, there are several challenges and interesting research topics re-
lated to this thesis. One refers to the use of validation services for certificate recon-
firmations, which is currently solved by the use of certificate notaries. While working
good and in combination with CA-TMS the load on these services can be limited
to face scalability problems, there is one major drawback. Such services must be
operated by some third party which will always limit the number of such services.
However, once such systems are not niche solutions anymore, they themselves might
get the target of attacks. A more robust solution would be to integrate validation
services as an integral component of the web infrastructure. A first attempt into
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this direction has already been taken in [B1], where ubiquitous support of multi
path probing was proposed. Having millions of potential servers providing means to
reconfirm a certificate would significantly harden the system against attacks.
Also, compromise detection still is an issue and will be subject to future research.
While the proposed service providers have been shown to enable this, the information
must be fed back into the PKI in order to trigger revocations. Such processes
should be automatized. Furthermore, we think that means for certificate owners
to check their certificates from the outside are very important additions to a PKI.
Again, multi path probing, and public logs like Certificate Transparency can be
good starting points for future research.
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Appendix
Details on data sets extracted from browsing histories
Trust
View
Number
of hosts
Number of hosts assigned to CAs with trustworthiness
w/o RS with RS
full med min full med min
1 2 0 0 0 0 0 1
2 4 0 0 0 0 1 2
3 5 0 0 1 0 2 2
4 5 0 0 0 0 1 3
5 10 0 3 1 3 1 4
6 15 0 6 4 3 7 5
7 21 0 11 3 12 4 4
8 22 7 5 2 14 5 3
9 26 0 19 3 19 3 2
10 44 4 25 5 26 14 4
11 46 7 23 7 37 5 2
12 47 7 18 8 26 11 8
13 48 0 22 13 24 14 10
14 48 11 24 7 33 13 2
15 51 9 26 6 35 6 8
16 55 9 21 13 30 17 8
17 63 19 19 13 43 13 5
18 68 18 25 16 48 16 4
19 83 55 10 3 66 9 7
20 84 42 23 8 65 11 7
21 90 43 18 15 58 15 17
22 94 38 30 12 66 21 7
23 95 50 22 14 76 8 11
24 101 44 30 15 78 14 9
25 102 45 30 17 72 22 6
26 105 44 38 19 84 15 5
27 107 31 45 18 78 20 9
28 110 62 21 14 85 11 14
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29 134 53 48 20 101 22 9
30 144 99 22 13 118 19 7
31 151 86 37 16 113 30 8
32 152 88 40 13 131 12 7
33 157 78 47 15 110 34 13
34 166 96 39 21 131 18 15
35 176 125 25 13 146 15 14
36 178 93 62 13 119 46 11
37 180 72 75 21 129 37 6
38 181 93 68 13 156 18 7
39 202 123 48 14 158 26 8
40 203 137 46 7 173 15 11
41 218 134 57 20 176 25 13
42 240 160 49 18 191 34 10
43 255 168 58 15 208 30 13
44 278 213 37 15 238 26 7
45 281 188 71 19 249 24 8
46 330 245 54 19 275 39 8
47 340 236 77 15 291 33 10
48 341 233 78 21 262 60 13
49 341 233 71 19 273 53 9
50 347 278 38 19 299 33 10
51 351 256 64 23 283 49 13
52 371 267 80 15 329 32 8
53 388 275 81 19 328 37 12
54 400 289 84 20 326 64 7
55 419 337 51 19 355 46 11
56 463 392 50 15 424 30 5
57 466 384 60 14 425 32 5
58 475 395 55 13 438 29 7
59 506 425 61 15 455 41 8
60 532 447 54 22 483 37 8
61 540 453 59 21 491 37 8
62 604 517 65 13 543 47 10
63 639 535 76 17 575 49 5
64 1013 903 77 20 912 82 8
Table 1: Numbers of hosts and their distribution to CAs with different security
levels for different trust views.
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Trust
View
Number
of CAs
Number of
host signing
CAs
Number of CAs with trustworthiness
w/o RS with RS
full med min full med min
1 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 1
2 7 3 0 0 0 0 1 1
3 11 5 0 0 1 0 2 2
4 10 4 0 0 0 0 1 2
5 16 7 0 1 1 1 1 3
6 17 10 0 2 3 1 4 5
7 25 13 0 3 3 4 4 4
8 23 11 1 1 2 4 4 3
9 17 10 0 4 2 4 2 2
10 38 19 1 5 4 8 7 4
11 37 20 1 6 6 13 4 2
12 41 24 1 5 5 7 9 6
13 44 25 0 5 9 8 8 9
14 31 18 1 6 5 8 8 2
15 39 22 2 6 4 8 4 8
16 40 26 2 5 9 8 11 7
17 49 27 2 6 9 12 9 4
18 48 29 3 7 12 14 11 4
19 46 27 8 3 3 12 7 7
20 49 26 5 5 6 10 9 6
21 52 33 6 5 10 12 7 14
22 57 32 5 8 9 15 12 5
23 54 32 6 7 10 16 5 11
24 63 37 5 9 12 17 12 8
25 59 34 6 7 12 15 12 5
26 49 30 3 10 13 15 9 5
27 55 34 4 10 11 15 12 7
28 48 30 6 5 9 12 7 11
29 75 48 6 16 15 23 16 7
30 58 38 11 8 11 17 14 7
31 66 42 8 11 13 16 18 8
32 71 44 11 13 11 26 11 6
33 72 48 8 17 10 19 18 11
34 69 44 9 13 14 19 12 11
35 64 39 12 6 10 17 10 11
36 80 59 10 30 12 18 31 9
37 91 61 7 27 17 22 27 5
38 65 44 8 18 12 24 13 7
39 79 50 11 15 11 20 16 7
40 69 43 14 11 7 23 7 10
41 72 52 12 20 15 21 18 11
42 88 59 14 19 15 23 22 9
43 80 52 13 16 13 21 18 9
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44 93 60 22 16 11 29 19 6
45 86 57 19 21 14 36 16 5
46 94 66 22 18 16 30 21 7
47 89 59 15 21 13 27 19 7
48 97 73 17 32 15 24 33 10
49 114 79 20 29 16 31 35 7
50 83 56 21 10 15 25 18 8
51 112 80 22 33 18 31 34 10
52 90 62 18 25 12 32 22 6
53 108 73 21 28 13 32 23 9
54 113 83 23 40 14 33 42 5
55 105 71 26 22 14 32 25 8
56 79 54 25 18 8 34 15 3
57 95 65 26 19 12 36 20 5
58 104 68 28 20 11 39 22 6
59 103 70 29 25 11 36 26 6
60 111 74 30 19 17 40 24 7
61 109 74 31 21 15 41 22 7
62 103 76 29 29 11 35 30 7
63 132 91 33 32 15 46 31 4
64 138 98 45 33 13 47 41 4
Table 2: Numbers of CAs and host signing CAs and their respective trustworthiness.
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